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FOREWORD

THE

DARTMOUTH ALUMNI LECTURESHIPS

have been established upon the theory that
the influence of the intellectual life of the College ought to be available, in some degree at
least, to others than those who are in residence
as students,-as for example, to graduates who
are solicitous for some contact with the College
which will help to maintain the breadth of their
scholarship; or to friends who are interested in
the kinds of intellectual interest for which the
College wishes to stand.
The suggestion of the particular form which
the project of these lectureships has taken was
made in my inaugural address in 1916 when
statement was made as follows:
"I am very sure that the contribution of the
College to its graduates ought to be continued
in some more tangible way than exists at present.
The tendency of college men to seek careers outside the professions, the tendencies of the professions themselves to become so highly specialized
as to necessitate the complete engrossment of
thought of the men who follow them, and the
ever increasing demand of the age on all, requiring constantly greater intensity of effort and
Vll
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more exclusive utilization of time in men who
wish to do their respective shares of the world's
work, impose a duty upon the college which
formerly belonged to it in no such degree, if at
all. Contacts with what we broadly classify as
the arts and sciences are less and less possible
for men of affairs. In many a graduate the interest in or enthusiasm for these which the college
arouses is, therefore, altogether likely to languish, or even die, for lack of sustenance. If the
College, then, has conviction that its influence
is worth seeking at the expense of four vital
years in the formative period of life, is it not
logically compelled to search for some method
of giving access to this influence to its graduates
in their subsequent years! The growing practice of retiring men from active work at ages
from sixty-five to seventy, and the not infrequent
tragedy of the man who has no resources for
interesting himself outside the routine of which
he has been relieved, make it seem that the College has no less an opportunity to be of service
to its men in their old age than in their youth,
if only it can establish the procedure by which
it can periodically throughout their lives give
them opportunity to replenish their intellectual
reserves. It is possible that something in the way
of courses of lectures by certain recognized
leaders of the world's thought, made available
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for alumni and friends of the College during a
brief period immediately following the Commencement season, would be a step in this direction. Or it may be that some other device would
more completely realize the possibilities. It at
least seems clear that the formal educational contacts between the College and its graduates
should not stop at the end of four years, never in
any form to be renewed."
The carrying out of the plan, with such purpose in view, was made possible by the hearty
endorsement of Mr. Henry Lynn Moore of the
class of 1877-and a Trustee of Dartmouth College-and by his promise of generous financial
assistance to establish in this form a memorial,
to keep alive the memory of his beloved son,
Guernsey Center Moore, of the class of 1904,
who died early in his college course.
The completion of the plans for the lectureships was originally set for an earlier time, but
the World War interrupted. It was, therefore,
not until the summer of 1921 that the experiment
was finally undertaken with Professor Roscoe
Pound, the brilliant and scholarly Dean of Harvard Law School, and Mr. Ralph Adams Cram,
noted architect and original thinker, as lecturers
upon this Foundation.
It has, of course, been recognized from the
beginning that the extension of the influence of
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these lectures would be largely increased by publication, which should make the mental stimulation in them available to wider groups than,
under any circumstances, could be expected to
be in attendance as auditors during any course.
It is, therefore, with much satisfaction that there
is presented herewith the lectures of Dean
Pound for the consideration, on the one hand, of
the considerable group who heard him and have
since been desirous of the lectures in printed
form as well as, on the other hand, that far
greater constituency to whom attendance was not
possible to hear the spoken word, but whose
interest in the speaker and the subject has been
keen. To all of these this book on, "The Spirit
of the Common Law" from the hands of Dean
Pound will be of major interest.
ERNEST MARTIN HOPKINS

PREFACE
a course at the Lowell Institute
I Nupon 4thisI gave
same subject, summaries of which,
19 1

based upon reports of the lectures in the Boston
Transcript, were published in the Green Bag (vol.
26, p. 166). Also the first lecture of that course
was published in the International Journal of Ethics
(vol. 25, p. I). In 1910 I delivered an address
before the Kansas State Bar Association upon the
subject of the second lecture, which was published
in the proceedings of that Association (Proc., 1910,
p. 45) and reprinted in the American Law Review
(vol. 45, p. 8 II) . An address on the subject of the
third lecture was delivered before the Iowa State
Bar Association in 1914 and is published in its proceedings (vol. 20, p. 96). It was also delivered
before the Worcester County (Mass.) Bar Association which printed it for private circulation. An
address on the subject of the fifth lecture was delivered before the Bar Association of North Carolina in 1920 and published in the proceedings of that
year. This address was reprinted in the West Virginia Law Quarterly (vol. 27, p. I). All these materials have been used freely, but all have been revised and much has been wholly rewritten.
As these lectures speak in large part from the
second decade of the present century, they show the
faith in the efficacy of effort and belief that the adxi
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ministration of justice may be improved by conscious
intelligent action which characterized that time. The
recrudescence of juristic pessimism in the past three
years has not led me to abandon that point of view.
At the end of the nineteenth century lawyers thought
attempt at conscious improvement was futile. Now
many of them think it is dangerous. In the same
way the complacent nothing-needs-to-be-done attitude of Blackstone, who in the spirit of the end of
a period of growth thought the law little short of a
state of perfection, was followed by the timorous
juristic pessimism of Lord Eldon who feared that
law reform would subvert the constitution. Not a
little in the legislative reform movement which followed might have proceeded on more conservative
lines if he had been willing to further needed changes
instead of obstructing all change. The real danger
to administration of justice according to law is in
timid resistance to rational improvement and obstinate persistence in legal paths which have become
impossible in the heterogeneous, urban, industrial
America of today. Such things have been driving us
fast to an administrative justice through boards and
commissions, with loosely defined powers, unlimited
discretion and inadequate judicial restraints, which
is at variance with the genius of our legal and political institutions.
Nor were the efforts of the decades of faith in
progress as futile as it is fashionable for the moment
to think them. Sometimes, as in projects for recall,
they displayed more zeal than intelligent understand·
ing of the task. But who would do away with the
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Municipal Court of Chicago and the modern city
courts which have arisen in its image? Who would
wipe out the simplifications of practice which were
brought about after 1900 at the instance of bar
associations ? Who would return to the condition
of industrial accident litigation at the end of the
nineteenth century, or revive the state of things in
which every act of administration encountered an
injunction, or restore the attitude of the bench from
1890 to 1910 when, in many state courts, any statute
which went upon unfamiliar premises or departed
from historical lines was prima facie unconstitutional?
When eighteenth-century common-law pleading
had become impossible in nineteenth-century America, one of the great lawyers of the time was
called upon to serve upon the commission which
framed the first code of civil procedure. Had he
been willing to put his skill and knowledge to the
work of rational improvement, legal procedure in
the majority of our states might be far different from
what it is, and the conflict between legislative endeavor to reform and judicial refusal to walk in new
paths, which has marked the history of "code pleading," might have been averted. Moreover, had the
judges of the first half of the century possessed sufficient vision to exercise their common-law powers
and had they done even some part of what Chief
Justice Doe did in New Hampshire, it is not unlikely
that the movement for an elective bench which swept
over the country about 1850, putting the courts into
politics and seriously impairing the judicial indepen-
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dence which is vital in our law, might have proceeded
more slowly, have extended to relatively few frontier
communities and have spared the higher tribunals.
When the lawyer refuses to act intelligently, unintelligent application of the legislative stearn-roller by
the layman is the alternative.
ROSCOE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
August 5, 1921
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THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW

THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW
I

THE FEUDAL ELEMENT
pERHAPS no institution of the modern world
shows such vitality and tenacity as our AngloAmerican legal tradition which we call the common
law. Although it is essentially a mode of judicial
and juristic thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules, it
succeeds everywhere in molding rules, whatever their
origin, into accord with its principles and in maintaining those principles in the face of formidable
attempts to overthrow or to supersede them. In
the United States it survives the huge mass of legislation that is placed annually upon our statute books
and gives to it form and consistency. Nor is it less
effective in competition with law of foreign origin.
Louisiana alone of the states carved from the Louisiana purchase preserves the French law. In Texas
only a few anomalies in procedure serve to remind
us that another system once prevailed in that domain. In California only the institution of community property remains to tell us that the Spanish
law once obtained in that jurisdiction. Only historians know that the custom of Paris once governed
in Michigan and Wisconsin. And in Louisiana not
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only is the criminal law wholly English, but the
fundamental common-law institutions, supremacy of
law, case law and hearing of causes as a whole in
open court, have imposed themselves on a French
code and have made great portions of the law AngloAmerican in all but name. There are many signs
that the common law is imposing itself gradually in
like manner upon the French law in Quebec. In
everything but terminology it has all but overcome
a received Roman law in Scotland. The established
Roman-Dutch law in South Africa is slowly giving
way before it as the judges more and more reason in
a Romanized terminology after the manner of common-law lawyers. In the Philippines and in Porto
Rico there are many signs that common-law administration of a Roman code will result in a system
Anglo-American in substance if Roman-Spanish in
its terms.
Whether it is the innate excellence of our legal
system or the innate cocksureness of the people that
live under it, so that even as Mr. Podsnap talked to
the Frenchman as if he were a deaf child, we assume
that our common-law notions are part of the legal
order of nature and are unable to understand that
any reasonable being can harbor legal conceptions
that run counter to them, the Anglo-Saxon refuses
to be ruled by any other law. Even more, he succeeds in ruling others thereby. For the strength of
the common law is in its treatment of concrete controversies, as the strength of its rival, the modern
Roman law, is in its logical development of abstract
conceptions. Hence wherever the administration of
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justice is mediately or immediately in the hands of
common-law judges their habit of applying to the
cause in hand the judicial experience of the past
rather than attempting to fit the cause into its exact
logical pigeonhole in an abstract system gradually
undermines the competing body of law and makes
for a slow but persistent invasion of the common
law.
At but one point has our Anglo-American legal
tradition met with defeat in its competition with the
rival tradition. The contest of French law, English
law and German law, in the framing of the new codes
for Japan, was won decisively by the German law.
And yet this was not a contest of English with German law. It was a competition between systems of
legal rules, not between modes of judicial administration of justice. In a comparison of abstract systems the common law is at its worst. In a test of the
actual handling of single controversies it has always
prevailed. Nor is this all. The American development of the common-law doctrine of supremacy of
law, in our characteristic institution of judicial power
over unconstitutional legislation, is commending itself to peoples who have to administer written federal constitutions. In the reports of South American
republics we find judicial discussions of constitutional
problems fortified with citation of American authorities. In the South African reports we find a court
composed of Dutch judges, trained in the RomanDutch law, holding a legislative act invalid and citing
Marbury v. Madison-the foundation of American
constitutional law-along with the modern civilians.

4-
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The Australian bench and bar, notwithstanding a decision of the judicial committee of the Privy Council
in England, are insisting upon the authority of Australian courts to pass upon the constitutionality of
state statutes; and the Privy Council has found itself
obliged to pronounce invalid a confiscatory statute
enacted by a Canadian province. Even Continental
publicists may be found asserting it a fundamental
defect of their public law that constitutional prin.
ciples are not protected by an independent court of
justice. Moreover, if in the eighteenth century,
while the absorption of the law merchant was
in progress, Anglo-American law received not a
little of the civil law indirectly, through the Conti.
nental treatises on commercial law which exercised
so wide an influence at that time, in the nineteenth
century we were well avenged. In the more recent
development of the subject the commercial law
evolved in the English courts has played a leading
part, and Continental jurists do not hesitate to admit
that in this way a considerable measure of English
law has been received into European legal systems.
When we add that the most significant movement
today in the countries that received the Roman law is
a change of front from the Byzantine idea of a closed
system of rules, authoritatively laid down, which
judges may only apply in a mechanical fashion, in
the direction of the common-law idea of judicial lawmaking through the decision of causes, it must be conceded that our Anglo-American system, no less than
its older rival, is a law of the world.
Vitality and tenacity are not new qualities in our
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legal tradition. It has been able to receive and to
absorb the most diverse bodies of doctrine and the
most divergent bodies of rules, developed outside of
itself, without disturbing its essential unity. Equity,
the law as to misdemeanors made in the Star Chamber, the law merchant, admiralty, the law as to probate and divorce made in the ecclesiastical courts,
and the statutes of the nineteenth-century legislative
reform movement in England and the United States,
have been, as it were, digested and assimilated. For
although we are wont to say of some of these that
they made over the common law, it is quite as true
that the common law made them over. In each case
their alien characters have steadily disappeared and
today they show few points of difference from the
institutions and doctrines of pure common-law pedigree by which they are surrounded.
Moreover, the common law has passed triumphantly through more than one crisis in which it seemed
that an alien system might supersede it; it has contended with more than one powerful antagonist and
has come forth victor. In the twelfth century it
strove for jurisdiction with the church, the strongest
force of that time. In the sixteenth century, when
the Roman law was sweeping over Europe and superseding the endemic law on every hand, the common
law stood firm. Neither the three R's, as Maitland
calls them, Renaissance, Reformation, and Reception
of Roman law, nor the partial reversion to justice
without law under the Tudors shook the hold of our
legal tradition. In the seventeenth century it contended with the English crown and established its
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doctrine of the supremacy of law against the Stuart
kings. In America, after the Revolution, it prevailed
over the prejudice against all things English, which
for a time threatened a reception of French law, developed its doctrine of the supremacy of law to its
ultimate logical conclusion in the teeth of the strongest political influence of the time, and maintained its
doctrine of precedent, involving the unpopular practice of citing English decisions, in spite of the hostility to lawyers and to systematic legal administration of justice characteristic of new communities.
It is not too much to say that the common law passed
through these several crises with its distinctive fundamental ideas not merely unshaken but more firmly
settled.
Superficially, then, the triumph of the common law
and its establishment as a law of the world by the
side of the Roman law, seem secure. And yet at
the very moment of triumph it is evident that a new
crisis is at hand. If not actually upon trial in the
United States, the common law is certainly under
indictment. If we look at the three most striking
examples of its present world-wide extension-its
doctrine of the supremacy of law, its commercial law
and its law of torts-its doctrine of supremacy of
law and consequent judicial power over unconstitutional legislation is bitterly attacked in the land of
its origin and is endangering the independence and
authority of the court which is the central point of
the Anglo-American system; its commerdal law is
codifying in England and in America; and in its
law of torts the sentence of death which hangs over
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contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the
doctrine that liability may flow only from fault appears to many of its votaries to involve characteristic
principles of the whole system. It is true the worldwide movement for socialization of law, the shifting
from the abstract individualist justice of the past
century to a newer ideal of justice, as yet none too
clearly perceived, is putting a strain upon all law
everywhere. In the United States, however, there is
more than this. Here, beyond this strain which is
felt wherever law obtains, the rise of executive justice, the tendency to commit everything to board5 and
commissions which proceed extrajudicially and are
expected to be law unto themselves, the breakdown
of our polity of individual initiative in the enforcement of law and substitution of administrative inspection and supervision, and the failure of the popular feeling for justice at all events which the common
law postulates appear to threaten a complete change
in our attitude toward legal problems.
Nor is our law well-prepared in all respects to
meet the present crisis. The conditions of judicial
lawmaking in the United States are by no means
those which are demanded for the best development
of the common law in an era of growth. The institution of an elective judiciary, holding for short
terms, which prevails in so many of our jurisdictions,
does not give us courts adequate to such a task. Indeed, the illiberal decisions of which complaint was
made so widely at the beginning of the twentieth century were largely, one might say almost wholly, the
work of popularly-elected judges. A system of law-
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making through judicial empiricism calls for much
more in a judge than popularity, honest mediocrity
or ignorant zeal for the public welfare may insure.
In the period of growth in the fore part of the last
century there was a strong, independent bench. That
American law grew so rapidly and was fashioned so
well up to the Civil War and stood still so steadfastly
thereafter, was by no means wholly due to causes
of general operation that made for rigidity of law
throughout the world in the nineteenth century. It
is demonstrable that this change was due in large
measure to a change in the character of the bench in
our state courts, closely connected with the change
in the mode of choice and tenure of judges which
swept over the country after 1850. Moreover, the
condition of pressure under which causes are passed
upon in the American urban communities of today,
where crowded calendars preclude the thoroughness
in presentation and deliberation in judicial study
which were possible a century ago, prevent judicial
lawmaking from achieving its best. An example
from the law reports will make clear what this
means. In 4 Wheaton's Reports, reporting the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
during the year 18 19, decisions in thirty-three cases
are reported. In other words, seven judges decided
thirty-three cases in that year. In 248-25 I United
States Reports, we may see the work of that court
a hundred years later. In 19 I 9 the court wrote two
hundred and forty-two opinions and disposed of six
hundred and sixty-one cases. If we look only at the
opinions written, where seven judges wrote thirty-
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three opinions in 1819, nine judges wrote two hundred and forty-two opinions in 1919. In other
words, merely in the way of writing opinions, a judge
of that court does five times what he had to do a century ago. This does not mean merely that the judges
are compelled to work rapidly and with a minimum
of deliberation. In order to hear these cases at all
the time allowed to counsel must be greatly abridged.
Hence where a century ago counsel were heard until
every detail had been gone into thoroughly in oral
argument, today the court is compelled to restrict
argument to an allowance of an hour and a half to
counsel upon each side. In st;tte courts the pressure
has become even greater. Thus at a time when constructive work of the highest order is demanded,
when questions are raising more difficult than any
with which American judges had to deal in our
classical constructive period-the period from the
Revolution to the Civil War-in many of our states
the courts are none too well equipped to do the work
effectively and in all of them the pressure of business
is such that work of the highest type is all but precluded.
Perceiving the condition rather than the causes of
unsatisfactory judicial administration of justice men
have been coming forward with all manner of supposed cures. Perhaps the most popular is to tinker
the judicial organization, carrying still further the
tearing down of the Anglo-American judicial office
and the subjection of the judge to politics. Another
is to supersede the common law by a mass of detailed
legislation which aims to leave nothing to the judge.
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Another goes to the opposite extreme and urges that
we abandon all juristic premises and put judicial lawmaking at large as completely as legislative lawmaking. The lawyer ought not to sit by silently when
such proposals, flying in the face of all that experience has taught us in the course of legal history, are
making head in the community. That they sometimes have gained adherents among the thoughtful
and patriotic in the immediate past makes it timely
for him to examine the body of legal tradition on
which he relies, to ascertain the elements of which it is
made up, to learn its spirit, and to perceive how it has
come to be what it is, to the end that we may know
how far we may make use of it in the stage of legal
development upon which the world has now entered.
No doubt there are those who will think the lawyer must apologize, or at least must show cause, for
all but the last of these inquiries. For it may be
conceded that historical jurisprudence, for the moment, is discredited. The fashion of the time calls
for a sociological legal history; for a study not
merely of how legal doctrines have evolved and developed considered only as jural materials, but of the
social causes and social effects of doctrines and of
the relations of legal history to social and economic
history. I should be the last to deny the great importance of this feature of the program of the sociological jurist. But it is possible to overrate the value
of this type of legal history for juristic purposes.
Just as a past generation, seeing rightly that there
was an intimate connection between law and politics,
assumed that the political interpretation of juris-
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prudence and legal history was the whole story, so
another generation, seeing rightly that there is an
intimate relation between law and economics, may
make the same assumption of all-sufficiency for the
economic interpretation of jurisprudence and legal
history, and that without much more warrant. For
by and large the economic interpretation of legal history has been sustained by examples drawn from legislation which has failed to leave any permanent
mark in the law or by a superficial view of particular
juristic or judicial doctrines out of their true juridical
setting. In truth two powerful forces have counteracted economic pressure and class interest throughout the history of law, and have prevented the law of
peoples that have attained any degree of legal development from being what economic forces or class
conflict might else have made it. These are, first,
the insistence upon development of law logically
from analogies of existing rules and doctrines, both
because it was supposed the jurist or the judge could
not make law but could only find it and because the
demand for certainty and predicability, resting on
the social interest in security, was held to require him
to deduce according to a known technique from
premises already existing, and, second, conscious endeavor to make law express supposed eternal and
unchangeable ideals.
Conscious, constructive lawmaking is a late phenomenon in legal history. In primitive society the
idea of sacred law or of settled custom, all departure
wherefrom is dangerous, in a later stage the authority of fixed ascertainments of the traditional law,
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and later still the conception of an eternal and im~
mutable natural law, of which the law of the time
and place is but declaratory-all these make against
conscious and deliberate creation of law by the free
setting up of new premises or by the promulgation of
rules which cannot be derived or made to appear
derived from existing premises. Even in periods of
growth, in which ideals are sought avowedly and
attempt is made to shape the law thereto, an identification of these ideals with an ideal development of
received legal principles is not unlikely to be the outcome. This tendency to rational working out of
the jural materials in the traditional system and the
demand for certainty lead jurists and judges to resort
to analogy whenever they are confronted with a new
problem. They fortify what would be, no doubt, a
natural tendency so to proceed in any event. Hence
the chiefest factor in determining the course which
legal development will take with respect to any new
situation or new problem is the analogy or analogies
that chance to be at hand when those whose function
it is to lay down the law are called upon to make an
authoritative determination.
Legal history, then, may be made to show us the
analogies, the legal premises, which have developed
as the potential bases of legal growth. It may be
made to show us the ideals which have developed, to
which jurists and judges have sought to make law
conform by logical use of these analogies and logical
drawing out of these premises. It may be made to
show the way in which the working out of these
analogies and the logical development of these
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premises have determined both the content and the
spirit of the tradition which is the most important
part of our law both in bulk and in intrinsic significance. It may be admitted that this is not all we
shall need in order to make effort effective in achieving the purposes of law in a new period of growth.
But it is a large part and an essential part. For the
inquiry will be nothing less than a taking stock of
the materials with which we must work, since, in
the long run, the condition of law depends upon the
condition of the traditional element in the legal system, by which legislative rules are interpreted and
developed and into which, if they succeed in establishing themselves as law, enacted rules are absorbed
and incorporated.
If we look narrowly at our legal tradition we shall
see that it has two characteristics. On the one hand,
it is characterized by an extreme individualism. A
foreign observer has said that its distinguishing
marks are "unlimited valuation of individual liberty
and respect for individual property." It is concerned
not with social righteousness but with individual
rights. It tries questions of the highest social import as mere private controversies between John Doe
and Richard Roe. Its respect for the individual
makes procedure, civil and criminal, ultra-contentious, and preserves in the modern world the archaic
theory of litigation as a fair fight, according to the
canons of the manly art, with a court to see fair play
and prevent interference. Moreover it is so zealous
to secure fair play to the individual that often it
secures very little fair play to the public. It relies on
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individual initiative to enforce the law and vindicate
the right. It is jealous of all interference with individual freedom of action, physical, mental, or economic. In short, the isolated individual is the center
of many of its most significant doctrines. On the
other hand, it is characterized by another element
tending in quite another direction; a tendency to
affix duties and liabilities independently of the will
of those bound, to look to relations rather than to
legal transactions as the basis of legal consequences,
and to impose both liabilities and disabilities upon
those standing in certain relations as members of a
class rather than upon individuals.
What has determined these characteristics of our
legal tradition? How does it come to be so thoroughly, so obstinately individualist in a time that
looks more and more to social control for a solution
of its problems and is bringing about a socialization
of pretty much everything except the common law?
How does it come that at the same time this tradition contains another element of an opposite tendency, an element that leads it to deal with men in
groups or classes or relations and not as individuals?
These questions demand our attention before we assume to pronounce what we may make of our traditional jural materials for the purposes of today
and of tomorrow.
Seven factors of the first importance appear to
have contributed to shape our American common
law. These are: (I) An original substratum of
Germanic legal institutions and jural ideas; (2) the
feudallaw; (3) Puritanism; (4) the contests between
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the courts and the crown in the seventeenth century;
(5) eighteenth-century political ideas; (6) the conditions of pioneer or agricultural communities in
America in the first half of the nineteenth century,
and (7) the philosophical ideas with respect to justice, law and the state that prevailed in the formative
period in which the English common law was made
over for us by American courts. All but one of these
made strongly for individualism, and it is to them
that we must trace the intense individualism that
made the classical common-law tradition so out of
accord with popular feeling in the first decade of
the present century. One of them, however, namely
the feudal law, has given to our legal system a fundamental mode of thought, a mode of dealing with
legal situations and with legal problems which gives
wholly different results, a mode of thought which
has always tempered the individualism of our law,
and now that the change from a pioneer, agricultural,
rural society to a settled, industrial and commercial
and even predominantly urban society calls for a new
order of legal ideas, has been the chief resource of
the courts in the movement which has long been proceeding quietly beneath the surface in judicial detision. Let us remember that the high-water mark
of individualism in American law was reached in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Before
that signs of a reaction were appearing, and the common-law tradition proved to have in itself a principle which could be employed to carry forward that
l'eaction without any general disturbance of the legal
system.

16

THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW

In considering the foregoing factors in order and
in appraising the extent to which and the manner in
which they have influenced or fashioned the common
law, a few words as to the substratum of Germanic
law will suffice.
Speaking broadly, it is true that for all but academic purposes the history of English law begins in
the thirteenth century. Yet it is equally true that no
arbitrary beginning may be assigned to any institution. In law especially, where until modern times
conscious making of much that was new was quite unthinkable, not4ing is made at once, as it were, out
of whole cloth. There were few anywhere who
knew any too much of Roman law when the system
that grew up in the courts of the Norman kings had
its beginnings, and certainly what was known of it
in England was superficial enough. The materials
with which the first common-law judges wrought
were Germanic materials. The ideas from which
and with which they laid the foundations of the
Anglo-American legal system were ideas of Germanic
law. So thoroughly did they lay them, so great was
the advantage to the law of strong, central courts of
justice administering the king's law for the whole
realm as the common law thereof, that our law is
today more Germanic than the law of Germany itself. The Norman conquest brought a Romance
element into our speech. But it brought relatively
little that was Roman into the law. When later the
Roman law swept over Continental Europe, the
traditional law, local, provincial, and conflicting on
the Continent, was general, unified, and harmonious
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in England. In England, therefore, with a vigorous,
central judicial system behind it and an established
course of teaching in the Inns of Court which gave
it the toughness of a taught tradition, the Germanic law persisted. When in the seventeenth century the labors of Coke gave it the form in which we
received it in America, the common law was an English development of Germanic legal ideas. Roman
law undoubtedly contributed many analogies and
many conceptions which were worked into the system.
But they were worked over as well as worked in and
acquired the character of endemic law. Accordingly
because of the attempt at Germanization of the law
of the German empire as a result of the Germanist
movement in the nineteenth century and the substitution of Germanic doctrines for Roman here and
there in the new civil code, our law has in it less of
the Roman than the Romanized law of Germany has
of the Germanic.
That the substratum of our law is Germanic is
something of much more than academic interest. It
means that the basis of American law, the material
out of which American judges in the nineteenth century made the law under which we live, represents
the stage of legal development which may be called
the stage of the strict law. On the other hand,
the basis of the common law of Continental
Europe, the Digest of Justinian, made up of extracts from the writings of the classical Roman
jurists, represents the later stage of legal development which may be called the stage of equity
or natural law. Our law also went through that
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later stage. But in the maturity of our law we
still had a double system in which each stage of legal
development was represented. In Continental Europe, on the contrary, the materials on which legal
development proceeded after the reception of Roman
law, had been all but purged of the characteristic
features of the stage of the strict law before they
were handed down to the modern world. In consequence our judicial tradition, speaking from our
classical period, the period in which Coke and his
contemporaries summed up and restated the law
developed by English courts from the thirteenth to
the fifteenth century, in a sense speaks from the stage
of the strict law. The Continental juristic tradition,
speaking from the Byzantine version of the classical
Roman jurists, who wrote from the first to the third
century, and representing, not the strict, archaic ius
ciuile but the liberal, modern ius gentium and ius
naturale, speaks from the stage of equity or natural
law.
Individualism is a prime characteristic of the stage
of legal development to which I have referred as the
strict law. For example, the strict law insists upon
full and exact performance at all events of a duty
undertaken in legal form. It makes no allowance
for accident and has no mercy for defaulters. When
a debtor in the sixteenth century incurred a heavy
forfeiture through the sudden rising of a river which
he had to pass in order to pay at the time fixed in his
bond, the law asked simply whether he undertook to
pay at that date and whether he paid accordingly.
He took the risk of mischance, and the strict law did
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not undertake to act as his guardian. Again, the
strict law had little use for one who was tricked or
coerced into a legal transaction. It might allow him
to sue for the wrong done. But it declined to set
aside the transaction. If he could not guard his own
interests, he must not ask the courts, which were only
keeping the peace, to do so for him. When it did
regard force and fraud, the law in this stage refused
to regard the actual case and ask, was this man deceived or compelled? Instead it asked, would the
standard, normal man have been defrauded or
coerced by what was done? In other words, it held
that every man of mature age must take care of himself. He need not expect to be saved from himself
by legal paternalism or by legal maternalism. If
he made a foolish bargain, it conceived he must perform his side like a man, for he had but himself to
blame. When he acted, he was held to have acted
at his own risk with his eyes open, and he must abide
the appointed consequences. He must be a good
sport and bear his losses smiling. The stock argument of the strict law for the many harsh rules it
enforces is that the situation was produced by the
party's own folly and he must abide it. The whole
point of view is that of primitive society and recalls
the story in Tacitus of how the Germans played dice.
They played, he tells us, as a serious business, even
staking their own liberty; and if one lost in such a
case, he voluntarily went into slavery and patiently
allowed himself to be sold. Something of this spirit,
which is the spirit of the strict law, may be recognized
today in such doctrines as contributory negligence
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and assumption of risk and the exaggerations of contentious procedure which treat litigation as a game.
Thus our Anglo-American law in its very beginning has in it the individualism of the strict law.
While the strict law insisted that every man should
stand upon his own feet and should play the game as
a man, without squealing, the principal social and
legal institution of the time in which the common law
was formative, the feudal relation of lord and man,
regarded men in quite another way. Here the question was not what a man had undertaken or what
he had done, but what he was. The lord had rights
against the tenant and the tenant had rights against
the lord. The tenant owed duties of service and
homage or fealty to the lord, and the lord owed
duties of defense and warranty to the tenant. And
these rights existed and these duties were owing simply because the one was lord and the other was
tenant. The rights and duties belonged to that relation. Whenever the existence of that relation put
one in the class of lord or the class of tenant, the
rights and duties existed as a legal consequence. The
first solvent of individualism in our law and the chief
factor in fashioning its system and many of its characteristic doctrines was the analogy of this feudal
relation, suggesting the juristic conception of rights,
duties and liabilities arising, not from express undertaking, the terms of any transaction, voluntary
wrongdoing or culpable action, but simply and solely
as incidents of a relation.
How important this conception is in the system of
the common law may be perceived if we compare the
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Roman and the Anglo-American way of putting
things with respect to some of the everyday institutions of the law. In the Romanist system the chief
role is played by the conception of a legal transaction, an act intended to create legal results to
which the law carrying out the will of the actor
gives the intended effect. The central idea in the
developed Roman system is to secure and effectuate
the will. All things are deduced from or referred
to the will of the actor. Arising as the law of
the city of Rome when it was a city of patriarchal
households, and as a body of rules for keeping the
peace among the heads of these households, its problem was to reconcile the conflicting activities of
free men, supreme within their households but meeting and dealing with their equals without. Accordingly it held them in penalties for such injuries as
they did wilfully and held them in obligations to
such duties or performances as they undertook in
legal form. It held them for what they willed and
did willingly and it held them to what they willed
and undertook legally. In our law, by contrast, the
central idea is rather relation. Thus in agency, the
civilian thinks of an act, a manifestation of the will,
whereby one person confers a power of representation upon another, and of a legal giving effect to
the will of him who confers it. Accordingly he talks
of the contract of mandate. The common-law lawyer, on the other hand, thinks of the relation of
principal and agent and of powers, rights, duties
and liabilities, not as willed by the parties but as
incident to and involved in the relation. He, there-
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fore, speaks of the relation of principal and agent.
So in partnership. The Romanist speaks of the contract of societas. He develops all his doctrines from
the will of the parties who engaged in the legal
transaction of forming the partnership, and he treats
it when formed on the analogy of communio or
common ownership in case of the consortium of coheirs who keep the patriarchal household undivided
after the death of its head. We speak instead of
the partnership relation and of the powers and
rights and duties which the law attaches to that relation. Again, the Romanist speaks of a letting and
hiring of land and of the consequences which are
willed by entering into that contract. We speak of
the law of landlord and tenant and of the warranties
which it implies, the duties it involves and the incidents attached thereto. The Romanist speaks of
a locatio operarum, a letting of services and of the
effects which the parties have willed thereby. We
speak of the relation of master and servant and
of the duty to furnish safe appliances and the assumption of risk which are imposed upon the respective parties thereto. The Romanist speaks of
family law. We speak of the law of domestic relations. The double titles of our digests, such as
principal and surety, or vendor and purchaser, where
the Romanist would use the one word, suretyship
or sale, tell the same story.
Anglo-American law is pervaded on every hand
by the idea of relation and of legal consequences
flowing therefrom. At law, the original type which
provided the analogy still exists in the law of land-
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lord and tenant. If I occupy your land adversely,
you may put me out and then have your action
on the case for mesne profits; but you have no action
against me for that I am enriched unjustly by the
use and occupation of your land. The action for
use and occupation may be maintained only where
a relation exists. But when the relation does exist
a train of legal consequences follow. There is an
implied warranty of quiet enjoyment. There is an
obligation to pay rent simply because of the relation,
which the covenants in the lease only liquidate.
Covenants in the lease run with the land; that
is the incidents so created go with the relation, not
with the person who made them. Again, in case
of a conveyance for life there is still the relation of
tenure, involving duties of the tenant toward those
in reversion and remainder. Hence covenants are
said to run with the land, that is, to follow the relation. But in case of a conveyance in fee simple
there has been no relation since the statute of Quia
Emptores in the reign of Edward I, and so the
burden of covenants in the conveyance does not run.
In the United States, when first we sought to extend
the law as to the creation of legal servitudes by permitting such covenants to run, we did not break
over the rule expressly, but our courts instead turned
to the word "privity," which in its proper use refers
to a relation, and thought the result justified by the
conjuring up of a fictitious privity. So also in the
law of torts, the existence of some special relation
calling for care or involving a duty of care is often
decisive of liability. For example, if A is drowning
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and B is sitting upon the bank with a rope and a
life belt at hand, unless there is some relation between A and B other than that they are both human
beings, for all that the law prescribes, B may smoke
his cigarette and see A drown. In the absence of
a relation that calls for action the duty to be the
good Samaritan is moral only. Other systems may
reach the result in another way. But here and in
other places where it is much less legitimate, the
common-law judge tends to seek for some relation
between the parties, or as he is likely to put it, some
duty of the one to the other.
Again in the case of mortgagor and mortgagee,
we do not ask what the parties agreed, but we apply
rules, such as once a mortgage always a mortgage,
or such as the rule against clogging the equity of
redemption, which defeat intent, in order to enforce
the incidents which courts of equity hold involved
in the relation. In the case of sale of land, it is
not our mode of thought to consider that we are
carrying out the will of the parties as manifested
in their contract. Once the relation of vendor and
purchaser is established, we think rather of the
rights and duties involved in that relation, of the
conversion of the contract right into an equitable
ownership and the turning of the legal title of the
vendor into a security for money, not because the
parties so intended, but because the law, sometimes
in the face of stipulations for a forfeiture, gives
those effects to their relation. Then too, we have
the great category of fiduciary relations, of which
trustee and beneficiary is the type. It is true this

THE FEUDAL ELEMENT

25

category and many of the instances above recounted
are the work not of common-law courts but of the
courts of equity. But the common-law lawyer was
at work in the courts of equity. The clerical chancellors brought about an infusion of morals into the
legal system. To prevent dishonest or unconscientious conduct, interposing originally perhaps for the
welfare of his soul, they forbade the trustee's or
the fiduciary's doing this or that which legally he
was at liberty to do. Presently common-law lawyers
came to sit upon the woolsack. They turned at once
to their staple analogy, lord and man, landlord and
tenant, and out of the pious interference of the
chancellors on general grounds of morals they built
the category of fiduciary relations with rights and
duties annexed to them and involved in them, no
matter what the parties to the relation may intend.
So completely has this idea taken possession of equity
that more than one subject, for example interpleader
and bills of peace, is embarrassed by a struggle to
find "privity," a struggle to find some relation to
which the right to relief may be annexed.
Our public law, too, is built around this same idea
of relation. Magna Carta is recognized as the
foundation of Anglo-American public law. But Professor Adams has shown that, as a legal document,
Magna Carta is a formulation of the duties involved
in the jural relation of the king to his tenants in
chief. As the Middle Ages confused sovereignty
and property, it was easy enough to draw an instrument declaring the duties incident to the relation of
lord and man which, when the former happened to
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be king, could be made later to serve as defining
the duties owing by the king in the relation of king
and subject. Political theory sought to explain the
duties of rulers and governments by a Romanist
juristic theory of contract, a theory of a contract between sovereign and subjects which was devised
originally in the medieval contests between church
and state to justify disobedience on the part of the
pious subject who resisted a royal contemner of ecclesiastical privileges. We shall see in another connection how in the eighteenth century the two
theories merged and the common-law rights of Englishmen, involved in the relation of king and subject,
became the natural rights of man deduced from a
social compact. Here it suffices to note that the
latter is an alien conception in our law. After working no little mischief in our constitutional law in the
nineteenth century, this conception of natural rights
going back of all constitutions and merely declared
thereby is giving way and there are signs that we
shall return to the true common-law conception of
the rights and duties which the law imposes on or
annexes to the relation of ruler and ruled.
Because of its origin in the general application to
new problems of the analogy of the reciprocal rights
and duties of lord and man, I have ventured to call
this element of our legal tradition "feudal law." Perhaps it might be called "Germanic law." For in
comparing Roman law and Germanic law, we are
struck at once by differences of treatment of the same
institution in the two systems, and these differences
turn largely upon their respective use of will and
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of relation as fundamental notions. Compare for
instance the Roman patria potestas, the power of
the head of the household, with the corresponding
Germanic institution of the mundium. The Roman
institution is legally quite one-sided. The paterfamilias is legally supreme within the household. He
has rights. But whatever duties he may owe are
owed without the household, not within. On the
other hand, the Germanic institution is conceived of
as a relation of protection and subjection. But the
subjection is not because of a right of the housefather. It is a subjection because of the relation and
for the purposes of the protection which the relation involves. Also the right of the house father
grows out of the relation and is a right against the
world to exercise his duty of protection. Indeed,
Tacitus indicates to us this idea of relation as a
characteristic Germanic institution. As such, it became the fundamental legal idea in the feudal social
organization. In our law, however, the idea is a
generalization from the results of judicial working
out of one problem after another by the analogy of
the institution with which courts were most familiar
and had most to do in the formative period of English law, namely, the relation of lord and tenant.
In the nineteenth century the feudal contribution
to the common law was in disfavor. Puritanism, the
attitude of protecting the individual against government and society which the common-law courts had
taken in the contests with the crown, the eighteenthcentury theory of the natural rights of the abstract
individual man, the insistence of the pioneer upon a
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minimum of interference with his freedom of action,
and the nineteenth-century deduction of law from
a metaphysical principle of individual liberty-all
these combined to make jurists and lawyers think of
individuals rather than of groups or relations and to
make jurists think ill of anything that had the look
of the archaic institution of status. The Romanist
idea of contract became the popular juristic idea and,
as Maitland puts it, contract became "the greediest
of legal categories." Attempt was made to Romanize more than one department of Anglo-American law by taking for the central idea the Romanist
doctrine of a legal giving effect to the individual will.
This was furthered by the general acceptance in
England and the United States of the political interpretation of jurisprudence and of legal history, an
interpretation which found the key to social and
hence to legal progress in a gradual unfolding of the
idea of individual liberty in the progress of political
institutions. It was furthered also by the famous
generalization of Sir Henry Maine that the evolution of law is a progress from status to contract.
Accepting this doctrine, English writers have charged
that the common law is archaic because it refers
legal consequences to relations rather than to contracts or to intention. But in truth the dogma of
Sir Henry Maine is a generalization from Roman
legal history only. It shows the course of evolution
of Roman law. On the other hand it has no basis
in Anglo-American legal history, and the whole
course of English and American law today is belying it, unless indeed, we are progressing backward.
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Taking no account of legislative limitations upon
freedom of contract, in the purely judicial development of our law we have taken the law of insurance
practically out of the category of contract, and we
have established that the duties of public service
companies are not contractual, as the nineteenthcentury sought to make them, but are instead relational; they do not flow from agreements which the
public servant may make as he chooses, they flow
from the calling in which he has engaged and his consequent relation to the public. What is this in each
case (and these are relatively recent developments
of the law) but the common-law idea of relation, a
relation of insurer and insured and of public utility
and patron, and of rights, duties and liabilities involved therein? It is significant that progress in our
law of public service companies has taken the form
of abandonment of nineteenth-century views for doctrines which may be found in the Year Books.
Even more significant is the legislative development whereby duties and liabilities are imposed on
the employer in the relation of employer and employee, not because he has so willed, not because he
is at fault, but because the nature of the relation is
deemed to call for it. Such is the settled tendency
of the present. To me it seems a return to the common-law conception of the relation of master and
servant, with reciprocal rights and duties and with
liabilities imposed in view of the exigencies of the
relation. Workmen's compensation acts have put
jurists to much trouble when they have sought to
. find a place for them in the legal system. Some
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have said they create a status of being a laborer and
this has frightened more than one court. For status
is an archaic idea, quite out of line with modern
ideas. Hence they have felt bound to inquire what
warrant might be found for imposing disabilities
upon one whom nature had given a sound mind, disposing judgment and years of discretion. Others
have said that the duties and liabilities involved in
workmen's compensation acts were quasi-contractual
-which means only that the author did not know
what to call them or where to place them. What is
clear is that they are not contractual and that they
are not in accord with what the last century regarded
as the principles of the law of torts. Is this legislation, then, in opposition to our law of torts, so
that one or the other must give way? If so, if this
legislation may not be made to fit into the system
of the common law, it may go hard with it in the
judicial working out of its consequences. But I submit the common law has a place for it and that without disturbance of our legal system it is perfectly
possible to administer these statutes and to give
them the sympathetic judicial development which all
statutes require, if they are to be effective. For it is
not out of line with the common law to deal with
causes where the relation of master and servant exists differently from causes where there is no such
relation. It is not out of line to deal with such
causes by determining the duties and the liabilities
which shall flow from the relation. On the contrary, the nineteenth century was out of line with
the common law when it sought to treat the relation
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of master and servant in any other way. In administering these acts the common law may employ its
oldest and most fertile legal conception. Hence we
may believe confidently that it will soon assimilate
this legislation and develop it into an agency of
justice.
It used to be said by way of reproach that the
common law was feudal. The Roman idea of a legal
transaction, which the nineteenth century sought to
apply to all possible situations, was regarded as the
legal institution of the maturity of law. But the
conception of a legal transaction regards individuals
only. In the pioneer agricultural societies of nineteenth-century America such a conception sufficed.
In the industrial and urban society of today classes
and groups and relations must be taken account of
no less than individuals. Happily the nineteenth
century did not lose for us the contribution of the
feudal law to our legal tradition. In its idea of relation, in the characteristic common-law mode of
treating legal problems which it derived from the
analogy of the incidents of feudal tenure we have a
legal institution of capital importance for the law
of the future; we have a means of making our received legal tradition a living force for justice in the
society of today and of tomorrow, as it was in the
society of yesterday.

II

PURITANISM AND T!HE LAW
history, as we now know it, began to be
L EGAL
written after Savigny and so after Hegel.
Hence the "great-man interpretation" of history
which was superseded by Hegel's idealistic interpretation, has never played much part in the literature
of law. The attributing of ancient "codes" to gods
or to divinely inspired sages or the Greek and Roman
practice of attributing a whole body of legal and
political institutions to some one lawgiver are another matter. They represent an attempt to put symbolically the sacredness of the law or the antiquity
and authority of the custom on which the general
security rests, and their place is taken in modern
times by an idea that our traditionally received body
of law is based upon an eternal intrinsic reasonableness. Yet something might be said for a greatlawyer interpretation of legal history. One might
attribute progress in legal institutions and the development of legal doctrines to the influence and the
genius of leaders among juristic writers, judges and
practising lawyers. Lord Campbell thought the lives
of the Chancellors and of the Chief Justices might
be made to tell the history of the English constitution and the history of English law. Not long ago
a writer sought to give us the spirit of the classical
Roman law through a study of the life and charac32
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ter of Papinian. Undoubtedly the great lawyer has
not been the least factor in legal history. Roman
law without Papinian and Ulpian and Paul, the civil
law of the modern world without Bartolus, international law without Grotius, French law without
Pothier, German law without Savigny, the common
law without Coke, or American constitutional law
without Marshall, are almost unthinkable. But it
may be that lawyers are products of legal development or along with legal institutions and systems and
doctrines are results of deeper-seated forces. It may
be that the lawyers themselves call for interpretation. Historical jurists in the last century were wont
to teach us that the contents of a legal system were a
necessary result of the whole history of a people and
were no more to be explained by the labors of individuals than was language. Later it was asserted
that great jurists and great judges had been but the
mouthpieces, through which social forces, or the
civilization of the time and place or class struggle or
economic pressure and the interest of the dominant
class for the time being had spoken the law. Whichever of these views was accepted, the creative role
of great lawyers was pushed into the background
in legal history, and he would be a bold man today
who would essay an exposition of the spirit of the
common law by study of the judges through whose
decisions our law has been expressed and has been
given form.
But little has been done in the way of applying
the other modes of interpreting legal history to the
history of Anglo-American law. The idealistic in-
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terpretation, which looks upon the history of law as
the unfolding of an idea of right or justice in human
experience, has been employed with no little success
in writing the history of Roman law. One phase
of this, the religious interpretation, which seeks the
key to juristic progress and juridical institutions in
the progress of religious thought and in the progress
of religious institutions, has been used in connection
with Roman law by those who have attempted to
trace the effect of Christianity upon the final stage of
that system in the ancient world. Neither of these,
however, has been tried by historians of the common law. Another phase of the idealistic interpretation, on the other hand, has been the staple of our
books in the immediate past. Both in jurisprudence
and in politics, the political interpretation has been
the favorite in England and in America. Historically it assumes that a movement from subjection to
freedom, from status to contract, is the key to legal
as well as to social development. Philosophically it
sees the end of all law in liberty and conceives of
jurisprudence as the science of civil liberty. Given
currency in the United States through the writings
of Sir Henry Maine, this interpretation was no mean
influence in bringing about the attitude of our courts
and lawyers toward social legislation which often,
but, as I think, erroneously, has been attributed to
class interest. An ethnological interpretation, which
finds the determining factors in juristic progress and
in legal institutions in the characteristics of the races
of men among whom laws exist, has been u!."ged also.
But the attempts to apply this method to the history
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of Roman law have yielded doubtful and meager results and there seems no reason to suppose that it
will do more for the history of our law. Finally
there is an economic interpretation which is much in
vogue at present. Its exponents assert that the idea
of justice has had nothing to do with the actual
course of legal development, and contend that the
sole agency in determining the growth and the content of legal systems has been the self interest of
the class dominant for the time being in a particular
society.
There is truth behind each of these several interpretations, and it would be hard to choose among
them, if choice were necessary. But choice is not
necessary. No social institution is the product of
anyone cause. It is rather the resultant of many
causes, of which some observers will lay stress upon
one and some upon others, but none of which may
be left out of account. Hence if some tell us that
the spirit of the common law, the exaggerated abstract individualism of our juristic thinking and judicial decision in the last century, is due to an innate
tendency to individualism among Germanic peoples,
kept down in some quarters by the weight of Roman
authority, but never so repressed in England, while
others see in it an outgrowth of the political contests
between the courts and the crown in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and an outcome of the political
development of that time; if some regard it as a
product of Puritanism, an application of Puritan
ideas in law and politics, reaching its highest development in America, that paradise of the Philistines,
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as Matthew Arnold put it, while others see instead
a result of economic thought and economic conditions in nineteenth-century America and of the frontier spirit surviving the frontier, I do not think we
are bound to make an absolute choice. In truth all
of these are factors and more than one has been a
factor of importance. Possibly one might refer Puritan theology and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
political thought ultimately to Germanic individualism. Kept back by Roman authority in law and in
theology, the Germanic genius burst its bonds at the
Reformation and the individual asserted himself in
law, in politics, in philosophy and in religion. One
might say that there was something congenial to the
Germanic spirit in Hebraism which gave the Old
Testament so profound an influence when our fathers
began to read it. In that view the Germanic character plus the economic conditions of the past century and the resulting economic theories would be
our formula. But one must reckon with the interaction of individualist character and religious doctrine and social conditions upon one another. There
is little to be gained therefore by an attempt at broad
generalization. We may say, at least, that Puritanism of itself and possibly because of the deeperseated causes of which it was a manifestation, has
been a significant factor in molding the spirit of our
common law.
Indeed there are special reasons for believing that
Puritanism has been in a sense a controlling factor.
And these reasons are my excuse, at a time when
religious interpretations are not the fashion, for
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venturing a bit of religious interpretation of jurisprudence. For individualism, in and of itself, has
not been peculiarly English or peculiarly American.
What is peculiar to Anglo-American legal thinking,
and above all to American legal thinking, is an ultraindividualism, an uncompromising insistence upon
individual interests and individual property as the
focal point of jurisprudence. Other causes brought
about a period of individualism in jurisprudence in
politics and in economics everywhere. It was perhaps Puritanism which gave that added emphasis to
individualist ideas in the formative period of our
American legal thought that served to stamp them
upon our theory and our practice and kept them alive
and active in the United States a half century after
English legal thought had turned over a new leaf.
Upon this hypothesis, the religious interpretation of
our legal thought becomes no less important than
the philosophical interpretation of Roman law,
through recognition of the part played by the Stoic
philosophy in its formative period.
Individualism in legal science, as distinguished
from law, had its origin in the end of the sixteenth
century and beginning of the seventeenth century in
the rise of theories of natural rights out of the older
theories of natural law. Two main factors in this
rise of individualism may be recognized, namely, the
emancipation of the middle class and Protestantism.
Berolzheimer has identified the former with the maturity and decay of the theory of natural law. But
individualist natural law still flourishes in America.
And if it be said that America has been par excel-
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lenee the country of the middle class, we must note
that the middle class has been dominant elsewhere
and that Puritanism has given a peculiar character
to the middle class of England and America. Even
less may we attribute our common-law mode of
thought solely to the Protestantism of England in
the period which was decisive for modern law. For
one thing its attitude toward the State is quite as
much Catholic as Protestant. It is much nearer the
view of the Jesuit jurists of the Counter-Reformation than it is to the view of Luther and his followers. In politics, Luther's principle was passive
obedience. Holding that submission to civil government was enjoined upon Christians by the Scriptures,
both Luther and Melanchthon vigorously denounced
the Anabaptists and the rebellious peasants. Indeed
they assumed that the state was a chief good and
that no individual claims could stand against it. The
basis for this doctrine was nationalist rather than
individualist. They insisted on the local sovereign
as against the universal church and the Protestant
jurist theologians who followed them insisted upon
the national law proceeding from that sovereign as
against the universal authority of Rome. Granting
that it was the mission of the Reformation to "give
life to individual freedom, II individual freedom
through the state and through society were quite as
possible means of achieving this mission as the
Anglo-American exaltation of abstract individual
freedom above the state and above society. In other
words, a peculiar phase of the emancipation of the
middle class and a peculiar phase of Protestantism
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must be taken account of in order to understand the
spirit of our common law.
It is not an accident that the first reformer in English legal thought was also the first reformer in
English religious thought. John Wycliffe is known
for his resistance to authority in the church and his
translation of the Scriptures to bring them home to
the common man. But in his tract De Officio Regis
he attacked authority in law and asserted the sufficiency of English case law-for such it fairly had
become-against the venerable legislation of Justinian and the sacred decretals of the Popes. Let
us remember what this meant according to the theories of that time. Whatever the fact, the theory of
the king's judges was that they administered the
common custom of England, the customary modes
of action of Englishmen in their relations with each
other. The academic theory as to the Roman law
was that the Corpus Juris Ciuilis, as legislation
of the Emperor Justinian, was binding upon peoples whose rulers were taken to be successors of
Augustus. The theory as to the canon law was
that all jurisdiction was divided between the spiritual and the temporal, that in matters spiritual the
temporal authority was wholly incompetent, and
that the church, whose mouthpiece was the Pope,
had an absolute legislative power within this field.
"The Pope," says Boniface VIII in the fourteenth
century, "holds all laws in his breast." Wycliffe
said boldly that men might well be saved "though
many laws of the Pope had never been spoken,"
that Roman law was "heathen men's law" and that
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there was no more reason and justice in the civil
law of Rome than in the civil law of England. He
appealed from authority to the local custom of
England, from the rules imposed externally by Roman law and the Pope, to the rules which Englishmen made for themselves by their everyday conduct. But this was the same position which Wycliffe
took with respect to religion. In law and in re·
ligion he appealed to the individual and for the
individual against authority.
But the real influence of religious thinking was
to come later. It has been said that for most purposes the history of the common law begins in the
latter part of the thirteenth century. Indeed it
might well be said that for American purposes its
history begins still later and that we shall not err
greatly in beginning with the end of the sixteenth
century. I am speaking here of the common law
as a mode of thought. Some dogmas, especially
in the law of property, have a longer history, and
our judicial institutions must be studied from the
time of Henry II. But our attitude toward legal
problems, our modes of legal reasoning, the prin.
ciples which make up the system of the common
law, have only to be studied from the reign of Elizabeth, and have a continuous and consistent development from that time. The periods of development in Anglo-American law begin respectively with
the reigns of Elizabeth and James I, with the American Revolution and with the Civil War.
What had been achieved in the English courts
prior to Coke was summed up for us and handed
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down to us by that indefatigable lawyer in a form
which the past generation chose to consider authoritative; and we have looked at it through his spectacles ever since. Hence the period of growth prior
to the reigns of Elizabeth and James I but gave
the materials. The shape which those materials
have taken in the present law is due to the way in
which their possibilities appealed to the end of the
sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth
century, to the interpretation put on them by Coke
and his contemporaries, and to the subsequent working over of the product in America when we received such part of the common law as was applicable to the new world. Again, we may pass over
the constructive work of the eighteenth century,
for that work was done in equity and the law merchant. Neither of these strictly is part of the common law, and so far from their affecting the spirit
of the common law, the spirit of the common law
affects them powerfully. But there are two growing periods of our common-law system; two periods
in which rules and doctrines were formative, in
which our authorities summed up the past for us
and gave us principles for the future. These periods
are (I) the classical common-law period, the end
of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth
century, and (2) the period that some day, when
the history of the common law as a law of the
world comes to be written, will be regarded as no
less classical than the first-the period of legal development in the United States that came to an end
with the Civil War. In the one the task was to
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go over the decisions and legislation of the past
and make a system for the future. In the other
the task was to examine the whole body of English
case law with reference to what was applicable to
the facts of life in America and what was not. Obviously the spirit of these times and of the men of
these times whose juristic labors gave us the mode
of treating legal problems which we call the common law, could not fail to give color to the whole
system. But the age of Coke was the age of the
Puritan in England and the period that ends with
our Civil War was the age of the Puritan in America. We must not forget that the Puritan had his
own way in America, that he was in the majority,
that he had no powerful establishment to contend
with, and that he made institutions to his own liking.
For, again, it is not an accident that common-law
principles, as they were fashioned in the age of
Coke, have attained their highest and most complete
logical development in America, and that in this respect we are and long have been more thoroughly
a common-law country than England herself.
A fundamental proposition from which the Puritan proceeded was the doctrine of a "willing covenant of conscious faith" made by the individual.
Thus he put individual conscience and individual
judgment in the first place. No authority might
rightfully coerce them; but everyone must assume
and abide the consequences of the choice he made.
Applied to church polity, it led to a regime of "consociation but not subordination." "We are not over
one another," said Robinson, "but with one an-
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other." Hence even church organization was a species of contract and a legal theory, a legalism, attached even to religion. If men were to be free
to act according to their consciences and to contract
with others for consociation in congregations, it was
a necessary consequence that the state, as a political congregation, was a matter of contract also;
and liberty of contract was a further necessary deduction. The early history of New England furnishes abundant applications of the idea that covenant or compact-the consent of every individual
to the formation and to the continuance of the
community-was the basis of all communities, political as well as religious. The precedent of the covenant which made Abraham and the children of
Israel the people of God, furnished the religious
basis for the doctrine. But it was applied to civil
as well as to ecclesiastical organization. One consequence was to make for the individualistic conception
that all legal consequences depend upon some exertion of the will, as against the feudal conception of
referring them to some relation. Contract and voluntary culpable conduct appeared to be the solving
ideas for all problems and the law was to be apportioned between the contractual and the delictual.
Another consequence was to make a moral question
of everything, and yet in such a way as to make
it a legal question. For moral principles are of individual and relative application. In applying them
we must take account of circumstances and of individuals. Hence if every question was treated as a
moral question and controversies involving moral
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questions were to be dealt with as concrete cases
to be individualized in their solution, subordination
of those whose cases were decided to those who
had the power of weighing the circumstances of the
actual case and individualizing the principle to meet
the case might result. The idea of consociation
demanded that a fixed, absolute, universal rule,
which the individual had contracted to abide, be resorted to; and thus the moral and the legal principle were to be applied in the same way, and that
the legal way. "Nowhere," says Morley, "has Puritanism done us more harm than in this leading us
to take all breadth and color and diversity and fine
discrimination out of our judgments of men, reducing them to thin, narrow and superficial pronouncements upon the letter of their morality or the precise conformity of their opinions to accepted standards of truth." The good side of all this we know
well. On the side of politics, the conception of the
people not as a mass but as an aggregate of individuals, the precise ascription of rights to each of
these individuals, the evolution of the legal rights of
Englishmen into the natural rights of man, have
their immediate origin in the religious phase of the
Puritan Revolution. But on the side of law, it has
given us the conception of abstract liberty of contract, which has been the bane of all social legislation, the rooted objection to all power of equitable
application of rules to concrete cases that has produced a decadence of equity in our state courts, the
insistence upon and faith in the mere machinery of
justice, which so often makes American legal proce-
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dure intolerable in the business world of today, the
notion of punishing the vicious will and the necessary connection between wrongdoing and retribution,
which makes it so difficult for our criminal law to
deal with anti-social actions and to adjust itself in its
application to the exigencies of concrete criminality.
How does this Puritan individualism affect the
actual administration of justice? We may best answer by turning to each of the great departments
of law and seeing the Puritan there at work. "The
mission of the Reformation," says Berolzheimer,
"was to give life to individual freedom." In this
the Puritan is the incarnation of the Reformation.
Individual freedom of interpretation, individual free
association, individual rights were the basis of his
religious, political and legal views. But abstract individual free self-assertion and individual interests
are by no means all that legal systems have to look
to, and in the nineteenth century our law showed
on every side the ill effects of taking these for
the sole basis. For instance, few doctrines of the
common law create more impatience with courts today than the traditional attitude toward legislation,
the judicial assumption that legislatures are in what
Dicey calls the quiescent stage, the professional feeling that there ought to be little or no legislation on
legal subjects, the attitude of resentment toward
legislation on the part of bench and bar that has
led so often to the failure of legislative attempts
to simplify procedure, and has made so much of
the labor of social workers nugatory after they have
put it upon our statute books. For many years a
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favorite topic of presidential addresses before the
American Bar Association was the plethora of legislature-made laws. A late leader of the American
bar died in the harness writing an elaborate argument against legislation, and made generous provision in his will for a professorship in a law school
whose incumbent should teach-I had almost said
preach-the gospel of the futility of legislation.
There is more than one reason for the attitude of
the common law toward legislation. But not the
least is the dominance of the Puritan during the
formative periods of our law. His reasons were
primarily religious. It appeared to him, says Lord
Acton, "that governments and institutions are made
to pass away like things of earth, whilst souls are
immortal; that there is no more proportion between
liberty and power than between eternity and time;
that, therefore, the sphere of enforced command
ought to be restricted within fixed limits and that
which had been done by authority and outward
discipline and organized violence, should be attempted by division of power and committed to the
intellect and the conscience of free men."
Such views of law-making fitted into and confirmed common-law ideas which grew up in an age
of legislative quiescence and were fostered by the
masterful temperament of Edward Coke, who,
brooking no lay interference with the law he had
dug laboriously from the parchments of the past,
impressed his ideas upon the tradition of which he
was the authoritative exponent. Hence the orthodox tradition of our law schools wholly ignores the
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enacted element in law. In its teaching the older
element, represented by the traditional course of
decision, stands for the real law and furnishes principles and analogies, while the newer element, represented by legislation, is regarded as something
alien, intruding in the body of the law, and may
furnish only detailed rules for the cases expressly
covered. Yet, while confirming the lawyer in his
attitude toward legislation, the Puritan was a firm
believer in enactment. The Commonwealth in England brought forth a great outburst of legislative
activity. One of the first fruits of Massachusetts
was an attempt to set the statute book in order.
This colonial code of statute law antedates the revision of English legislation some two hundred
years; and its preface contains a defense of legislative lawmaking. For, if the Puritan did not
believe in coercion he did believe in instruction;
and liberal instruction through the statute book,
with the extent to which the instruction shall be
followed left largely to the conscience and judgment of the individual, has long been an unhappy
feature of our polity.
In the law of torts, few doctrines have been
more irritating than those of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence, as applied to injuries
to employees. But these are eminently Puritan conceptions. The employee is a free man, guided by
his own conscience and his own interpretation of
Scripture. He chooses for himself. So choosing,
he elects to work in a dangerous employment in
which he runs a risk of being injured. He knows
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that others are to be employed with him; he knows
that they may be negligent and that if they are, he
may be injured. Very well; he is a free man, let
him bear the loss. The master has done no wrong.
The servant, to use Mr. Carter's language, must
stand or fall by the consequences of his own conduct. It is not an accident that the classical exposition of this doctrine was penned in Massachusetts. Again, a workman, engaged constantly upon
a machine, so that he comes to be a part of it and
to operate mechanically himself, omits a precaution
and is injured. The common law says to him, "You
are a free man, you have a mind and are capable
of using it; you chose freely to do a dangerous
thing and were injured; you must abide the consequences." As a matter of fact, it may well be he
did not and could not choose freely. Before the
days of workmen's compensation it was said that
statistics showed the great majority of industrial
accidents happened in the last working hour of the
day, when the faculties were numbed and the operative had ceased to be the free agent which our theory
contemplated. But there was no escape from the
legal theory. That very condition was a risk of the
employment, and was assumed by the laborer. Legislation has been changing these rules, yet courts
long had a tendency to read the doctrine of contributory negligence into statutes even where the
legislature had tried to get rid of it.
Out of many examples in constitutional law, we
may notice the nineteenth-century decisions as to the
right to pursue a lawful calling and liberty of con-
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tract, which bore so grievously upon social legislation until well into the present century. Here it is
significant that the prophet of a belated individualist crusade, the late Mr. Justice Field, had added
to a Puritan ancestry and Puritan bringing up, careful study of the common law and practice of his
profession on the frontier at a time and in a place
where the individual counted for more and the law
for less than has been usual even on the frontier.
No doubt the latter circumstance had its influence.
None the less the conception of a maximum of abstract individual self-assertion exempt from social
control, to which his vigorous and learned opinions
gave currency, is essentially the Puritan conception
of consociation. We are to be with one another
but not over one another. The whole is to have
no right of control over the individual beyond the
minimum necessary to keep the peace. Everything
else is to be left to the free contract of a free man.
Happily this idea passed its meridian in our constitutional law at the end of the last century.
Again in criminal law, one of the problems is
the individualization of punishment, the adjusting
of our penal system to the criminal rather than to
the abstract crime. Another is to get rid of the
retributive theory, the revenge idea as the basis of
legal treatment of crime-an idea which is the bane
of punitive justice. Still another is to make the
criminal law an effective agency for repressing antisocial actions and protecting society. At each of
these points our Puritan common-law theories have
been fighting a vigorous defense and slow retreat.
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The Puritan's objection to individualization in punitive justice was instinctive and deep-seated, for he
saw in the Star Chamber the same fundamental
theory as that involved in the penitential system
of the Roman church. Sociologists are now recognizing the deep and humane insight of the ecclesiasticallaw and its essentially modern point of view.
In the penitential system, "it is not the crime," says
Saleilles, "but the criminal alone that is . . . regarded. It becomes a subjective individualization
under cover of a wholly objective legal sentence;
and this is what we now demand." "This subjective
individualization," he continues, "is the same formula which is called for today." To the Puritan,
such a point of view was wholly repugnant. The
same attitude toward law and government that called
for an over-individualism in the abstract rules of
law and in the doctrines from which they proceed,
precluded individualization or adjustment to individual cases in the application of the rules and doctrines in practice. In the former it is an assertion of
the individual against his fellows individually. It
expresses the feeling of the self-reliant man that
he is to make his own bargains and determine upon
his own acts and control his own property, accepting the responsibility that goes with such power,
subjecting himself to liability for the consequences
of his free choice, but exempt from interference in
making his choice. In the latter it is an assertion of
the individual against his fellows collectively. It
expresses the feeling of the same self-reliant man
that neither the state nor its representative, the mag-
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istrate, is competent to judge him better than his
own conscience; that he is not to be judged by the
discretion of men, but by the inflexible rule of the
strict law.
Our criminal law had a new birth in the seventeenth century, when the fall of the Star Chamber
threw the whole subject of punitive justice into the
common-law courts. Accordingly it received the
Puritan stamp while it was formative, and in the
nineteenth century many of the United States carried the Puritan repugnance to all margin of judicial
action so far as to abolish common-law misdemeanors and try to prescribe chapter and verse of a
criminal code for every case. All three of the demands of modern criminal science, then, have been
resisted by our Puritan criminal law. It is not so
long ago that a learned supreme court released a
child from a reformatory on the ground that a
reformatory was a prison, that commitment thereto
was necessarily punishment for crime, and hence
could only be warranted by criminal proceedings of
a formal type, conducted with due regard to constitutional safeguards. The rise of juvenile courts
has accustomed us to courts of criminal equity for
the youthful offender; but attempts to introduce
any system of judicial individualization for the
adult will have to wrestle a long time with constitutional difficulties. Indeed we have had to resort
to administrative boards and commissions to do
what England now does through a court of criminal
appeal. So, too, the retributive theory is among
the fundament a of our cnminallaw. The common
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law looks upon the criminal in the abstract. He is
a free man, who, having a choice between right and
wrong, voluntarily chose the wrong and must abide
the penal consequences appointed in advance. Not
only does this Puritan view of the matter keep
alive the retributive theory in jurisprudence, after
kindred sciences have abandoned it, but it hampers
the efficiency of penal legislation intended to protect society. The good sense of courts has introduced a doctrine of acting at one's peril with respect
to statutory crimes which expresses the needs of
society. Such statutes are not meant to punish the
vicious will but to put pressure upon the thoughtless
and inefficient to do their whole duty in the interest
of public health or safety or morals. Nevertheless
all extension of this doctrine has been opposed sturdily by our text-writers, and to the Puritanism of
Bishop and common-law orthodoxy of Judge
McClain the decisions are anomalous and unsatisfactory.
In the law of property we may see conspicuous
examples in the doctrine as to "abusive exercise of
rights"-as to use of property or exercise of powers
incident to property for the sole purpose of injuring another -and in the older doctrine with respect to surface water. Here again we may note
that the typical exposition of the extreme individualist view as to the rights of adjoining owners in
disposing of surface water came from Massachusetts. Much of this has been done away with under
modern Roman influence. But the common law
asked simply, was the defendant acting on his own
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land and committing no nuisance? If so, it cared
nothing about his motive. If one were to put the
argument of the French jurists, that use of property
merely to injure another is anti-social and should be
repressed, the common-law lawyer would no doubt
reply in the language of Blackstone, "the public
good is in nothing more essentially interested than
in the protection of every individual's private
rights."
Equity in America shows the same influence. The
Puritan has always been a consistent and thoroughgoing opponent of equity. It runs counter to all
his ideas. For one thing, it helps fools who have
made bad bargains, whereas he believes that fools
should be allowed and required to act freely and
then be held for the consequences of their folly.
For another thing, it acts directly upon the person.
It coerces the individual free will. It acts preventively, instead of permitting free action and imposing after the event the penalty assented to in advance. For still another, it involves discretion in
its application to actual cases, and that, in the Puritan view, means superiority in the magistrate in
that it allows him to judge another by a personal
standard instead of by an unyielding, impersonal,
legal rule. Hence in large part the opposition to
the Court of Chancery in England, which lasted
almost to the eighteenth century, the abolition of
the Court of Chancery by Barebones' Parliament
and the tracts against chancery during the Commonwealth. Hence the reluctance of Massachusetts to
grant equity powers to the courts and the popular
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vote against equity in New Hampshire after the
Revolution. Hence the general tendency, in the
United States to turn the liberal doctrines of equity
as to discretion in granting relief into hard and fast
jurisdictional rules. Pomeroy has remarked "the
extreme reluctance of American courts to extend the
jurisdiction of equity, even where such extension consists solely in applying familiar principles to new
conditions of fact." The gradual abandonment of
equity powers and legalizing of equitable doctrines
which I have ventured on another occasion to call
a decadence of equity in America is no less remarkable. Truly the methods and doctrines of equity
have not been congenial to our tribunals, and if we
remember that the latter have been manned with
Puritans, the reason is obvious.
From the beginning the Protestant tradition in
law has been nationalist. The Protestant jurist theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
opposed a nationalist conception to the universal
authority of the canon law and the universal doctrines of the Jesuit jurists of the Counter-Reformation. For universal authority, they sought to substitute the civil law of each people, sacred because
it sprang from the divinely ordained state. The
Puritan carried this particularism in law to the
extreme because of his conception of states as political congregations. The Ten Commandments and
the Scriptures, interpreted by the individual Christian, furnished sufficient general principles. For the
rest, there was need only of the local laws to which
those subject thereto had freely assented. Much
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of this spirit is with us today in the American exaltation of local peculiarities in law, in our fostering of local anomalies of substantive law and of
procedure as if they had some intrinsic importance
in the administration of justice to compensate for
the manifold inconveniences to which they give rise.
Until the general adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it used to be a saying in the West that
a draft on Chicago drawn in Omaha and put through
the usual course of collection was subject to three
different laws. Nor did this seem incongruous to
lawyers. Even now that, under pressure from business men, the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
has been put in force, so little does the commonlaw lawyer value universality, that there are disquieting symptoms of provincial interpretations in
the several states which will involve a gradual return to our former condition of divergent local
laws.
It is, however, in application and administration
of the law that Puritanism has produced the most
serious results for the legal system of today. The
Puritan's characteristic jealousy of the magistrate
has taken an extreme form and has been developed
as a jealousy of the judge. "There is," says Bryce,
"a hearty Puritanism in the view of human nature
which pervades [the Constitution]. It is the work
of men who believed in original sin, and were resolved to leave open for transgressors no door
which they could possibly shut." It is hardly too
much to say that the Puritan ideal state was a
permanent deadlock where the individual, in-
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structed by a multitude of rules but not coerced, had free play for the dictates of his own
reason and conscience. For our legislation exhibits
an inconsistency that is part of the Puritan character. He rebelled against control of his will by
state or magistrate, yet he loved to lay down rules,
since he realized the intrinsic sinfulness of human
nature. Accordingly we have abundance of rules
and no adequate provision for carrying them out.
Until we began to find a way out by our recent
development of administrative boards and commissions, law paralyzed administration. In the nineteenth century injunctions, actions of trespass, and
mandamus proceedings hemmed in the executive
officer on every side. But when the judicial department came forward to execute laws, local juries and
grand juries, local prosecuting officers, local sheriffs,
were given power to hold up as well as to uphold
the law and wielded it as their individual consciences
might dictate. Hence it was no less true that administration paralyzed law. The system of checks
and balances produced a perfect balance. In practical result, the law too often accomplished little or
nothing. We had abundance of law in the books,
but very little law in action. Revolt from this condition, which had become intolerable in our complex urban societies at the end of the last century
has almost threatened a season of oriental justice
through conferring of wide powers upon boards and
commissions which are expected to proceed with a
minimum of rule and a maximum of expedition.
Puritan jealousy of the magistrate is even more
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conspicuous in American judicial procedure. It has
cooperated with the pioneer spirit and the ideas of
rural communities in the first half of the nineteenth
century to produce a condition in the administration
of judicial business very like that to which it led
in executive administration. In more than One state
codes and practice acts aim to regulate every act of
the judge from the time he enters the court room.
It is hardly too much to say that the ideal judge
is conceived as a pure machine. Being a human
machine and in consequence tainted with original
sin, he must be allowed no scope for free action.
Hard and fast rules of evidence and strict review
of every detail of practice by a series of reviewing
tribunals are necessary to keep him in check. In
many states he may not charge the jury in any effective manner; he must rule upon and submit or
reject written requests for academically-phrased
propositions of abstract law; he must not commit
any error which might possibly prejudice a party
to the cause-whether in fact there is prejudice or
not. The past two decades have seen a steady
movement away from this type of procedure; but
in more than one Western community, settled from
New England, which preserves the pristine faith, it
is dying hard. Dunning has pointed out that in
America the Puritan was able to carry into effect
what in England could be only abstract opinions.
Hence in America, in addition to a ritual of justice
belonging to a past age of formalism that put gold
lace and red coats on the picket line, we have a
machinery of justice devised to keep down the judi-
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cial personality which has made legal procedure in
some sort an end in itself.
At the beginning of the present century it had
become evident that our legal system must temper
its individualism; that the common law could not
succeed in an attempt to force the modern world
into a Puritan bed of Procrustes. We may grant
that the law should only temper, not abandon, the
element in our tradition which was contributed by
the Puritan. In another connection I shall try to
show how we may use that element in the legal
development of the future. But for the moment we
must insist upon keeping it within bounds. If we
recognize that it is not fundamental principles of
jurisprudence, but traditional principles of Puritanism, operating out of their sphere, with which American legislatures are struggling, we may abate some
of our hostility to legislation, and may be willing to
allow lawmakers to take account of the demands involved in social life and formulate in laws the needs
of crowded urban industrial communities even in
derogation of our traditional law. We may be will.
ing to concede something to the vir bonus upon the
woolsack who would protect men from themselves.
We may be willing to allow the magistrate some
power of meeting the exigencies of justice in concrete
cases. We may be willing to trust a trial judge to
use honestly and impartially the discretion without
which trials will always be dilatory, expensive, and
unsatisfactory. For it is always to be remembered
that justice is made up of individual cases. If the
judicial machinery does not produce speedy, inex-
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pensive and just results in the actual causes that
pass through it, no amount of mechanical or theoretical perfection will atone. Above all, we may
be willing to relegate procedure to its proper place
in the legal system.
At the battle of Balaclava the English pickets
posted to warn their comrades of the approach of
the enemy were themselves surprised, and the attack
of the Russians on the main body was in progress
before the pickets were aware that an enemy was in
the neighborhood. In commenting on this, a military historian says that the surprise resulted from
the high degree of drill and discipline of the pickets,
which had destroyed all initiative and had led them
to believe that they had done their whole duty when
they had conformed to the rules in which they had
been trained while on guard in barracks and parade
grounds. The historian adds that rules may deaden
men's wits but can hardly sharpen them.
Legal formulas are necessary to preserve the dignity of the tribunal, to expedite its business, to keep
the person of the magistrate in due bounds, and to
give to the judge the benefit of the experience of
the past. But they are means, not ends. However
much it may have suited the Puritan disposition to
make them ends, in order to bring about a maximum
of individual self-assertion and a minimum of magisterial action, it is against the genius of the time
and the interest of the modern industrial community
to continue in this attitude.

III
THE COURTS AND THE CROWN
a memorable Sunday morning, the loth of
O NNovember,
the judges of England were
1612,

summoned before King James I upon complaint of
the Archbishop of Canterbury. It appeared that
the High Commission, an administrative tribunal
established for the regulation of the church, had
begun to take cognizance of temporal matters and
to deal with lay offenders. Not only was this tribunal wholly unknown to the common law, but it decided according to no fixed rules and subject to no
appeal. When, accordingly, it sought to send its
pursuivant to the house of this or that lay subject
and arrest him upon a complaint of a wholly temporal nature, the Court of Common Pleas stopped
the proceeding with a writ of prohibition. To
meet this judicial insistence upon the supremacy of
law, it was suggested that the king might take away
from the judges any cause he pleased and decide it
himself; and the immediate business of the Sunday
morning conference with the judges was to explain
this proposition and hear what they could say to it.
The Archbishop proceeded to expound the alleged
royal prerogative, saying that the judges were but
the delegates of the king, wherefore the king might
do himself, when it seemed best to him, what he
left usually to these delegates. He added that this
60
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was clear, if not in law yet beyond question in divinity, for it could be shown from the word of God in
the Scripture. To this Coke answered on behalf
of the judges, that by the law of England the king
in person could not adjudge any cause; all cases,
civil and criminal, were to be determined in some
court of justice according to the law and custom of
the realm. "But," said the king, "I thought law
was founded upon reason, and I and others have
reason as well as the judges." "True it was," Coke
responded, "that God had endowed his Majesty with
excellent science and great endowments of nature;
but his Majesty was not learned in the laws of
his realm of England, and causes which concern the
life or inheritance or goods or fortunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural reason, but
by the artificial reason and judgment of the law,
which law is an art which requires long study and
experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it." At this the king was much offended,
saying that in such case he should be under the law,
which it was treason to affirm. Coke answered in
the words attributed to Bracton, that the king ought
not to be under any man but under God and the
law. But this was not the last of such conferences
and in the end Coke, who would give no pledge to
do otherwise than administer the law as a judge
should, was removed.
In 1787 the legislature of Rhode Island, having
put forth paper money of the nominal value of
.£100,000 made it penal to refuse to accept the bills
in payment of articles offered for sale or to make
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any distinction between them and gold or silver coin
and provided further that if anyone were accused
of that heinous offence, he should be tried forthwith
in an inferior court by judges without a jury, on a
summary complaint, without any continuance and
with no appeal. One Weeden being charged with
violating the statute objected that trial before such
a special court uncontrolled by the supreme judiciary and without a jury was repugnant to the charter which stood as the constitution of the state, and
hence that the statute was void. The judges sustained this objection. Thereupon, on the last Monday of September, 1787, the judges were summoned
to appear before the legislature much as Coke and
his colleagues had appeared before James I. The
judges appeared and two of them made learned and
convincing arguments that they could not be compelled by statute to send a citizen to jail without
trial by jury when trial by jury was guaranteed by
the constitution, the supreme law of the state, under
which the legislature itself was constituted. The
legislature, however, voted that it was not satisfied
with the reasons of the judges, and a motion to dismiss the judges from their offices followed and would
doubtless have prevailed had it not appeared that
the constitution unhappily required the deliberate
process of impeachment. Like cases occurred at the
time in many states.
Again in the twentieth century, in the movement
for recall, judges were to be sent for to explain
themselves to the sovereign. Bills of rights in our
constitutions, state and federal, had been adminis-
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tered by courts as the supreme law which they purport to be. Thereupon the people were urged to
send for the judges, to determine that their reasons
were unsatisfactory and to dismiss them. The alternative proposition was that the people proceed
to decide the case directly, as James I sought to do.
There is a close parallel here in more senses than
one. In the seventeenth century, it was progressive
to insist upon the royal prerogative. Those who
thought of the king as the guardian of social interests and wished to give him arbitrary power, that
he might use it benevolently in the general interest,
were enraged to see the sovereign tied down by antiquated legal bonds discovered by lawyers in such
musty and dusty parchments as Magna Carta. To
them, the will of the king was the criterion of law
and it was the duty of the courts, whenever the royal
will for the time being and for the cause in hand
was ascertained, to be governed accordingly, since
the judges were but the king's delegates to administer justice. In the eighteenth century, the center of
political gravity had shifted to the legislature. That
body now thought of itself as sovereign and conceived that, no matter what the terms of the fundamental law under which it sat, the courts had but to
ascertain and give effect to its will. At the end of
the nineteenth century the center of political gravity
had shifted to the majority or more often the plurality of the electorate, voting at a given election, and
those who thought of pluralities and militant minorities as the guardians of social interests and would
give them arbitrary powers, that they might use
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them benevolently in the general interest, were enraged to see the sovereign tied down by what seemed
to them dead precedents and antiquated legal bonds
discovered by lawyers in eighteenth-century bills of
rights. The judges were but delegates of the people
to do justice. Therefore, it was conceived, they
were delegates of the majority or plurality that
stood for the whole in wielding general governmental powers. Once more it was insisted that the will
of the ruling organ of the state, even for the time
being and the cause in hand, must be both the ultimate guide and the immediate source to which judges
should refer.
Toward king, legislature and plurality of the electorate, the common law has taken the same attitude.
Within the limits in which the law recognizes them
as supreme it has but to obey them. But it reminds
them that they rule under God and the law. And
when the fundamental law sets limits to their authority or bids them proceed in a defined path, the common-law courts have consistently refused to give
effect to their acts beyond those limits. Juristically
this attitude of the common-law courts, which we
call the doctrine of the supremacy of law, has its
basis in the feudal idea of the relation of king and
subject and the reciprocal rights and duties involved
therein. Historically, it goes back to a fundamental
notion of Germanic law. Philosophically, it is a
doctrine that the sovereign and all the agencies
thereof are bound to act upon principles, not according to arbitrary will; are obliged to conform to
reason, instead of being free to follow caprice.
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Along with the doctrine of judicial precedent and
trial by jury this doctrine of the supremacy of law is
one of the three distinctively characteristic institutions of the Anglo-American legal system. It became definitely established therein as a result of the
contests between the courts and the crown in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hence we may
enquire (I) what led up to these contests, (2) what
effect did they have on the common-law tradition,
and, in particular, how did they contribute to the
exaggerated individualism of that tradition in the
nineteenth century, and (3) what is the significance
of the resulting doctrine of the supremacy of law
for the law of the future?
Throughout the Germanic law books of the
Middle Ages, says Heusler, runs the idea that law
is " a quest of the creature for the justice and truth
of his creator." All notion of arbitrary will was
foreign to it. The conception that the will of the
sovereign had the force of law came from Rome, if
not, indeed, from Byzantium. The Germanic conception was instead that expressed in the phrase attributed to Bracton-that the king was under God
and the law. The Germanic polity always postulated a fundamental law above and beyond mere
will. Moreover it conceived that those who wielded
authority should be held to account for the conformity of their acts to that law. Perhaps the extrem~
instance is to be found in the Salic law, which prescribes that where a creditor has duly appealed to
the count for justice and the count does not act with
no sufficient reason, he shall answer with his life or
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redeem himself with his wergeld; but when he does
act pursuant to such an appeal, if he goes beyond enforcement of what was due he is likewise to answer
with his life or redeem himself with his wergeld.
But the conception developed as the basis of public
law only in England. There the establishment of
strong central courts, purporting to administer the
common custom of the whole realm, the strong central administrative power of the king, and the early
formulations of the feudal duties of the king toward
his tenants in chief afforded a unique opportunity for
the evolution of a legal doctrine of the legal duties
and responsibilities of those who wield governmental powers.
Two cases of the reign of Edward III show the
first phase of the doctrine. In 1338 in an action
of replevin for cattle distrained by a collector of
the king's taxes, it appeared that the collector had
no warrant under seal. The plaintiff demurred to
his avowry (that is to his plea that he took as col.
lector of taxes) and the court rendered judgment for
the plaintiff. Men could not go about the realm
distraining the property of the subject or purporting to collect the king's taxes without a special warrant. The next year, the Court of King's Bench,
having convicted Reginald de N erford and others
of a forcible disseisin, issued a writ of exegi facias
(outlawry) against them. This writ was returned
by the sheriff who reported that he had received a
letter from the king under his private seal to the
effect that he had pardoned the defendants and com·
manding that they should not be put to damage,
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wherefore he had not executed the writ. The court
would not listen to this. It told the sheriff he could
not justify refusal to execute a writ of the king's
court by showing a mere private letter from the
king; and after imposing a fine upon the sheriff, it
issued a new writ to outlaw the defendants. In
other words, Edward III, King of England, might
pardon offenders, but he might not instruct a sheriff
to disobey the precepts of the law. If he did, the
sheriff could not justify his disobedience thereby.
When he acted as king, his acts were those of the
law j when he acted by private letter as Edward
Plantagenet, he could not interfere with the due
course of the law which bound the whole realm. It
will be noted that in each of these cases the point
was largely one of form. If the tax collector had
held a warrant in due form, if the king had pardoned
Reginald de N erford and his companions in the
mode which the law recognized, there would have
been no question. Yet there was more here than
form. Requiring the king and his agents to act in
due form, if their acts were to have legal validity,
was, in an age of formal law, the first step toward
requiring him and them to act within the legally appointed limits of their authority. When Fortescue
wrote in praise of the laws of England a century
later, he could lay down dogmatically that the power
of the English king was not regal, in the sense that
he could make what innovations and alterations in
the laws he pleased and impose on his subjects what
burdens he chose, but was instead political j it was
not the personal government of Edward or Henry,
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it was the political government of the king of England, exercised within the bounds which the law and
customs of the realm had established. In this wider
form, the doctrine soon required the courts to pass
on the validity of royal acts of a very different character.
At common law the king is parens patriae, father
of his country, which is but the medieval mode of
putting what we mean today when we say that the
In the
state is the guardian of social interests.
feudal way of looking at it, the relation of king and
subject involved duties of protection as well as rights
to allegiance. The king, then, was charged with the
duty of protecting public and social interests, and
he wielded something very like our modern police
power. But this power was limited on every side
by the maxims of the common law and the bounds
set by the law of the land. It was a maxim that
the law had so admeasured the prerogatives of the
king that they should neither take away nor prejudice
the inheritance of anyone. Naturally the royal
power of protecting social interests soon came in
conflict with such a maxim. A few examples are
worth recalling. Henry IV granted the measuring
of woollen cloth or canvas that should be brought
to London by any stranger or denizen, taking a
penny of the buyer and another of the seller for
each piece measured. The judges held that this was
not a grant in the public interest; that it tended to
the burdening, oppressing and impoverishing of the
king's subjects and not to their advantage, "and
therefore the said letters patent were void." Again,
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King Henry VI granted to the company of dyers in
London the power to search for cloth dyed with
poisonous dyes and to seize and confiscate it, if
found. The judges held this also against the law
of the land on the ground that no one's property
could be forfeited by virtue of letters patent without adjudication and an opportunity to be heard.
There is a long succession of these cases between
the reigns of Henry IV and Elizabeth in which the
crown is manifestly endeavoring to make the royal
power to protect social interests a source of revenue
or a means of enriching favorites, while the courts
insist it shall be exercised according to settled principles of reason and within limits defined by the law.
To this extent the common law was struggling with
the prerogatives of the crown precisely as today it
struggles with the prerogatives of majorities and
pluralities. There is, however, a significant difference. In these contests between courts and crown
prior to the Stuarts, the courts had been guarding
social interests by preventing perversion to quite
different uses of powers which could be used rightfully only to further public or social interests. In
the nineteenth century we find common-law courts
going much beyond this and thinking themselves
bound to put limits in the interest of the individual
to social control for the social interest. This change
in the spirit of the common law resulted from the
political phase of the contests between courts and
crown under the TudorE aha Stuarts and from the
political and juristic theories of the eighteenth
century.
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It is probable that the further extension of the
legal doctrine of supremacy of law has its juristic
origin in the medieval conception of the distinction
between temporal and spiritual jurisdiction and the
entire incompetency of temporal power in the domain of the spiritual. This proposition was so fundamental that medieval judges no doubt thought of
temporal administrative or legislative acts which
sought to invade the field set apart for the church
much as judges of today might regard the statute
sarcastically proposed by an English conveyancer"Be it enacted that during the month of April of
each year the King's loyal subjects shall be at liberty
to and are hereby enabled to go forth without umbrellas upon any and all public streets, roads and
highways without getting wet." Accordingly in the
reign of Henry VII a majority of the Court of Common Pleas laid down unhesitatingly that an act of
Parliament for seizing the lands of alien monasteries
into the king's hands could not make the king a parson. No temporal act, they said, can make the king
parson without the assent of the head of the church.
In other words, there was a fundamental law, dividing temporal power from spiritual power, which ran
back of all states and of all human authority, and
even acts of parliament, if they ran counter to this
fundamental law, must be disregarded. When at
the Reformation the temporal power became supreme, decisions of this sort seemed to sanction a
doctrine that the sovereign, whether king or parliament or people, was bound to act within certain
limits imposed upon all government by fundamental
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principles of right and reason which it was beyond
the power of lawmakers to change. Such was the
legal situation when a new movement in English
polity required the common law to fight for its life
and gave a political significance to its power of judging of the validity of royal acts and determining
whether they were in truth acts of the sovereign.
In the middle of the sixteenth century the common-law courts, struggling to meet the wants of
England of the Reformation by a feudal property
law and a criminal law devised primarily as a substitute for the rough and ready justice of an outraged neighborhood in the days when self help was
the staple remedy, found themselves in a position
very like that of American courts, developed in and
for the pioneer or agricultural societies of the first
half of the nineteenth century which are struggling
to meet the wants of today with the rules and the
machinery devised for such communities. Moreover, an era of liberalization was at hand. The preceding period, a period of strict law, had regarded
only conformity to the letter of the law and compliance with prescribed form. The stage of equity
and natural law was at hand, a stage which involved
an infusion of morality-an infusion of purely moral
ideas developed outside of the legal system. Such
periods of liberalization, in which the law is made
over by reception of ideas from without, have always involved for a time a movement away from
law, a temporary reversion to justice without law.
In such periods at first the chief reliance for obtaining justice seems to be the power of the magistrate.
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And arbitrary power is looked upon complacently
since it is taken to be the sole means of escape from
the bonds imposed by the strict law. Thus in the
United States today, in a period of legal development which has much in common with the one we
are considering, a movement for liberalization, an
infusion into the law of ideas developed in the social
sciences, has led to a tendency away from courts and
law and a reversion to justice without law in the
form of revival of executive and even of legislative
justice and reliance upon arbitrary governmental
power.
Accordingly, in the middle of the sixteenth century lawyers began to complain that the common
law was being set aside. Very little business of importance came longer to the king's courts of law.
The courts, which for three hundred years had been
shaping the law and holding even the king to the
limits prescribed thereby, seemed to be losing their
hold. The law seemed to be fashioning in quite
another type of tribunal and by other hands than
those of common-law lawyers. "In criminal causes
that were of any political importance," Maitland tells
us, "an examination by two or three doctors of the
civil law threatened to become a normal part of our
procedure." The living law seemed to be making
and applying in the King's Council, in the Star
Chamber, in the Court of Requests and in the Court
of Chancery-all of them courts of a Roman, and,
what was more important, a summary procedure.
It seemed that judicial justice, administered in
courts, was to be superseded by executive justice ad-
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ministered in administrative tribunals or by administrative officers. In other words there was a reaction
from justice according to law to justice without law,
in this respect entirely parallel to the present movement away from the common-law courts in the
United States. In place of the magistrate limited by
law and held to walk strictly in the paths fixed by the
custom of the realm, men sought to set up a benevolent guardian of social interests who should have
power to do freely whatever in his judgment protection of those interests might involve; in place of deliberate judicial tribunals, restrained by formal procedure and deciding according to fixed principles,
they turned to offhand administrative tribunals in
which the relations of individuals with each other
and with the state were adjusted summarily according to the notions for the time being of an administrative officer as to what the general interest or good
conscience demanded, unencumbered by many rules.
A valiant fight against this movement for administrative absolutism was waged by the common-law
courts, and in the end the older law prevailed. The
Court of Chancery was the only one of the Romanized courts of the Tudors and Stuarts which survived and that tribunal little by little was made over
along common-law lines till it became an ordinary
English court. Moreover the doctrines which were
evolved in the course of judicial administration by
these tribunals were made into law and received into
the common-law system. The law was liberalized
but it was still the common law. The chief weapon
which the common law employed in this contest and
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the one about which the contest raged, was the doctrine of the supremacy of law. That doctrine, therefore, became established among the fundamenta of
our legal tradition as a result of the victory. But
the victory gave it a new scope and a new spirit. Its
:lcope for a time broadened, so as to make of it a
doctrine of limitations upon all sovereign power,
independent of positive law and at most simply declared thereby. Its spirit became individualist. It
became a doctrine that it was the function of the
common law and of common-law courts to stand
between the individual and oppressive action by the
state; that the courts were set up and the law existed to guard individual interests against the encroachments of state and of society. Thus the Sunday-morning conference between King James and the
judges, which is the glory of our legal history, led
in the nineteenth century to constitutional doctrines
that for a time enabled a fortified monopoly to shake
its fist in the face of a people and defy investigation
or regulation. Too often it led the law in the last
century to stand full-armored before individuals,
natural and artificial, that needed no defence, but
sallied from beneath its aegis to injure society.
Both the broadening of scope and the change of
spirit demand notice.
It has been noted already that in the reign of
Henry VII the courts had enforced against an act
of Parliament the medieval dogma of the distinction between temporal and spiritual jurisdiction. To
Coke, the champion of the common law in the contest with the Stuarts, such decisions established a
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general doctrine of the competence of the courts,
since they administered the law and law was reason,
to compel not merely all private individuals, and all
agents of government, but the very sovereign itself,
to keep within the bounds of reason, by refusing to
recognize or give legal effect to acts or ordinances
of the sovereign which went beyond such bounds.
"When an act of Parliament," he said boldly, "is
against common right and reason . . . the common
law will control it and adjudge such act to be void."
The events of 1688 in England established the supremacy of Parliament and Coke's proposition failed
to maintain itself. But experience of review of colonial legislation with respect to its conformity to
charters, applied to written constitutions and bills
of rights, led us in the United States to carry the
supremacy of law to its logical limits, and indeed
to go beyond such limits and practically adopt Coke's
conception of a control of legislation upon fundamental principles of right and reason. Eighteenthcentury ideas of natural law and the assumption that
the seventeenth-century legal rights of Englishmen
were the same as the natural rights of man which
were the staple of juristic and political thought in
the eighteenth century, combined to give Coke's
theory of the supremacy of law much currency.
When our courts first came to pass upon constitutional questions, what they read in Coke's Second
Institute and in his report of Bonham's Case appeared but a common-law version of what they read
in French and Dutch publicists as to an eternal and
immutable natural law, by which all human laws
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must be measured, and of which, in order to have
validity, they must be declaratory. Accordingly it
became usual to speak of limitations involved in the
very idea of free government which go back of and
are only declared by constitutions and bills of rights.
It became usual to think, not of the text of the bills
of rights, but of these supposed fundamental prin~
ciples of which they were but declaratory. Thus un~
wittingly at the end of the nineteenth century courts
found themselves too often enforcing not the bills of
rights but the individualist doctrines of the historical
and philosophical jurisprudence and classical economics of that century.
Moreover, for reasons in part growing out of the
seventeenth.century contests between courts and
crown and in part growing out of eighteenth-century
political theory, as has been said, this doctrine of a
fundamental law, binding even the sovereign, was
taken to be something which existed for individuals
to protect them against state and society. Assuming that the abstract individual was the center of
all things and tha t the state existed only to secure
his interests, it was thought that courts and law had
for their function to prevent use of this machinery,
set up to protect the individual and to secure his
rights, as a means of oppressing him and depriving
him of his rights. To understand this notion, as it
developed in the Anglo-American juristic tradition,
we must look for a moment at the history of the
idea of sovereignty.
In the Roman I>olity the power of making laws
was in the populus Romanus. The magistrate had
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imperium, the power to command the citizens; a
name and an idea growing out of the combined civic
and military functions of the magistrate in the ancient city-state. To protect society by keeping discipline in time of war and by keeping order in time
of peace, the magistrate had a power of command.
Later the emperor had delegated to him both of
these powers. The people conferred on him their
legislative power for life and they made him magistrate for life. Thus arose in the Byzantine period
the conception of a sovereign in whom all the lawmaking and all the coercive powers of organized
political society are concentrated, and this conception was handed down to the modern world in the
law books of Justinian.
Imperium and dominium, the power of the magistrate and the power of the owner, were confused
during the Middle Ages. The great land owner was
also a territorial ruler; the owner of the manor was
also magistrate and judge within its limits. The
king was ultimate lord of the soil and also the fountain of justice. Under the reign of the Germanic
idea of reciprocal rights and duties involved in such
a relation the royal dominium was more like imperium than the sovereignty of the Byzantine texts.
But the breakdown of feudalism, the growth of central national authority in place of the local feudal
lordships, and the rise of the nationalist idea at the
Reformation, with the accompanying notion of the
duty of passive obedience to rulers, gave significance
to these texts as a more scientific study of Roman
law went forward as a result of the Renaissance and
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of the humanist movement. In France, where the
treatises of widest influence were written, there was
coming to be something very like the Byzantine
princeps, and in England if Tudor and Stuart had
had their way there would have been a like result.
Throughout western Europe the idea of sovereignty
as a control from without, of the sovereign as something external to society and set over it, something
with which the several individuals who compose
society had made a compact binding them to obedience or to which as of divine right passive obedience
was due-throughout western Europe this idea superseded the Germanic and feudal conception of a
relation of protection and service growing out of
tenure of land and involving reciprocal rights and
duties. When this idea came to prevail the sovereign was a Byzantine emperor. What it willed had
tht force of law. Law was not something fundamental and eternal, running back of all states, it
was the will of this state or that; the command of
this or that sovereign. Whatever the moral duties
of sovereigns, they were incapable of legal limitation. They might rule under God, but they certainly
did not and could not rule under the law, for they
made the law. This conception of law as will has
been struggling with the idea of law as reason ever
smce.
When the common law, with its feudal theory of
the relation of king and subject and its Germanic
theory of the supremacy of law came in conflict with
the new conception of sovereignty developed in
:f rance on Byzantine lines, it was forc~d hi a posi-
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tion which seemed in practice to assert that the
sovereign had legal duties to the subjects, that there
was law above and behind all sovereigns which they
could not alter and by which their actions might be
judged, and that the law stood between the individual subject or citizen and this leviathan and compelled it to recognize the natural rights of the individual, given him by this eternal and immutable law,
or to recognize the terms of the social compact
whereby the individual had conferred upon leviathan
his very sovereignty and the latter in return had
undertaken to secure those natural rights. At the
Revolution, the peoples of the several states succeeded to the sovereignty of Parliament. They
thought of this not as feudal but as Byzantine sovereignty. And yet they were afraid and justly afraid
of these emperors they were setting over themselves,
even though the princeps was a fluctuating body
made up of a majority or plurality of themselves.
Hence by bills of rights they sought to impose legal
limits upon the action of those who wielded the
powers of sovereignty, while adhering to a political
theory of illimitable and uncontrollable power in the
sovereign itself. It was inevitable that this compromise between inconsistent theories should sooner
or later produce a conflict between courts and people.
In that conflict, which became acute in the first decade of the present century, each was in a measure
right and each was in a measure wrong.
"Talk of stubborn facts," says Dr. Crothers,
" they are but babes beside a stubborn theory." The
conflict between courts and people was not a contest
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of theory with fact. It was a conflict of two stubborn theories. It was a conflict of juristic theory
with political theory as to what law is, whence it
comes and whence it derives its force. Each theory
was the outgrowth of the law and politics of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I shall have
to say more as to this conflict in my next lecture.
Suffice it to say here that if, as I shall try to show
on another occasion, the classical juristic theory as
laid down by Coke and developed in the eighteenth
century is untenable and must be abandoned by the
jurist, the classical political theory as laid down by
the sixteenth. and seventeenth-century publicists and
developed in the eighteenth century in an age of
absolute governments, must likewise be abandoned.
Indeed the French who have advocated it most zeal·
ously and given it the furthest logical development
are now beginning to throw it over and are urging
that sovereignty is not force from without but is
public service from within. Properly understood,
and shorn of the extravagances that it acquired
through seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories
of natural law, the doctrine of supremacy of law is
entirely in accord with such a conception. Public
service, whether by a railroad company or by a
municipal corporation or by the state, is not an end
but a means. In neither case may it be left to the
arbitrary will of those who perform it. In each case
the social interest in general security requires that it
be guided and regulated by reason; that it conform
to principles and standards formulated dispassionately in advance of controversy upon weighing of
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all the interests to be affected. In insisting on the
supremacy of law, the common law is not bound of
necessity to stand always against the popular will
in the interest of the abstract individual. Rather
its true position is one of standing for ultimate and
more important social interests as against the more
immediately pressing but less weighty interests of
the moment by which mere will unrestrained by
reaSOn is too likely to be swayed.
I have made more than one comparison between
the period of the Tudor and Stuart kings, in which
the contests between courts and crown shaped our
doctrine of the supremacy of the law, and the present
iperiod, in which contests between courts and majorities or pluralities have threatened to overthrow it.
One more remains to be made which is by no means
the least significant. At the very time that absolute
ideas of lawmaking were dominant through the rise
of the absolute theory of sovereignty and acceptance of the Byzantine doctrine that the will of the
emperor has the force of law, a period of juridical
idealism was at hand which proceeded upon a radically different idea. Our law and the law of Continental Europe were liberalized and modernized in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not by legislation, not by exercise of the will of any sovereign,
but by a juristic doctrine that all legal institutions
and all legal rules were to be measured by reason
and that nothing could stand in law that could not
maintain itself in reason. So today, while absolute
theories of law as a mere expression of the popular
will are current in political thinking, a return to juri-
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dical idealism is in progress. Once more jurists of
Continental Europe are writing elaborate treatises
on natural law. In the United States, a revival of
philosophical jurisprudence has definitely begun and
conscious attempt to make the law conform to ideals
is once more becoming the creed of jurisprudence.
This does not mean that jurists are going back to
the eighteenth-century conception of a set of fundamental legal principles of universal validity for all
men, in all places, in all times, from which a complete set of rules might be drawn by purely logical
processes. They are content to search for the ideals
of the age and to set them up as a guide. They are
content to seek what Kohler calls the jural postulates
of the civilization of the time. But they are not
content to abdicate all function and to concede that
court and lawyer have no more to do than to ascertain and interpret the will of the majority or plurality for the time being. The notion of juristic superfluity involved in such a doctrine is as impossible in
the complex industrial society of today as the notion
of legislative futility, held so generally during the
hegemony of the historical school, or the notion of
juristic futility added thereto by the positivists.
Men are not born with intuitions of the principles
by which justice may be attained through the public
adjudication of controversies. The administration
of justice is not an easy task to which every man is
competent. It is no more possible for the people to
administer justice directly or to control the course
of justice directly than it is for them to administer
medicine or control the course of medical science di-
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recdy or to direct armies and control the course of
military science. In each case, study of the experience of the past joined with scientific understanding
of the problems involved is the road to the ends
sought, and a technical body of knowledge inevitably results which may be mastered only through
special study and training. Such was the element of
truth in Coke's answer to his sovereign. Indeed
every attempt in legal history to go back to justice
without law has enforced the lesson which the judges
of England sought to impress upon King James at
their Sunday conference. In this country we should
have learned it when, in the period after the Revolution, the bitter hostility to lawyers and the attempt
ruthlessly to break down the professional tradition,
to insure the access of the untrained and incompetent
to the opportunities of the bar and to degrade the
judicial office, resulted only in establishing the lawyer
as the leader of the community and in intrenching
the fundamental dogmas of the common law in our
constitutions.
We may be assured, therefore, that the supremacy
of law, established by the common law against Tudor and Stuart is not to disappear. We may be
confident that we shall have, not merely laws, expressions of the popular will for the time being, but
law, an expression of reason applied to the relations
of man with man and of man with the state. We
may be confident also that in the new period of legal
development which is at hand as in like periods in
legal history there will be a working over of the
jural materials of the past and working into them of
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new ideas from without. We shall be warranted in
prophesying that this working over will be effected
by means of a philosophical theory of right and justice and conscious attempt to make the law conform
to ideals. Such a period will be a period of scientific
law, made, if not by judges, then by lawyers trained
in the universities; not one of arbitrary law based on
the fiat of any sovereign, however hydra-headed.
For the notion of law as the will of the people belongs to the past era of a complete and stable system in which certainty and security were the sole
ends. Throughout legal history law has been stagnant whenever the imperative idea has been uppermost. Law has lived and grown through juristic
activity. It has been liberalized by ideas of natural
right or justice or reasonableness or utility, leading
to criteria by which rules and principles and standards might be tested, not by ideas of force and command and the sovereign will as the ultimate source
of authority. Attempts to reduce the judicial office
in the United States to the purely mechanical function of applying rules imposed from without and of
serving as a mouthpiece for the popular will for the
moment are not in the line of progress.

IV
THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN AND THE
RIGHTS OF MAN

IN PRIMITIVE law the end is simply to keep the

peace. The legal order is a peaceable order at
whatever cost, and in consequence whatever serves
to avert private vengeance and prevent private war
is an instrument of justice. In its beginning law is
no more than a body of rules by which controversies
are adjusted peaceably. At first, therefore, it attempts nothing more than to furnish the injured a
substitute for revenge. Where modern law thinks of
compensation for an injury, primitive law thought
of composition for the desire to be avenged. Thus
the original Roman law dealt with injury to the
person under the head of insult; the earliest of the
Anglo-Saxon laws provided two-fold payment, where
a bruise was not covered by the clothes and so
subjected the victim to chaffing and increased his
desire to be revenged; the Salic law gave double
composition to the Frank, accustomed to right his
own wrongs, as compared with the Roman,
trained for generations to adjust his controversies
in court.
Greek philosophy and Roman law soon got beyond the crude conception of primitive law and gave
us in its place an idea of the legal order as a device
to preserve the social status quo; to keep each man
8,~
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in his appointed groove and thus prevent the friction
with his fellows which the older conception sought
only to mitigate. Thus in Plato's ideal state every
member of the community is to be assigned to the
class for which he proves to be best fitted; then the
law is to keep him there and so, it was conceived,
"a perfect harmony and unity will characterize both
the state and every person in it." To Aristotle also,
rights, that is interests to be protected by law, existed only between those who were free and equal.
The law was in the first instance to take account of
relations of inequality in which individuals were
treated according to their worth. Then, each being
in his proper place, the law would keep him there
and would preserve among equals a unanimity in
which there would be no violation of mutual rights.
The well-known exhortation in which St. Paul calls
upon everyone to exert himself to do his duty in the
class in which he finds himself, brings out this same
idea.
Roman legal genius gave practical effect to this
conception of justice as a preservation of the social
status quo by conceiving it to be the province of the
state to define and protect the interests and powers
of action which in their aggregate make up the legal
personality of the individual. As laid down in the
Institutes of Justinian, the precepts of law are three:
to live honorably, not to injure another, to give to
everyone his due. What the interests of another are
which one is not to injure, what constitutes anyone's
due which is to be given him, are questions left to the
traditional and authoritative social organization. In
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other words, we have here the Greek idea of the end
of the legal system, the idea that it exists to maintain harmoniously the existing social order.
In the Middle Ages Germanic law brought back
for a time the primitive conception of merely keeping the peace and the primitive institutions of buying off vengeance, of a tariff of compositions and of
private war. But as the authority of Justinian in
law and of Aristotle in philosophy came to be accepted, this conception of justice gave way to the
classical idea of preservation of the social status quo,
which, indeed, had behind it not merely Aristotle and
the Roman law but the unassailable authority of
more than one text of Scripture. Hence in the
Middle Ages, as in Antiquity, the idea of a device
to keep the peace is succeeded by the idea of a device
to maintain the social status quo. This conception
of the end of law was not questioned till the Reformation. Then the appeal to reaSOn against authority led to a new conception in philosophy, in
theology, in politics and ultimately in legal theory,
as a result of which the legal order came to be
thought of as a device to secure a maximum of individual self-assertion. The beginnings of the change
are in philosophy, in the attempt to sustain authority
by reason. But the Middle Ages added nothing
to the juristic theory of the end of law and only
prepared the way, through philosophy, for the
new conception which developed in the seventeenth
century.
We commonly fix the date of the new era in jurisprudence by the appearance of the great work of
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Grotius in 1625. As he and those who followed him
expounded the new doctrine it had two sides. On
the one hand there was a theory of limitations upon
human activities imposed by reason in view of human
nature, on the other hand there was a theory of
moral qualities inherent in human beings, or natural
rights, demonstrated by reason as deductions from
human nature. The first had been worked out by
those who went before Grotius, especially the Spanish jurist-theologians of the preceding century. They
had sought to combine the newer ideas of the political order with the older ideas of the unity of law as
eternal verity rather than state enactment. Accordingly in developing the conception of unity of the
law as a universal and eternal body of principles,
they thought of restraints upon states, of certain
limits to their activities which they could not overpass, so that in international law there were limits
of state activity in the relations of states with other
states, in political theory there were limits of state
activity in the relations of state to subject, in juristic
theory there were limits of individual activity in the
relations of individuals with each other. Grotius, and
seventeenth-century jurisprudence following him,
made reason the measure of all obligation. Thus
at the very time that the common law had established its doctrine of supremacy of law and had
turned the feudal duties of the paramount lord
toward his tenants into legal duties of the king
toward his subjects, a juristic theory of fundamental
limitations upon the activities of states, of rulers
and of individuals dictated by eternal reason, had
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sprung up independently to furnish the scientific
explanation.
As has been said, Grotius and those who followed him made reason the measure of all obligation. They conceived that the end for which law
exists is to produce conformity to the nature of
rational creatures. They had broken with authority as authority, but they accepted the Roman law
as embodied reason and ventured little that did not
have authority behind it. Hence they accepted the
Roman maxim-not to injure another and to give
to everyone his due, that is, respect for personality
and respect for acquired rights-as conformity to
the nature of rational creatures. This raised certain
obvious problems: What is injury to another?
What is there in personality that makes aggression
an injury? What is it that constitutes anything one's
own? Grotius and his successors tried to answer by
a theory of natural rights; not merely natural law,
as before, not merely principles of eternal validity,
but certain qualities inherent in persons and demonstrated by reason and recognized by natural law, to
which therefore the national law ought to give effect.
Thus, again, at the very time that the victory of
the courts in the contests between the common.law
courts and the Stuart kings had established that
there were fundamental common-law rights of Englishmen which Englishmen might maintain in courts
and in which courts would secure them even against
the king, a juristic theory of fundamental natural
rights, independent of and running back of all states,
which states might secure and ought to secure, but
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could not alter or abridge, had sprung up independently and was at hand to furnish a scientific explanation when the next century called for one. By
a natural transition, the common-law limitations
upon royal authority became natural limitations upon
all authority; the common-law rights of Englishmen
became the natural rights of man. Each underwent
some change of substance along with this change
of name.
To understand this change and the effect which
it had upon the law as we received it at the end of
the eighteenth century and worked it over in the
fore part of the nineteenth century, we must examine the theory of natural rights, the theory of
the relation of law to natural rights, and the theory
of natural law and of the possibility of deducing
a fixed and complete system of positive law from
the principles of natural law, as these theories were
held when our bills of rights were framed and our
constitutional law was formative.
According to the Grotian definition, a right is
"that quality in a person which makes it just or
right for him either to possess certain things or to
do certain actions." The medieval idea was that
law existed to maintain those powers of control over
things and those powers of action which the social
system had awarded or attributed to each man. The
Grotian idea was that law exists to maintain and
give effect to certain inherent moral qualities in
every man which reason discovers for us, by virtue of which he ought to have certain powers
of control over things or certain powers of action.
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But one of the characteristics of the stage of liberalization which may be called the stage of equity or
natural law is a tendency to hold that the legal and
the moral are necessarily synonymous, that if something ought to be juristically, for that reason alone
it is legally. Hence the scheme of natural rights that
the law ought to secure, quickly becomes the scheme
of fundamental rights which it does secure, legal
rights being taken to be merely declaratory thereof.
There was a good side to all this. The insistence
on what ought to be as the measure of what is did
no less than create international law, and it liberal·
Ized and modernized the actual law of the European states through the juristic testing of every doctrine and every category with reference to its basis
in reason. But it had a bad side. It led to a confusion between the interests which it is conceived
the law ought to recognize and the rights by which
the law secures interests when recognized, which
has been the bane of jurisprudence ever since, and
it led to absolute notions of an ideal development
of received legal ideas as the jural order of nature
which later brought legal thought and popular political thought into an obstinate conflict.
A legal system attains its end by recognizing certain interests, individual, public and social; by de-:fining the limits within which these interests shall
be recognized legally and given effect through the
force of the state, and by endeavoring to secure the
interests so recognized within the defined limits. It
does not create these interests. There is so much
truth in the eighteenth-century theory of natural
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rights. Undoubtedly the progress of society and
the development of government increase the number and variety of these interests. But they arise,
apart from the law, through the competition of individuals with each other, the competition of groups
or societies with each other and the competition of
individuals with such groups or societies. The law
does not create them, it only recognizes them. Yet
it does not have for its sole function to recognize
interests which exist independently. It must determine which it will recognize, it must define the extent to which it will give effect to them in view of
other interests, individual, public or social, and the
possibilities of effective interference by law, and it
must devise the means by which they shall be secured. Such is the theory of today. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theory, however, confused the interest, which exists independently of law,
and the legal right, the creature of law. It confused the interest, which the law recognizes in whole
or in part and seeks to secure, with the right by which
the law gives effect to the interest when recognized
and to the extent of the recognition. Natural rights
mean simply interests which we think ought to be
secured; demands which human beings may make
which we think ought to be satisfied. It is perfectly
true that neither law nor state creates them. But
it is fatal to all sound thinking to treat them as legal
conceptions. For legal rights, the devices which law
employs to secure such of these interests as it is expedient to recognize, are the work of the law and in
that sense the work of the state. Through the ex-
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altation of individual interests which resulted from
the theory of natural rights and the confusion of
interest and legal right involved therein, the natural
rights of men presently became as tyrannous as the
divine rights of states and rulers.
It soon became apparent that the theory of inherent moral qualities, while it would serve for interests of personality-for claims to be secure in
one's body and life and the interests immediately
related thereto-would not serve as a basis for the
so-called natural right of property-for the suum
cuique element of justice, or, as we put it today, for
interests of substance. None of the jurists of that
time questioned the existing social order. On the
wntrary they assumed as beyond question a natural
right of property. They conceived that security of
acquisitions, including what one had acquired
through the existing social order, was a chief end.
At the same time they could not but see a difference
between this natural right and such rights as those
to the integrity of one's body, to free motion and
locomotion and to free speech. Accordingly jurists
turned for an explanation to the idea of contract.
It must be remembered that contract in this connection has reference to the Roman conception of
a legal transaction, an act intended to have legal
consequences to which the law attributes the intended
result. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
this was the staple legal analogy. The idea of the
legal transaction was the most important contribu
tion of Rome to the law, and in an age when tradt
and commerce were expanding the law of such trans-
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actions was becoming the living part of the legal
system. The juristic problem of the time was to
reconcile the needs of business and the ethical ideas
of good faith which accompanied the infusion of
morals into the law with the traditional categories
of contracts in Roman law. Naturally contract
loomed large in juristic thought for two centuries.
Moreover, the central point in the theory of the
legal transaction is will, the will to produce a possible and legally permissible result. But the central
idea in the theory of natural law and of natural
rights was conformity to the nature of reasoning
creatures possessed of wills. So the question, how
could such creatures acquire rights against one another seemed easy to answer. How, indeed, could
this be except by contract; through a legal transaction? Thus the foundation of the natural rights,
which the law existed to maintain, was taken to be
a legal transaction, a compact of all men with all
men by virtue of which rights and corresponding
duties were created. Justice, therefore, consisted
in respecting and observing the terms of this compact and the business of the jurist and the lawmaker
was to discover and to interpret its terms. The
sole end of the law was taken to be a giving effect
to the inherent moral qualities in individual men,
whereby things are theirs, or a securing to individual
men of those things to which they are entitled under
the terms of the social compact.
Not only was the eighteenth-century system of
natural rights a closed. hard and fast system, for
the jurists of that time were sure that they could
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deduce all the terms of the social compact and all
the inherent moral qualities of mankind from the
nature of man in the abstract, but the eighteenthcentury theory of law was no less absolute. It was
conceived that there were first principles of law
inherent in nature and that these principles were
discoverable by deduction as necessary results of
human nature. Hence it was thought possible to
discover, and that the jurists had discovered, principles of universal validity, among all men, in all
places and in all times from which might be deduced
a complete code for the lawgiver, a complete constitution for the statesman and an infallible guide to
the conscience for the individual. It was thought
possible through elaborate bills of rights to prescribe
universal principles by which legislation might be
guided for all time.
Identification of the common-law rights of Englishmen with the natural rights of man and of the
fundamental law for which Coke contended with
the immutable and eternal natural law had two consequences for our common-law tradition. One was
to give currency to an idea of the finality of the
common law. For, as has always been true when
men have believed in absolute theories of the sort,
the principles, supposed to be the dictates of nature,
flowed in practice from one of two sources. On social, economic and ethical questions, nature was
always found to dictate the personal views of the
individual jurist as they had been fixed and settled
by education, association and, perhaps, class interest.
On legal questions, nature was found to dictate for
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the most part the principles of law with which the
individual jurist was familiar and under which he
had grown up. Just as in nine cases out of ten natural law meant for the Continental jurist of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an ideal development of the principles of the Roman law, which
he knew and had studied, for the common-law lawyer
it came to mean an ideal development of the common law. The past generation of lawyers brought
up on Blackstone, learned this mode of thinking as
part of the rudiments of legal education. More recently our historical legal scholarship, assuming that
all of our legal system was at least implicit in the
law reports of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen·
turies, if not in the Year Books, gave us a natural
law upon historical premises. Hence scholar and
lawyer concurred in what became a thorough-going
conviction of the nineteenth century, that at least
the principal dogmas of the common law were of
universal validity and were established by nature.
When the lawyer spoke of law he thought of these
doctrines. He conceived that constitutions and bills
of rights simply declared them. He construed statutes into accord with them. He forced them upon
modern social legislation. When he reminded the
sovereign people that it ruled under God and the
law, he meant that these doctrines, which he conceived as going back of all constitutions and beyond
the reach of legislation, were to be the measure of
state activity. This was not the true common law.
The common law rested on the idea that reason not
arbitrary will should be the measure of action and
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of decision. But the eighteenth century was sure
that it had the one key to reason and was fond of
laying out philosophical and political and legal
charts by which men were to be guided for all time.
Examples of this idea of the finality of the common law and of the identity of its principles with
the principles of natural law may be found throughout the reports of the last century. Thus in the
great case of Fletcher v. Peck, where a statute of
Georgia revoking a land grant on the ground that
it had been procured by fraud was in question, it
appeared that the land had passed into the hands of
a purchaser for value without notice. This being
so, Chief Justice Marshall said that, apart from particular provisions in the federal constitution, the
state was restrained from such legislation by "general principles which are common to our free institutions." The general principle here was the familiar one that equity will not set aside a transaction
for fraud where the title to what was parted with
through fraud has passed to a purchaser for value
without notice. This principle depends upon the history of our courts of equity and the relation of
equity to law in our system. Apart from this history, it has not seemed so intrinsically self-evident
to recent thinkers. In the same spirit, at the end
of the century, when legislation prohibiting employees from making certain contracts came before
the courts we find more than one laying down a
doctrine of natural incapacities to which the legislature is incompetent to add new ones based merely
on the fa.cts of modern industrial employment. In
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the event these "natural incapacities" all prove to
be incapacities which were recognized at common
law. In the same spirit, in the present century we
find an able court saying of the fellow-servant rule
that it "is a part of the general American common
law, resting upon considerations of right and justice." The fundamental conceptions of our traditional case law came to be regarded as fundamental
conceptions of legal science. Not merely the jurist,
but the legislator, the sociologist, the criminologist,
the labor leader, and in the case of our corporation
laws and laws as to restraint of trade the business
man had to reckon with them. With the coming
of a period of collectivist thinking and of social
legislation, conflict was inevitable.
Such a conflict did result when the absolute theory
of law came in contact with an equally absolute
theory of politics. While on the one hand the legal
theory as to the nature of law had become absolute
through the general acceptance of the eighteenthcentury conception, a political theory became established on the other hand which ran counter to the
whole common-law theory of law and of lawmaking.
For the popular theory of sovereignty, what we may
call the classical American political theory, is quite
as firmly rooted in the mind of the public as the
eighteenth-century theory of law is rooted in the
mind of the lawyer. The layman is taught this
political theory in school, he reads it in the newspapers, he listens to it on the Fourth of July and
from the stump and from Chautauqua platforms,
and he seldom or never hears it questioned. In
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consequence, he is as thoroughly sure of it as is the
lawyer of his juristic theory. If the lawyer is moved
to stigmatize all that does not comport with his
doctrine as lawlessness, the people at large are
moved to stigmatize all that does not comport with
their theory as usurpation.
While the lawyer as a rule still believes that the
principles of law are absolute, eternal, and of universal validity, and that law is found, not made,
the people believe no less firmly that it may be made
and that they have the power to make it. While
to the lawyer the state enforces law because it is
law, to the people law is law because the state, reflecting their desires, has so willed. While to the
lawyer law is above and beyond all will, to the people
it is but the formulation of the general will. Hence
it often happens that when the lawyer thinks he is
enforcing the law, the people think he is overturning the law. While, for example, the lawyer thinks
of popular action as subject to legal limitations running back of all constitutions and merely reasserted,
not created, thereby, the people think of themselves
as the authors of all constitutions and limitations
and the final judges of their meaning and effect.
This conflict between the lawyer's theory and the
political theory weakens the force of law. The
lawyer's theory leads him to pay scant attention to
legislation or to mold it and warp it to the exigencies of what he regards as the real law. But to
those who do not share his theory, this appears as
a high-handed over-riding of law, and the layman,
laboring under that impression, is unable to perceive
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why the lawyers should have a monopoly of that
convenient power. On the other hand, the people's
theory that law is wholly a conscious product of
the human will tends to produce arbitrary and illconsidered legislation impossible of satisfactory application to actual controversies. Each of these absolute theories must be given up.
A second effect of eighteenth-century theory upon
the common-law tradition was to intensify the individualism of which for other reasons it had quite
enough. In both its aspects the juristic theory of
natural rights was thoroughly individualist. As a
theory of inherent moral qualities of persons, it was
based on deduction from the nature of an abstract
isolated individual. As a theory of rights based
upon a social compact, it thought of natural rights
as the rights of individuals who had entered into
a contract, apart from which there would and could
be no law and nothing for the law to maintain. In
either view, the law exists to maintain and protect
individual interests. This fitted the legal theory of
the common-law rights of Englishmen so perfectly
that there is no cause for wonder that the founders
of our political and legal and judicial systems, who
were studying Coke and Blackstone on the one hand
and the French and Dutch publicists on the other,
thought they were reading about the same things.
Hence Americans of the end of the eighteenth century argued for either or for both. The declaration
of rights of the Continental Congress of 1774 asserted the legal rights of Englishmen. The Declaration of Independence of 1776 asserted the natural
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rights of man. Yet each claimed essentially the
same things. It followed that the common law was
taken to be a system of giving effect to individual
natural rights. It was taken to exist in order to secure individual interests, not merely against aggression by other individuals, but even more against
arbitrary invasion by state or society. It followed
also that the bills of rights, declaratory of natural
rights, were likewise declaratory of the common
law. This idea is very prominent in judicial discussions of liberty of contract in the nineteenth century.
F or example, one court in passing on legislation
directed against fines in cotton mills, tells us that
a statute which violates "fundamental rights" is
unconstitutional and void even though the enactment
of it is not expressly forbidden. Another court tells
us that natural persons do not derive their right
to contract from the law. Hence whatever the state
may do in limiting the power of a corporation to
make certain contracts, because the corporation gets
its power from the state, it may not limit the contractual capacity of natural persons, who got their
power to contract from nature, so that nature alone
may remove it. Another court, in passing adversely
upon legislation against company stores, said that
any classification was arbitrary and unconstitutional,
unless it proceeded on the "natural capacity of persons to contract." Another, in passing on a similar
statute denied that contractual capacity may be restricted except for physical or mental disabilities.
Another held that the legislature could not take
notice of the de facto subjection of one class of
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persons to another in making contracts of employment in certain industries, but must be governed
by the theoretical jural equality. All these instances
come to the proposition that the common-law categories of disability are final and that legislation
may not add new ones. The bills of rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment were treated as but declar·
ing a natural liberty which was also a common-law
liberty; hence an abridgement not known to the
common law was thought to go counter to their
fair construction, if not to their letter.
Perhaps nothing contributed so much to create
and foster the hostility to courts and law and constitutions, which was conspicuous at the end of the
nineteenth century and at the beginning of the present century, as this conception of the courts as guardians of individual natural rights against the state
and against society, of the law as a final and absolute body of doctrine declaring these individual natural rights, and of constitutions as declaratory of
common-law principles, which are also natural-law
principles, anterior to the state and of superior validity to enactments by the authority of the state, having for their purpose to guarantee and maintain the
natural rights of individuals against society and all
its agencies. When houses are scarce and landlords
are grasping, Blackstone's proposition that the public good is in nothing more essentially interested than
in the protection of every individual's private rights
is not the popular view. A crowded, urban, industrial community looks to society for protection
against predatory individuals, natural or artificial,
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and resents doctrines that protect these individuals
against society for fear society will oppress them.
But the common-law guarantees of individual rights
are established in our constitutions, state and federal. So that, while in England these common-law
dogmas have had to give way to modern legislation,
in America they have stood continually between the
people, or large classes of the people, and legislation they desire. In consequence, the courts were
long put in a false position of doing nothing and
obstructing everything, which it was impossible for
the layman to interpret aright.
It is not in constitutional law alone that the common-law rights of Englishmen, translated into rights
of man and intrenched in constitutions, have been
a source of popular irritation toward the law. American criminal procedure has done scarcely less to
produce discontent with judicial administration of
justice. But judicial administration of punitive justice is hedged about on every side with constitutional
guarantees securing the so-called natural rights of
the accused. All crimes of any consequence were
once felonies punishable with death. The reform
that led to milder sentences and more humane punishments came after the principles and even the detailed rules of criminal procedure had been well
established. The judges "favoring life in capital
cases," and all cases of any consequence were capital, "took advantage of the slightest technical defect to discharge a defendant, and form became in
the highest degree essential." When the commonlaw rights of the accused Englishman became the
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natural rights of the accused man and these rights
were intrenched in state and federal constitutions,
these rules and the spirit in which they were conceived were projected into a time in which they
were not merely inapplicable but downright harmful.
Bentham long ago pointed out the ill effects of the
complicated, expensive and time-consuming machinery of a common-law criminal prosecution. Many
states, however, guarantee to an accused the power
to insist upon all of this wasteful machinery as a
natural right which legislation must hold sacred.
Again, another serious defect in our criminal procedure is the lack of any legal mode of interrogating
the accused. In practice the rich malefactor takes
the advice of counsel, closes his mouth and leaves
the prosecution to prove what it may. The police
labor with the friendless malefactor till a confession
is extorted. Let us note how the privilege of the
accused against interrogation and the rules of evidence as to confessions arose. When these insti.
tutions of the law grew up, petty offences against
property were felonies and the offenders were peasants and laborers, habituated by generations of subordination to an exaggerated, one may say a stupid,
deference to authority. As Dean Wigmore has said,
in commenting upon the rules as to confessions, "the
situation of such a peasant, charged by his landlord
with poaching and urged to confess, the situation
of a maid urged and threatened by her mistress to
confess a petty theft, involves a mental condition to
which we may well hesitate to apply the test or a
rational principle. We may believe that rationally
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a false confession is not to be apprehended from
a normal person under certain paltry inducements
or meaningless threats; but we have here perhaps
a person not to be tested by a normal or rational
standard." It is not to be wondered at that the
judges of a hundred and fifty or even a hundred
years ago strained every point to exclude confessions
and prevent interrogation of accused persons. But
under modern conditions of an emancipated proletariat fully conscious of its rights and filled with
scant respect for authority, the whole basis of these
rulings has failed, and today the immunity from
interrogation and the strict rules as to confessions
do the poor no good and are an unnecessary burden
upon the prosecutor. Immunity of accused persons
from all interrogation, if they are firm, well-advised
and able to give bail, is a most effective shield of
wrongdoers. Knowledge of this tempts police and
detectives ~nd prosecutors to lawless modes of getting what cannot be had lawfully whenever the poor
and defenceless are in their custody. Granting all
that may be said as to the abuses to which a legal
form of interrogation is liable, the fact remains that
the present state of the law operates unequally and
invites oppression and lawlessness. No rich man
has been subjected to the third degree to obtain
proof of violation of anti-trust or anti-rebate legislation, and no powerful politician has been so dealt
with in order to obtain proof of bribery or graft.
The common-law right of the accused poacher, become the natural right of the accused magnate and
intrenched in the bill of rights, shows how legal
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machinery may defeat its own ends when one age
conceives it has said the final word and assumes
to prescribe unalterable rules for time to come.
Lawyers of the last century were brought up on
the doctrine of natural rights and the conception
that law exists to secure these rights to the individual
as against state and society, as fundamental doctrines. They were brought up to believe that the
highest social interest was an interest in securing
to everyone these natural rights. Inevitably they
regarded protection of the supposed right of the
accused to every jot of procedural advantage afforded him by a ritual born of obsolete conditions
as a duty superior to protection from lawlessness,
since the first interest of the public lay in maintaining that same right.
Thinking of common-law rights as declaratory of
natural rights and of common-law doctrines as declaratory of natural law has led to bad results also
in the attitude of courts toward legislation. The
courts have done more than enforce their ideas
of economics upon reluctant communities in passing upon the constitutionality of social legislation.
Through their power of interpretation they have
made statutes yield to their juristic ideas in the
very teeth of legislative intent. Usually they have
done this from belief in the eternal and unalterable
character of common-law doctrines and commonlaw institutions. Conceiving some doctrines to be
beyond the reach of legislation, they have held
that statutes were meant only to reaffirm and declare these doctrines and not to introduce anything
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new. Conceiving that case law is the normal type
and legislature-made law something exceptional, to
be resorted to only on special occasions and for
special reasons, they have insisted that we must
presume the legislature intended no innovation upon
the common law, must construe strictly all departures thereform, and must restrict the operation of
changes to those particulars with respect to which
the statute is clear and express. Bearing in mind
that the common law thus protected so zealously
from all modification is essentially judge-made,
these doctrines certainly come very close to a judicial assertion of legislative incompetence to deal
with ordinary legal relations. To take another example: If a state legislature acts unreasonably and
arbitrarily in the enactment of an oppressive statute,
the courts conceive that there is a deprivation of
liberty or property within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the federal courts, if necessary, will refuse to give effect to the enactment or
will even restrain its operation. If the state executive acts unreasonably and arbitrarily to the injury of an individual, the same position will be
taken; the act is fairly certain to be held of no
effect. But let the state judiciary act in the same
way, and the divinity that doth hedge about a court
requires a different result. If the highest court of
a state decides arbitrarily and unreasonably in defiance of all legal principle there is no remedy; the
protection which the Fourteenth Amendment
throws around liberty and property when they are
threatened by legislative or executive action is with-
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drawn. In such a case our highest federal tribunal
will not act. One need not complain of these propositions. It is enough to state them as facts.
Whether the doctrines are desirable or undesirable
they demonstrate that judges, like the king and like
the people, when they act upon absolute theories
are not easily confined by self-imposed limitations
and may even wield absolute power in an arbitrary
manner. Probably of the three they are on the
whole least likely to do so. For the training and
bent of judges leads them to subordinate everything to principles and general rules. Even when
they overstep legal bounds, they do so according
to rules and upon a system. Their theory is that
some rule or principle contains a better expression
of the law. But a theory must be judged by its
fruits. One under which so many of our state
courts in the last century made of the proposition
that statutes will not be held unconstitutional unless
their repugnance to the constitution is beyond doubt
"a mere courteous and smoothly transmitted platitude" is worse than an anachronism.
But we must not infer that the contribution of
eighteenth-century theory to our legal tradition is to
be cast out utterly. For the theory of fundamental
principles to which law must conform and of fundamental interests which law must secure at all
events has another side. Those who held it were
willing to do justice and to suffer justice to be done
against their immediate interests for the very sake
of justice, and they were eager to vindicate justice
at any cost. Where the eighteenth-century and the
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nineteenth-century American were willing to bear
a hand in the administration of justice by asserting
rights even at a sacrifice, today vindication of right
and justice are generally, if not universally, coming
to be secondary to the trouble and expense involved.
Where the common law relied on individual initiative, we are more and more turning to administrative interference. No doubt the delay and expense in litigation involved in our judicial organization has had much to do with the one phenomenon, and our excessive reliance on individual action
and the requirements of large cities, of the relation
of employer and employed in modern industry and
of distribution in a highly specialized society have
had much to do with the latter. But beyond what
may be assigned to these causes there has been a
marked change. "The administration of justice,"
said Daniel Webster, "is the great end of human
society," and he pronounced justice, meaning the
end of the legal order, "the greatest interest of
man on earth." In contrast with such statements,
which were staple in the last century, men are saying
today that material welfare is the great end to
which all institutions must be directed and by which
they must be measured. Men are not asking merely
to be allowed to achieve welfare j they are asking
to have welfare achieved for them through organized society. Much that advertises itself as social
is in truth individualist j it is individualism to be
attained through society rather than through individual self-help. Even though we seek social ends
through law, law is not self-enforcing. Exceptas
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a vigorous despot may for a time put rules in force
by the might of his arms, enforcement depends ultimately upon the general will. And this does not
mean an abstract desire that a rule or a body of
rules be adhered to. It means a steadfast will on
the part of the individual citizen to obey the rule
in action and to see to it that others obey it also.
An active individual popular interest in justice, a
fixed and constant popular determination to secure
for everyone his due is a prerequisite of an effective
legal system. The law may give effect to this determination. It cannot create it. An easy-going
attitude toward right and justice bodes as ill for law
as an easy-going attitude toward politics bodes ill
for government and administration. The individual citizen must do his duty with respect to the one
no less than with respect to the other, if the machinery of the modern state is to be effective.
Moreover, even if we grant that ultimately all
interests, individual and public, are secured and
maintained because of a social interest in so doing,
this does not mean that individual interests, the
details of which the last two centuries worked out
so thoroughly, are to be ignored. On the contrary
the chiefest of social interests is the moral and
social life of the individual; and thus individual
interests become largely identical with a social interest. Just as in the seventeenth century an undue
insistence upon public interests, thought of as the
interests of the sovereign, defeated the moral and
social life of the individual and required the assertion of individual interests in bills of rights and
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declarations of rights, there is like danger now that
certain social interests will be unduly emphasized
and that governmental maternalism will become an
end rather than a means and defeat the real purposes of the legal order. Although we think socially, we must still think of individual interests,
and of that greatest of all claims which a human
being may make, the claim to assert his individuality, to exercise freely the will and the reason
which God has given him. We must emphasize
the social interest in the moral and social life of
the individual. But we must remember that it is
the life of a free-willing being.

V
THE PIONEERS AND THE LAW

INdothenothighly
organized urban life of today we
always remember how near we are to
the pioneer. Less than a century ago the author
of the Leatherstocking tales could write of central
New York as newly redeemed from the wilderness.
The grandfathers of men now living were pioneers
in the states formed from the Northwest Territory.
The fathers of the present population of the states
immediately west of the Mississippi were pioneers
there and many of the present generation were
brought up under pioneer conditions. Men are still
living who were pioneers on the Pacific coast and
the beginnings of California are no further back
than the span of one life. A great and populous
state of the Southwest was opened to settlement by
the white man in the last decade of the nineteenth
century and has been developed in the present century. The moment one passes beyond the narrow
fringe of original settlements along the Atlantic
coast, he has but to scratch the surface in order to
find the frontier.
"There are features of American democracy,"
says Professor Sumner, "which are inexplicable unless one understands . . . frontier society. Some
of our greatest political abuses have come from
transferring to our now large and crowded cities
II2
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maxims and usages which were convenient and harmless in backwoods country towns." This is no less
true of many of our more serious legal abuses. In
particular many crudities in judicial organization
and procedure are demonstrably legacies of the
frontier. Moreover the spirit of American law
of the nineteenth century was sensibly affected by
the spirit of the pioneer.
For most practical purposes American judicial history begins after the Revolution. Administration
of justice in colonial America was at first executive
and legislative, and these types of non-judicial justice persisted well into the last century. Again
with a few conspicuous exceptions the courts before
and for some time after the Revolution were made
up largely of untrained magistrates who administered justice according to their common sense and
the light of nature with some guidance from legislation. Until the Revolution in most of the colonies it was not considered necessary or even expedient to have judges learned in the law. Of the
three justices of the Superior Court in New Hampshire after independence, one was a clergyman and
another a physician. A judge of the highest court
of Rhode Island from 1814 to 18 I 8 was a blacksmith, and tiLe chief justice of that state from 1819
to 1826 was a farmer. When James Kent went
upon the bench in New York in 179 I, he could say
with entire truth: "There were no reports or state
precedents. The opinions from the bench were delivered ore tenus. We had no law of our own
and nobody knew what [the law] was."
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Our judicial organization, then, and the great
body of our American common law are the work
of the last quarter of the eighteenth century and
the first half of the nineteenth century. On the
other hand our great cities and the social and legal
problems to which they give rise are of the last
half of the nineteenth century, and, indeed, the
pressing problems do not become acute until the last
quarter of that century. Our largest city now contains in three hundred and twenty-six square miles
a larger and infinitely more varied population than
the whole thirteen states contained when the federal
consti tution was adopted. But New York City did
not attain a population of one million till about
1880; and questions of sanitation and housing were
first urged after the Civil War. Such commonwealths as the states west of the Missouri, each
of which, with a population not much exceeding a
million, occupies an area considerably greater than
England and Wales, represent more nearly the conditions for which the American judicial organization was developed and for which the common law
of England was made over into a law for America.
To understand the administration of justice in
American cities at the end of the nineteenth century, we must perceive the problems of the administration of justice in a homogeneous pioneer or
rural community of the first half of the nineteenth
century and the difficulties with which lawyers and
jurists had to contend in meeting those problems;
we must perceive the attitude of such a community
toward legal procedure and its conception of the
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nature and function of a trial; we must perceive its
attitude toward government and administration and
its rooted objection to supervision and restraint.
In the homogeneous pioneer or rural community
of the first half of the nineteenth century, the administration of justice involved three problems: (I)
To receive the English common law, or to find somewhere else a basis for legal development, and to
work out upon the basis adopted a system of principles and rules adapted to America; ( 2) to decentralize the administration of justice so as to
bring justice to every man's door; and (3) to devise
a criminal law and criminal procedure sufficient to
deal with the occasional criminal and the criminal
of passion in a homogeneous community, of vigorous pioneer race, restrained already for the most
part by deep religious conviction and strict moral
training.
Chief of these problems was the one first named,
the problem of working out a system of rules and
principles applicable to America. It has long been
the orthodox view that the colonists brought the
common law with them and that the English law
has obtained in this country from the beginning.
But this is only a legal theory. In fact the colonies
began with all manner of experiments in administering justice without law and it was not till the
middle of the eighteenth century that the setting
up of a system of courts and the rise of a custom
of studying law in England began to make for a
general administration of justice according to English law. Just prior to the Revolution the wide-
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spread study of Blackstone, whose first edition appeared in 1765, gave great impetus to the reception
of the commOn law. But as late as 179 I the law
was so completely at large in New York that the
genius of a Kent was needed to make the common
law the law of that state.
After the Revolution the public was extremely
hostile to England and to all that was English and
it was impossible for the common law to escape
the odium of its English origin. Judges and legislators were largely influenced by this popular feeling
and there was no well-trained bar to resist it. In
Philadelphia there were a number of great lawyers,
and there were good lawyers here and there throughout the country. But the bulk of the profession
was made up of men who had come from the Revolutionary armies or from the halls of the Continental Congress and had brought with them many
bitter feelings and often but scanty knowledge of
the law. It was natural that they should resent
any serious investigation of the English authorities
and perhaps endeavor to palliate their lack of information by a show of patriotism. Moreover a
large and influential party were enthusiastically attached to France and not only denounced English
law because it was English but were inclined to
call for a reception of French law. "The citation
of English decisions in the opinions of the courts,"
says Loyd, "greatly exasperated the radical element. What were these precedents but the rags
of despotism, who were the judges that rendered
them but tyrants, sycophants, oppressors of the
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people and enemies of liberty." The legal muckraker of today wields a feeble pen in comparison
with his predecessor of the first half of the last cen·
tury. Under the influence of such ideas, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Kentucky legislated
against citation of English decisions in the courts.
There was a rule against such citations in New
Hampshire, and more than one judge elsewhere
had his fling at the English authorities cited before
him.
In part this opposition to the reception of the
common law was political. In large part, however,
it was but a phase of the opposition of the frontiersman to scientific law. "The unthinking sons of the
sagebrush," says Owen Wister, "ill tolerate anything which stands for discipline, good order and
obedience; and the man who lets another command
him they despise." In this they but represent the
feelings of the outposts of civilization everywhere.
As numbers increase there is a greater interest in
general security. But even then in the rude pioneer
community the main point is to keep the peace.
Tribunals with power to enforce their judgments
are the most pressing need. There the refined, scientific law that weighs and balances and deliberates
and admits of argument is out of place. A few
simple rules which everyone understands and a swift
and decisive tribunal best serve such a community.
The customary law of the mining country from
1849 to 1866 largely repeated in this respect the
experience of the Atlantic coast down to the Revolution. In the next stage, as wealth increases, com·
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merce develops and society becomes more complex,
the social interests in the security of acquisitions
and in the security of transactions call imperatively
for certainty and uniformity in the administration
of justice and hence demand rules. But, as we have
seen, at the beginning of the nineteenth century
American law was undeveloped and uncertain. Ad·
ministration of justice by lay judges, by executive
officers and by legislatures was crude, unequal, and
often partisan, if not corrupt. The prime requirement was rule and system, whereby to guarantee
uniformity, equality and certainty. And, since in
the nature of things rules may not be laid down in
advance for every case, this meant that a scientific
development of law was inevitable.
Scientific development of American law was retarded and even warped by the frontier spirit surviving the frontier. The effects of the opposition
to an educated well-trained bar and to an independent, experienced, permanent judiciary, which are
legacies of the Jefferson Brick era of American
politics have been spoken of on a former occasion.
It will suffice here to recall the lack of interest in
universality and fostering of local peculiarities which
are so characteristic of our legal system. In part
Puritanism must share the responsibility. But in
large part this spirit in American law is a remnant
of the frontier repugnance to scientific law and the
insistence of the pioneer that his judges decide offhand without study of what other judges may have
done in European monarchies or in effete communities to the eastward.
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Again, the insistence upon the exact working out
of rules and the devotion to that end of the whole
machinery of justice, which is so characteristic of
nineteenth-century America, is due in great part to
pioneer jealousy of governmental action. A pioneer
or a sparsely settled rural community is content
with and prefers the necessary minimum of government. The social interest in general security requires a certain amount of governmental machinery. It requires civil and criminal tribunals and
rules and standards of decision to be applied therein.
But when every farm was for the most part sufficient unto itself the chief concern was that the governmental agencies set up to secure this social interest might interfere unduly with individual interests. This pioneer jealousy of governmental action
cooperated with the Puritan idea of consociation
and the eighteenth-century idea of the rights of
man to exalt individual interests and put all possible checks upon organized social control. There
must be no magisterial or administrative or judicial
discretion. If men had to be governed, it must be
by known rules of the law.
Thus the chief problem of the formative period
of our American legal system was to discover and
lay down rules, to develop a system of certain and
detailed rules which on the one hand would meet
the requirements of American life, and, on the other
hand, would tie down the magistrate by leaving as
little to his personal judgment and discretion as
possible, would leave as much as possible to the
initiative of the individual and wouid keep down
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all governmental and official action to the minimum
required for the harmonious coexistence of the individual and of the whole. This problem determined the whole course of our legal development
until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
.M oreover it determined our system of courts and
our judicial organization. Above all else we sought
to insure an efficient machine for the development
of law by judicial decision. For a time this was
the chief function of our highest courts. For a
time it was meet that John Doe suffer for the commonwealth's sake. Often it was less important to
decide the particular cause justly than to work out
a sound and just rule for the future. Hence for
a century the chief energies of our courts were
turned toward the development of our case law
and the judicial hierarchy was set up with this purpose in view. It could not be expected that a system of CQurts constructed chiefly for such purposes
would be able to deal effectively with the litigation
of an urban community of today in which men look
to legislatures to make rules and to courts to dispose
of controversies.
A second problem in the formative period of
American law was to decentralize the administration of justice so as to bring justice to every man
in a sparsely settled community. The system of
English courts at the Revolution was too arbitrary
and involved to serve as a model to be followed
in detail in this country. But overlooking concurrent jurisdiction and some historical anomalies, a
general outline might be perceived which was the
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model of American judicial systems. To begin at
the bottom, this was: (1) Local peace magistrates
and local inferior courts for petty causes; ( 2) a
central court of general jurisdiction at law and over
crimes, with provision for local trial of causes at
circuit and review of civil trials in bank in the central court; (3) a central court of equity in which
causes were heard in one place, though testimony
was taken in the locality; (4) a separate court with
probate jurisdiction; and (5) a supreme court of
review. In the United States all but five or six
jurisdictions merged the second and third. But with
that salutary act of unification most of our jurisdictions stopped. Indeed for a season there was
no need for unification. The defects in the foregoing scheme that appealed to the formative period
of American judicial organization lay in the second
and third of the tribunals above described, namely
the central court of law and the central court of
equity. In a country of long distances in a period
of slow communication and expensive travel, these
central courts entailed intolerable hardship upon litigants. It was a prime necessity to bring justice to
every man's back door. Accordingly in most states
we set up a number of local courts of general jurisdiction at law and in equity and our policy has been
one of multiplication of courts ever since. Nowhere
is radical change so much needed as in the organization of our courts. In almost all of our states the
whole plan of judicial organization, adapted to a
pioneer, rural, agricultural community of the first
half of the nineteenth century, is in the way of
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efficient disposition of the litigation of the industrial
and urban community of today.
A hundred years ago the problem seemed to be
how to hold down the administration of punitive
justice and protect the individual from oppression
under the guise thereof rather than how to make
the criminal law an effective agency for securing
social interests. English criminal law had been developed by judicial experience to meet violent crimes
in an age of force and violence. Later the necessities of more civilized times had led to the development in the court of Star Chamber of what is now
the common law as to misdemeanors. Thus one
part of the English law of crimes, as our fathers
found it, was harsh and brutal, as befitted a law
made to put down murder by violence, robbery, rape
and cattle stealing in a rough and ready community. Another part seemed to involve dangerous
magisterial discretion, as might have been expected
of a body of law made in the council of Tudor and
Stuart kings in an age of extreme theories of royal
prerogative. The colonists had had experience of
the close connection of criminal law with politics.
The pioneers who had preserved the memory of
this experience were not concerned solely to do away
with the brutality of the old law as to felonies.
Even more their constant fear of political oppression through the criminal law led them and the generation following, which had imbibed their ideas,
to exaggerate the complicated, expensive and dilatory machinery of a common-law prosecution, lest
some safeguard of individual liberty be overlooked,
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to give excessive power to juries and to limit or
even cut off the power of the trial judge to control
the trial and hold the jury to its province. Nor
did these enfeeblings of punitive justice work much
evil in a time and in places where crime, except possibly the feud and the duel, on which the community
looked indulgently, was rare and abnormal, where,
therefore, the community did not require the swiftmoving punitive justice, adjusted to the task of
enforcing a voluminous criminal code against a multitude of offenders, which we demand today.
In Fennimore Cooper's Pioneers, the story opens
with a striking picture of central New York in
1833, a region which, as we are told, had been a
wilderness forty years before. Above all the author
attributes its prosperity to mild laws and to the
spirit of the pioneer. "The whole district," he says,
"is hourly exhibiting how much can be done, in even
a rugged country, and with a severe climate, under
the dominion of mild laws, and where every man
feels a direct interest in the prosperity of a commonwealth of which he knows himself a part." This
is the spirit of our American common-law polity.
It presupposes a homogeneous population which is
jealous of its rights and in sympathy with the institutions of government. It presupposes a public
which is intrinsically law abiding, even if inclined
under provocation to vindicate public justice by
rough and ready methods. It presupposes a people
which for the most part will conform to rules of
law when they are ascertained and made known,
so that the chief concern of courts and of the state
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is to settle what is the law. It presupposes a public
which in the jury box may be relied upon to enforce
law and vindicate justice between man and man intelligently and steadfastly. In other words, our
common-law polity presupposes an American farming community of the first half of the nineteenth
century; a situation as far apart as the poles from
what our legal system has had to meet in the endeavor to administer justice to great urban communities at the end of the nineteenth and in the
twentieth century.
American procedure, as it had developed through
judicial decision, professional usage and legislation
in the last century, shows the hand of the pioneer
even more plainly. It requires no great study of
our procedure to enable us to perceive that many
of its features, taking the country as a whole, were
determined by the conditions of rural communities
of seventy-five or one hundred years ago. Many
of its features are more appropriate to rural, agricultural communities, where in intervals of work, the
farmer, remote from the distractions of city life,
found his theater in the court house and looked to
politics and litigation for amusement, than to modern urban communities. For instance, if I have read
American judicial biography aright, no small part
of the exaggerated importance of the advocate in
an American court of justice, of the free rein, one
might almost say the license, afforded him, while
the judge must sit by and administer the rules of
the combat, may be traced to frontier conditions
and frontier modes of thought. When the farmers
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of the county have gathered to hear a forensic display they resent the direction of a verdict on a point
of law which cuts off the anticipated flow of eloquence. They resent judicial limitation of the time
for argument, since the audience is to be considered
as well as the court and the litigants. Hence legislation tying down the trial judge in the interests of
untrammeled advocacy has its origin on the frontier.
In particular it may be shown that legislation restricting the charge of the court has grown out of
the desire of eloquent counsel, of a type so dear to
the pioneer community, to deprive not merely the
trial judge but the law of all influence upon trials
and to leave everything to be disposed of on the
arguments. Moreover the frontier: spectator in
the forensic arena is not unlike his urban brother
who looks on at a game of baseball. He soon learns
the points of the game and knows and appreciates
those who can play it.
In a book of reminiscences of an eminent lawyer
there is a chapter entitled "Country Practice of the
Law" which describes the writer's experience in the
western part of Massachusetts in 1861. He tells
of a case where, in a prosecution for malicious injury to real estate, the case was that a wooden
pump had been taken out of a well in mere wanton
mischief. Counsel contended that there was no malicious injury to real estate since the land was not
injured and the pump itself was personalty so that
the complaint should have been for malicious injury
to personal property. To show this he argued that
if a pump were realty there would have to be a
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conveyance by deed of sale every time one was sold.
The magistrate was duly impressed and discharged
the accused, but, being a conscientious man, proceeded to draw up a new complaint for malicious
injury to personal property, upon which the accused
were re-arrested and put upon trial. Thereupon
the same counsel cited authorities, which were unanimous and conclusive, that the pump in the well and
annexed thereto for permanent use was a fixture
and so not personal property. The justice could
not deny the force of these decisions and was obliged
to discharge the accused upon this charge also, so
that they escaped. But, we are told, "the magistrate enjoyed the joke upon himself as much as the
rest of us. In fact," the author continues, "many
of these legal trials at the time were looked upon
as huge jokes." Elsewhere he says: "The whole
contest was looked upon as a contest of wits, and
if a person prevailed on account of knowing more
than the other party, it was not considered at all
derogatory to his character that he should use that
knowledge in any way that was best suited to the
interest of his client." The ethics of such a contest
were the ethics of the professional baseball game.
I need not say that we have got well beyond this
in professional ethics today. But our procedure is
still too much in the spirit of which such advocacy
is only an extreme manifestation.
The pioneer has influenced American judicial procedure in another way. On the frontier "everyone
that was in distress and everyone that was in debt
and everyone that was discontented gathered them-
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selves" to begin life anew. Hence the attitude of
the pioneer was not favorable to the creditor seeking to enforce his claim and the legislation of our
pioneer jurisdictions was often what might have
been expected of the cave of Adullam. Extravagant powers in juries, curtailment of the powers of
trial judges, an abattis of procedural obstacles in
the way of plaintiffs and a vested right in errors
of procedure on the part of defendants-all these
institutions of American procedure grow out of the
desire of the frontier community to shield those who
had fled thereto from the exactions of their creditors. Later, when these communities had borrowed
heavily from their older neighbors in developing
their natural resources there was a strong local interest in preserving these institutions. The very
spirit of procedure in some parts of the United
States is so tinctured by frontier favor to debtors
that improvements in the direction of increased effectiveness in the judicial machinery can come but
slowly. All this is quite alien to common-law modes
of thought. But it has affected common-law procedure in America not a little.
What Dean Wigmore has called the sporting theory of justice, the idea that judicial administration
of justice is a game to be played to the bitter end,
no doubt has its roots in Anglo-American character and is closely connected with the individualism of
the common law. Yet it was fostered by the frontier
attitude toward litigation and it has flourished
chiefly in recent times in tribunals such as the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, where the memory of
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the frontier is still green. Moreover the rise of a
class of habitual defendants, who are compelled to
fall back upon procedural niceties through the unwillingness of juries to judge them according to law
or even to do them justice, and the rise of a class
of habitual plaintiffs' lawyers, who rely on sympathy
and prejudice rather than law, and resent judicial
interference to enforce law or preserve justice, have
served to keep the spirit of frontier procedure alive
in a wholly different environment. Technical pro~
cedure is neither a necessary check on the magis.
trate in the interest of liberty nor a device to ad·
vance justice. It is a remnant of the mechanical
modes of trial in the beginnings of our law, devel·
oped in the eighteenth century in an age of formal
over-refinement, fostered and even further devel·
oped in the pioneer or rural American communities
of the last century, and turned to new uses in the
standing warfare between professional plaintiffs'
lawyers and habitual defendants produced more reo
cently by the conditions of tort litigation in industrial and urban communities.
Reference has been made in other connections to
the nineteenth-century aggravation of the common·
law attitude toward administration. The political
ideas of the seventeenth century growing out of the
contests between the courts and the crown, Puri.
tanism, and the political ideas of the eighteenth cen·
tury all contributed to this attitude. But the exaggeration of if in the last century was in no small
degree the result of the pioneer's jealousy of government and administration and his rooted objection
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to supervision and restraint. So also the jealousy
of social legislation that developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the insistence upon
liberty of contralt and the right to pursue a lawful
calling as guaranteed to the individual and beyond
the reach of legislation, result in part from the feeling on the part of the pioneer that he should be let
alone and that he was ruled best when he was ruled
least. In both these instances, Puritan and pioneer,
working with materials fashioned in the contests
between courts and crown in the seventeenth century, were able to put checks upon the enactment
and enforcement of social legislation in this country
for forty years after English lawmaking had definitely changed front.
How great a strain is put upon our legal and
judicial institutions by the stamp of the pioneer,
which they acquired in the formative period, may
be seen by taking up the chief problems of administration of justice in the American city of today and
perceiving how little our institutions are adjusted to
them.
Demand for socialization of law, in the United
States, has come almost wholly, if not entirely from
the city. We have no class of agricultural laborers
demanding protection. The call to protect men
from themselves, to regulate housing, to enforce
sanitation, to inspect the supply of milk, to prevent
imposition upon ignorant and credulous immigrants,
to protect the small investor of savings from getrich-quick enterprises, to regulate conditions of labor
and provide a minimum wage, and the conditions
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that require us to heed this call, have come from
the cities. But our legal system has had to meet
this demand upon the basis of rules and principles
developed for rural communities or small townsfor men who needed no protection other than against
aggression and overreaching between equals dealing
in matters which each understood. Less than a
generation ago we were echoing the outcry of our
fathers against governmental paternalism. Today,
not only have we swung over to this condition in
large measure, as our increasing apparatus of commissions and boards and inspectors testifies every
day, but we are beginning to call for what has been
styled governmental maternalism to meet the conditions of our great urban communities. Although
much has been done and comparatively rapid progress is now making, it is perhaps still a chief problem
to work out a system of legal administration of justice which will secure the social interest in the moral
and social life of every individual under the circumstances of the modern city, upon the basis of rules
and principles devised primarily to protect the interest in general security in a rural community of
seventy-five years ago.
Again, the demand for organization of justice
and improvement of legal procedure comes from
our cities. It is a significant circumstance that in
the debates upon this subject in the past fifteen
years in our bar associations, national and state, the
city lawyer has asserted that reform was imperative,
while the country lawyer has contended that the evils
were greatly exaggerated and that grave changes

THE PIONEERS AND THE LAW

131

were wholly unnecessary; the city lawyer has been
urging ambitious programs of reform and the country lawyer has been defeating them. A modern
judicial organization and a modern procedure would,
indeed, be a real service to country as well as to
city. But the pressure comes from the city, to
which we are vainly endeavoring to adjust the old
machinery. Courts in our great cities as they are
now organized are subjected to almost overwhelming pressure by an accumulated mass of litigation.
Usually they sit almost the year round, and yet they
tire out parties and witnesses with long delays, and
in some jurisdictions dispose of much of their business so hastily and imperfectly that reversals and
retrials are continually required. Such a condition
may be found in the courts of general jurisdiction
in nearly all of our cities. To deal adequately with
the civil litigation of a city, to enforce the mass of
police regulations required by conditions of urban
life, and to make the criminal law effective to secure
social interests, we must obviate waste of judicial
power, save time and conserve effort. There was
no need of this when our judicial system was framed.
There is often little need of it in the country today.
In the city the waste of time and money in doing
things that are wholly unnecessary results in denial
of justice.
A third problem of the administration of justice
in the modern city is to make adequate provision
for petty litigation, to provide for disposing quickly,
inexpensively and justly of the litigation of the poor,
for the collection of debts in a shifting population,
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and for the great volume of small controversies
which a busy, crowded population, diversified in race
and language necessarily engenders. It is here that
the administration of justice touches immediately the
greatest number of people. It is here that the
great mass of an urban population, whose experience of law in the past has been too often experience
only of the arbitrary discretion of police officers,
might be made to feel that the law is a living force
for securing their individual as well as their collective interests. For there is a strong social interest
in the moral and social life of the individual. If
the will of the individual is subjected arbitrarily to
the will of others because the means of protection
are too cumbersome and expensive to be available
for one of his means against an aggressive opponent who has the means or the inclination to resist,
there is an injury to society at large. The most real
grievance of the mass of the people against American law has not been with respect to the rules of
substantive law but rather with respect to the enforcing machinery which too often makes the best
of rules nugatory in action. Municipal courts in
some of our larger cities are beginning to relieve
this situation. But taking the country as a whole,
it is so obvious that we have almost ceased to remark it, that in petty causes, that is with respect to
the everyday rights and wrongs of the great majority
of an urban community, the machinery whereby
rights are secured practically defeats rights by making it impracticable to assert them when they are
infringed.
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Many causes have contributed to this neglect of
provision for petty litigation which has disgraced
American justice. Two of them at least are attributable to the conditions of pioneer justice. One
has been noticed in another connection, namely that
we have had to work out a body of substantive law
for large causes and small alike in an age of rapid
growth and rapid change. Hence we have studied
the making of law sedulously. For more than a
century in this country we have been engaged in
developing in judicial experience a body of principles and a body of rules as deductions therefrom
to accord as nearly as may be with the requirements
of justice. This is true especially of that most important part of our law which is to be found in
the reports of adjudicated cases. Almost the whole
energy of our judicial system has been employed in
working out a consistent, logical, minutely precise
body of precedents. But while our eyes have been
fixed upon the abstract rules, which are but the
means of achieving justice, the results which we
obtain every day in actual causes have escaped our
attention. If the dilatory machinery of enforcement
succeeds finally in applying the principle to the cause,
we may be assured that in the very great majority
of causes the result will be what it should be. But
our failure to devote equal attention to application
and enforcement of law has too often allowed the
machinery designed to give effect to legal rules to
defeat the end of law in its actual operation. The
other cause referred to is that our procedure, as
has been seen, was determined largely by the con-
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ditions of rural communities of seventy-five or one
hundred years ago. Hence when better provision
for petty causes is urged, many repeat the stock
saying that litigation ought to be discouraged. It
will not do to say to the population of modern cities
that the practical cutting off of all petty litigation,
by which theoretically the rights of the average man
are to be maintained, is a good thing because litigation ought to be discouraged. Litigation for the
sake of litigation ought to be discouraged. But this
is the only form of petty litigation which survives
the discouragements involved in American judicial
organization and procedure. In truth, the idea that
litigation is to be discouraged, proper enough, in
so far as it refers to amicable adjustment of what
ought to be so adjusted, has its roots chiefly in the
obvious futility of litigation under the conditions of
procedure which have obtained in the immediate
past. It is much more appropriate to frontier and
rural communities where a lawsuit was a game and
a trial a spectacle than to modern urban commu~
nities. Moreover, there is danger that in discouraging litigation we encourage wrongdoing, and it
requires very little experience in the legal aid societies in any of our cities to teach us that we have
been doing that very thing. Of all peoples in the
world, we ought to have been the most solicitous
for the rights of the poor, no matter how petty
the causes in which they are to be vindicated. Unhappily, except as the organization of municipal
courts in recent years has been bringing about a
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change, we have been callous to the just claims of
this class of controversies.
Application and enforcement of law are regarded
as the central questions in modern legal science.
These questions are especially acute in the United
States because our polity has committed so much
to courts that elsewhere is left to the executive and
legislative departments. They are especially acute
in American cities because in these cities the demands made of the courts increase continually. In
these communities the Puritan conception of law as
a guide to the conscience and the pioneer conception
that the courts exist chiefly to work out rules for a
new country are wholly inadequate. The pioneer conception of enforcement through individual initiative
is even more inadequate. Both the law and the
agencies that administer the law, shaped by such
conceptions, are unequal to the burden put upon
them by the circumstances of city life and the modern feeling that law is a product of conscious and
determinate human will. This is the more apparent
in application and enforcement of law in a heterogeneous community. Under the influence of the theory of natural rights and of the actual equality in
pioneer society, American common law assumed that
there were no classes and that normally men dealt
with one another on equal terms and at arm's length j
so that courts at the end of the nineteenth century
were 10th to admit, if they would admit at all, the
validity of legislation which recognized the classes
that do in fact exist in our industrial society and the
inequality in point of fact that may exist in bar-
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gaillings between them. It assumed also that every
normal part of the community was zealous to maintain its rights and would take the initiative in doing
so. Not a little friction has resulted from application of rules based upon this theoretical equality in
communities divided into classes with divergent interests. A great deal of ineffectiveness has come
from application of common-law principles, developed to an extreme in adapting them to pioneer
communities, to elements of the city population
which do not understand our individualism and our
tenderness of individual liberty, and from reliance
upon individual initiative in case of other elements
which by instinct and training are suspicious of authority and of magistrates. Mr. Train's book,
Crime, Criminals and the Camorra, shows vividly
how fear of courts, bred of conditions in another
land, may lead immigrants to tolerate gross oppression rather than to go to the law for relief.
Finally the social workers in our cities have had
to wrestle with the problem of freeing administration from the rigid limitations imposed in the last
century. The attempt to confine administrative action within the narrowest possible limits gave us at
the end of the nineteenth century a multitude of
rules which hindered, as against few which helped.
Regulation of public utilities, factory inspection,
food inspection, tenement house inspection and
building laws have compelled us to turn more and
more from the criminal law to the administrative
supervision and prevention which the pioneer abhorred. So thoroughly did he hamper administration
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that the reaction has given rise to a real danger that
we go too far in the opposite direction and withdraw such matters wholly from the domain of law.
The pioneer's public and administrative law cannot
endure. We must work over the whole along new
lines.
Reviewing the influence of the pioneer upon our
law, it may be conceded that we owe not a little
to the vigorous good sense of the judges who made
over the common law of England for our pioneer
communities. Science might have sunk into pedantry where strong sense gave to America a practical
system in which the traditional principles were made
to work in a new environment. On the other hand
this rapid development of law in a pioneer environment left a bad mark on our administration of
justice. The descendants of the frontiersman have
been slow to learn that democracy is not necessarily
a synonym of vulgarity and provincialism; that the
court of a sovereign people may be surrounded by
dignity which is the dignity of that people; that
order and decorum conduce to the dispatch of judicial business, while disorder and easy-going familiarity retard it; that a counsellor at law may be a
gentleman with fine professional feelings without
being a member of a privileged caste; that a trial
may be an agency of justice among a free people
without being a forensic gladiatorial show; that a
judge may be an independent, experienced, expert
specialist without being a tyrant. In the federal
courts and in an increasing number of the states
something has been done to secure the dignity of
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judicial tribunals. But the country over there is
still much to do. Not the least factor in making
courts and bar efficient agencies for justice will be
restoration of common-law ideals and deliverance
of both from the yoke of crudity and coarseness
which the frontier sought to impose on them.

VI
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

INredress
primitive society an injured person may obtain
by self-help, by the help of the gods or
of their ministers, or in a limited class of cases and
on compliance with certain procedural forms, by the
help of the political organization. In antiquity,
when the bond of kinship was the strongest bond in
society, the first meant redress by the help of oneself
and of his kinsmen, so that the staple institutions of
primitive society are reprisals, private war and the
blood feud. But these institutions are inimical to
the social interest in general security and so more
and more appeals for redress are made to the state.
Self-help and private war are regulated and repressed until the latter is wholly put down and the
former becomes exceptional. Thus in its beginnings
law is a means toward the peaceable ordering of
society. It stands beside religion and morality as
one of the regulative agencies by which men are
restrained and the social interest in general security
is protected. Moreover this character of a regulative agency, of a means toward a peaceable ordering of the community, is retained to the end, although
other purposes are added as it develops. In this
first stage of legal evolution men acquire the conception of a peaceable ordering of society through
the peaceable adjustment of controversies.
131)
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A second stage of legal evolution has been referred to in a former kccure under the name of
"the strict law." In this stage, law has definitely
prevailed as the regulative agency of society and
the state has prevailed as the organ of social control. Self-help and self-redress have been definitely
superseded for all but exceptional causes. Normally
men appeal only to the state to redress wrongs.
Hence the body of rules determining the cases in
which men may appeal to the state for help comes
to define indirectly the substance of rights and thus
indirectly to point out and limit the interests recognized and secured. When this point has been
reached, two causes operate to produce a rigid system, namely, fear of arbitrary exercise of the power
of state assistance to individual victims of wrong,
and survival of ideas from primitive law when deliberate deviation from sacred texts and settled customs was held impious and dangerous. Accordingly the chief end sought is certainty. The cases
in which the state will interfere, the mode in which
it will interfere and the manner in which its interference may be invoked are defined in an utterly
hard and fast way. The rules of law are wholly
inelastic and inflexible. Also the law is highly formal. It refuses to look beyond and behind the
form, for forms admit of no debate. At any rate
one may know whether the appointed form has been
pursued. Thus the strict law is indifferent to the
moral aspects of conduct or of transactions that
satisfy its letter and so further development becomes imperative. But the strict law gives us as
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permanent contributions the ideas of certainty and
uniformity and of rule and form as means thereto.
A stage of liberalization, which may be called
the stage of equity or natural law, succeeds the strict
law. This stage is represented in Roman law by
the classical period (the empire to Diocletian), in
English law by the rise of the Court of Chancery
and development of equity, in the law of Continental
Europe by the period of the law-of-nature school,
that is, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The watchword of the stage of strict law was certainty. The watchword of this stage is morality or
some phrase of ethical import such as equity and good
conscience. The former stage insists on uniformity,
the latter on morality; the former on form, the latter
on justice in the ethical sense; the former on remedies, the latter on duties; the former on rule, the
latter on reason. The capital ideas of the stage
of equity or natural law are the identification of
law with morals, the conception of duty and attempt to make moral duties into legal duties, and
reliance upon reason rather than upon arbitrary rule
to keep down caprice and eliminate the personal element in the administration of justice. Aside from
liberalization of the law, the permanent contributions of this stage of legal evolution are the conception of good faith and moral conduct, to be
attained through reason, ethical solution of controversies and enforcement of duties. But the endeavor
to make law and morals coincide and to reach an
ethical solution of each particular controversy gives
too wide a scope to judicial discretion so that at
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first the administration of justice in this stage is too
personal and too uncertain. This excess of margin
for discretion is corrected by a gradual fixing of rules
and consequent stiffening of the legal system. Moral
principles, having acquired the character of legal
rules, are carried out to logical consequences until
the original principle is lost among the derived rules,
or are developed as mere abstractions and thus are
deprived of their purely moral character. In this
way transition takes place to the next stage, which
may be called the maturity of law.
As a result of the stiffening process by which the
undue fluidity of law and over-wide scope for discretion involved in the identification of law and
morals are gradually corrected, there comes to be
a body of law with the stable and certain qualities
of the strict law yet liberalized by the conceptions
devolped by equity or natural law. In this stage of
matured legal system, the watchwords are equality
and security. It derives the idea of equality partly
from the insistence of the strict law that the same
remedy shall always be applied to the same formal
situation and partly from the insistence of equity or
natural law on treating all human beings as legal
persons and upon recognizing full legal capacity in
all persons possessed of normal mind and years of
discretion. Hence its idea of equality has two elements; equality of operation of legal rules and
equality of opportunity to exercise one's will and
employ one's substance. It derives its idea of security from the strict law, but finds it modified by
the ideas of the stage of equity or natural law that
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legal results should flow from will rather than from
form and that one person should not be enriched unjustly at the expense of another because of form
and without intention. In consequence, its idea of
security includes two elements: everyone is to be
secured in his interests against aggression by others
and others are to be permitted to acquire from him
or to exact from him only through his will that they
do so or through his breach of rules devised to secure others in like interests.
To insure equality, the maturity of law again insists strongly upon certainty and in this respect is
comparable in many ways to the stage of the strict
law. To insure security it insists upon property
and contract as fundamental ideas. Our bills of
rights bring this out in their guarantees of life, liberty and property.
Liberty in such connections was taken to mean
in the nineteenth century, and is still sometimes taken
to mean, that the individual shall not be held legally
unless for a fault, unless for an act on his part
which infringes another's right, and that another
shall not be permitted to exact of him except as
and to the extent he has willed a relation to which
the law in advance attached such power to exact.
The same idea appears in the modern Roman law
in the insistence upon will as the central point in
legal transactions and the nineteenth-century attempt to make the Anglo-American law of contracts
conform to the Roman conception was quite in accord with the spirit of the time.
Along with liberty the maturity of law puts prop-
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erty, that is, the security of acquisitions. But one
of these acquisitions may be a power to exact from
a promisor. Accordingly contract acquires a property aspect. The law is regarded as existing to secure
the power of contracting freely and the right to
exact a performance freely promised as widely as
possible. Moreover in this stage even personality
acquires a property aspect. The power of the individual to make contracts freely is thought of primarily as a sort of asset. In other words, physical
integrity and free motion and locomotion, physical
and mental, are thought of as species of natural
acquisitions, as it were, so that the security of acquisitions, which is conceived to be the main end of
the law, includes (I) natural acquisitions, that is,
what nature has given one in the way of physical
and mental powers, (2) what one has acquired
through the position in which he found himself in
society, and (3) what one has acquired through
the free exercise of his natural powers. In the
maturity of law men may be willing to agree that
acquisitions of the second type shall be restricted
greatly or even cut off for the future, but all idea
of interfering with what has been so acquired in the
past appears intolerable. From the point of view
of this stage of legal development, Mr. Choate was
entirely justified when he said, in his argument in
the Income Tax Cases, that a fundamental object
of the law was "preservation of the rights of private property."
If, as I believe, the law has entered definitely
upon a new stage, in many ways analogous to the
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stage of equity or natural law, as the maturity of
law was analogous to the strict law, one may venture
to pronounce as to the permanent contribution to
the science of administering justice made by the
period from which we are passing. Obviously its
important legal institutions are property and contract. Its contribution seems to be the thorough
working out of individual rights. Accordingly the
philosophy of law in the nineteenth century put individual rights at the foundation of the legal system.
At the end of the eighteenth century transition
from the stage of equity or natural law to the stage
of maturity of law was complete. On the Continent, codification had begun with the draft code of
Frederick the Great in 1749 and in 1804 the French
civil code summed up the work of the eighteenthcentury jurists and furnished the model for practically all the codes of the Roman-law world until
the Germans set a new model in 1896. In the
common-law world Lord Mansfield had incorporated the law merchant in English law, equity had
crystallized so that in 18 I 8 Lord Eldon could say
that the principles of equity were almost as fixed and
uniform as the rules of the common law and bills
of rights in America were codifying the natural
rights of man. The completion of this rigidifying
process, which had been going on for more than
a century, coincided with an epoch-making change
in the philosophy of law. The theory of natural
law had done its work of liberalization and modernization and had become for the time an agency of
stabilization. Men thought it possible to discover
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a body of fixed and immutable principles, from which
a complete system, perfect in every detail, might be
deduced by purely logical operations, and held it
the duty of the jurist to find them and of the legislator to promulgate the deductions in the form of
a code. The principles also, they conceived, were
to be discovered once for all by reason since they
were mere expressions of abstract human nature;
they were the principles of reason inherent in the
conduct of the abstract individual. But the possibilities of this juristic method had been exhausted.
The rationalizing legal philosophy of Grotius had
accomplished its task. It was no longer capable
of making for growth in the law, and for a season
growth was not needed. The demand of the time
was not for growth but for system and classification and analysis in order to produce certainty and
insure security. Philosophy was asked to make law
stable as two centuries before men had turned to it
to make law fluid. Although eighteenth-century
natural law had led to codification and had become
an absolute system it was not equal to the philosophical problem of nineteenth-century law. It left
too much to the individual judgment and conscience
to afford a satisfactory theoretical foundation. Indeed, the philosophical anarchist builds on the doctrine of natural rights and on the natural-law conception of the individual conscience as the ultimate
arbiter as to duties of obedience. The time was
ripe, therefore, when the received theory of natural
law got its death·blow at the hands of Immanuel
Kant. He undermined the seventeenth- and eigh-
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teenth-century foundations of philosophical jurisprudence and replaced them with a new order of ideas.
These new ideas, however, were to serve for the
basis of the stable law of the nineteenth century.
Hence the present generation, wrestling with legal
institutions and legal doctrines fashioned in other
eras, often finds them intrenched, however remote
their origin, in nineteenth-century philosophy. of
law.
To Kant and those who followed him more immediately the first problem in law was the relation of
law to liberty. He lived in an age of codification,
an age of absolute governments, in which there was
and it was taken that there had to be external constraint and coercion. But he lived also in the age
of the French Revolution, a democratic age in which
some other basis than mere authority was required
to sustain the arbitrary and authoritative; the age
of the classical economics, in which the individual
demanded the widest possible freedom of action.
Hence the problem was how to reconcile these two
ideas-external constraint and individual freedom
of action. This question furnishes the clue to all
philosophical discussion of the basis of law in the
last century. Kant met it by formulating what has
come to be known by the significant name of legal
justice; by working out the idea of an equal chance
to all, exactly as they are, with no artificial or
extrinsic handicaps. In other words, he put a new
philosophical foundation under the idea of justice
as the maximum of individual self-assertion-the
idea which came in with the Reformation-and so
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enabled it to reach its final logical development III
the law of the nineteenth century.
Down to Kant, all jurists had been in agreement
as to the method of legal science. Much as they
might differ as to details, they were agreed in using
philosophical method and in postulating a natural
law by which all questions were to be tried. As
the effect of Kant's demolition of the old natural
law came to be felt, for a time philosophical jurisprudence was pushed to the wall, and it is only in
the present century that philosophy has begun to
regain the place it once held in legal science. The
historical and the analytical methods are the methods
of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. This is true
especially in Anglo-American juristic thought. English and Americans a generation ago were confident
that they had effected a complete separation of
jurisprudence from philosophy. To a certain extent, it is true, such a separation took place everywhere and we but carried it to an extreme. The
need of stability and certainty in the maturity of
law and the importance of the social interests in
security of acquisitions and security of transactions
in a commercial and industrial society called for
analytical rather than philosophical method; the task
of the jurist was to perfect what he found in the
legal system rather than to build anew. Naturally
this general tendency of the last century became most
pronounced in America since, as has been shown in
another connection, American law is a product of
the nineteenth century. Our classical period, from
the Revolution to the Civil War, is not so much
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a period of growth as one of adaptation; it was
not a creative period, but instead was a period in
which received materials were worked over into
better form and were developed into a consistent
legal system. Hence with all its appearance of
growth, it was a period of stability, and in common
with the maturity of law everywhere is comparable
to the stage of strict law. For in each stage the
law is taken to be self-sufficient. Such periods of
legal development require and rely upon analysis
rather than philosophy. It is in periods of growth,
periods in which the law is fluid, periods in which an
infusion of ideas from without is making over the
law, that philosophy has played a leading role in
legal history. Hence, on the one hand, philosophy of
law is reviving today, as we enter upon the new stage
of legal development which has been called the socialization of law, and hence, on the other hand,
American law, the product of the nineteenth century, has affected to have no use for philosophy.
In practical effect, the result has been to intrench
in our legal thinking the absolute ideas which we
inherited from the eighteenth century. The naive
natural law of the practitioner, who takes the principles in which he has been trained and with which
he is familiar for fundamenta of all law everywhere, the theories of natural law and natural rights
which came into our elementary books and our books
on constitutional law from Continental publicists of
the seventeenth and eighteenth century had their
own way with the profession; and later historical
jurisprudence which developed a natural law of its
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own and reached results quite as absolute had its
own way in the schools.
Our absolute ideas which have prevailed so largely
in American legal thinking come from Grotius in two
ways. On the one hand they come through Blackstone, whose preliminary discussions are founded
upon Grotius, and on the other hand they come
through American publicists in the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth century who
followed the Dutch and French publicists and civilians. Chiefly, however, they come from Blackstone.
It was only in the present generation that legal education in the majority of our best schools was divorced from Blackstone, and bar examinations in
many states still call for a knowledge of this obsolete
legal science: Such was the result in practice of our
contempt of philosophy of law.
Two movements are represented in eighteenthcentury juristic thought. First there is a purely juristic movement, proceeding upon the conception that
law is reason, in which the ideas of right and justice
are made paramount. In this movement, as we have
seen elsewhere, individual rights and justice as the
realization of individual rights were put above state
and society as permanent absolute realities which
state and society existed only to protect. Second,
there is a legislative movement in which rights are
thought of as the product of the human will, as the
outgrowth of a social contract, so that there would
be no rights without the social organization and no
justice or law but for the political organization j a
movement in which law is thought of as emanating
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from the sovereign and the idea of command of the
state or of the general will becomes paramount.
Both theories are stated by Blackstone without a hint
of their inconsistency. In the nineteenth century,
however, they came to divide the field. The second
theory passed into political thinking and the science
of legislation. Thence, following Bentham, it was
taken up by the analytical jurists, who have been
dominant in English legal thought since the middle
of the last century. But this side of analytical jurisprudence was never congenial in America. The
first theory passed into metaphysical and historical
jurisprudence. Already accepted by the American
lawyer while analytical jurisprudence was formative
in England, it came back to him presently in scientific
garb from Germany and became a settled conviction.
Five types of philosophy of law in the nineteenth
century are of significance for our present purpose.
We may call those who adhered to them the metaphysical school, the historical school, the utilitarians,
the positivists and the mechanical sociologists. It is
a striking example of the way in which the same conclusion may sustain the most divergent philosophical
premises that all of these arrived ultimately at the
same juristic position by wholly diverse routes and
from the most diverse starting points, so that the
futility of conscious effort to improve the condition
of humanity through the law and the conception of
justice as the securing of the maximum of self-assertion became axioms of juristic thought.
While to the eighteenth century justice meant the
securing of absolute, eternal, universal natural rights
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of individuals, Kant held that it meant securing freedom of will to everyone so far as consistent with all
other wills. The metaphysical jurists developed this
idea. Their fundamental position was that the
whole legal system could be deduced from the conception of right and in this way a critique of institutions and doctrines, a sort of ideal system, could be
set up. As a rule they carried out Kant's idea of
securing the free will into its practical consequence
of liberty; of general freedom of action for individuals. Hence in their view the end of law was to
secure the widest possible liberty to each individual.
The test of right and justice with respect to any institution or doctrine was the amount of abstract individualliberty which it secured. The metaphysical
method gradually fell into discredit abroad after the
middle of the nineteenth century, although it had
representatives in juristic writing to the very end of
that century. But through its effect upon the historical school, which controlled legal thought for
almost a hundred years, its intensely individualist
conception of justice governed in jurisprudence until
the rise of the social-philosophical school set jurists
to thinking in a new way. Anglo-American jurists
paid little or no attention to the systems of the metaphysical school. Its central idea of liberty, however,
fitted the eighteenth-century individualism of our
law so well that the method of deduction from that
idea was gradually adopting when a new and more
attractive mode of getting to the same result was
furnished by the positivists.
Savigny, the founder of the historical school,
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turned Kant's formula of right into one of law.
Kant thought of right as a condition in which the will
of one was reconciled with the will of another according to a universal rule. Savigny thought of law
as the body of rules which determine the bounds
within which the activities of each individual are
secured a free opportunity. If we adopt an idealistic interpretation of legal history and conceive of the
development of law as a gradual unfolding of Kant's
idea of right in human experience of administering
justice, we shall understand the position of the historical school. For Savigny carried forward one of
the two ideas which had been contending in jurisprudence in the eighteenth century. The element in
law which the medieval jurists had rested on theology, the seventeenth-century jurists had derived
from reason, and the law-of-nature school in the
eighteenth century had deduced from the nature of
man, Savigny sought to discover through history.
In effect the historical school and the metaphysical
school were closely akin. Each postulated an ideal
law. One sought to discover this ideal law through
history, the other sought to find it through logical
development of an abstract idea. Indeed, it was not
hard to reconcile these views. As the historical jurists adopted the idealistic interpretation of legal history it was possible to say that jurisprudence had two
sides. On the one hand it had to do with the historical unfolding of the idea of liberty as men discovered the rules by which to realize it. This was
historical jurisprudence. On the other hand, it had
to do with the logical unfolding of the principles
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involved in the abstract conception. This was philosophical jurisprudence. Most of the German expositions of jurisprudence in the latter half of the nineteenth century proceed in this way. Philosopher
and historian were agreed that law was found not
made. One found it by deduction from a metaphysical principle, the other found it by historical study.
Each, one need not say, found an ideal development
of the principles of the existing law; the historian
because he so interpreted history, the philosopher
because he was seldom a lawyer and got his facts
and illustrations from the historian.
The doctrines of the German historical school appear to have been taught first in this country in a
course of lectures given by Luther S. Cushing at the
Harvard Law School in I849 and published in 1854.
It is interesting to note that the late James C. Carter was a law student at Harvard the last year that
this course was given; for unless the effect of early
training is borne in mind, it is hard to understand
how a jurist of his caliber could dogmatically assent
to Savigny's views in 1905. But the influence of the
historical school did not become marked in America
till after 1870, when American students had begun
to go to Germany in increasing numbers and German
ideas had taken root in our universities. In the
meantime another influence had profoundly affected
American legal thought. That influence, namely,
the political interpretation of legal history and political theory of jurisprudence expounded by Sir
Henry Maine, moved in the same direction. I have
spoken sufficiently of Maine's political interpretation
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in other connections. It is enough to say here that
his theory of the progress from status to contract
was so thoroughly adapted to the individualism
which characterized the traditional element of our
law for other reasons and accorded so well with the
absolute ideas which our law books had inherited
from the century before, that it soon got complete
possession of the field.
As I have said, the historical jurist and the philosophical jurist agreed that law was found, not made,
differing only with respect to what it was that was
found. The philosophical jurist thought that a principle of justice and right was found and expressed in
a rule. The historical jurist conceived that a principle of human action or of social action was found
by human experience and was gradually developed
into and expressed in a rule. Hence the historical
school denied that law was a product of conscious or
determinate human will. They doubted the efficacy of
legislation, in that it sought to achieve the impossible
and to make what cannot be made. They held that
the living organs of law were doctrinal writing and
judicial decision, whereby the life of a people, expressed in the first instance in its traditional rules of
law made itself felt in a gradual development by
molding those rules to the conditions of the present.
I would not be understood as denying or forgetting that this historical school did many great things
for the science of law. But its exclusive reign in
American juristic thought in the past fifty years
brought out its worst side. For the historical school
also worked a priori and gave us theories fully as
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absolute as those of the school of natural law. Each
deduced from and tested existing doctrines by a fixed,
arbitrary, unchangeable standard. When the historical jurists overthrew the premises of the philosophical school of the preceding century they preserved the method of their predecessors, merely
substituting new premises. They were sure that
universal principles of jurisprudence were not to be
found by deduction from the nature of the abstract
individual. But they did not doubt that there were
such principles and they expected to find them
through historical investigation. In the United
States we carried this further than elsewhere, since
the merger of the common-law rights of Englishmen
in the rights of man seemed to show that here at
least universal principles had been worked out in the
course of legal history. Even now, on the whole,
the basis of all deduction is the classical common law.
No system of natural law was ever more absolute
than this natural law upon historical premises. For
other systems of natural law gave ideals developed
from without. With us, under the dominion of the
historical school the sole critique of the law was to
be found in the law itself. Moreover, every addition or amendment from without was brought to the
same test. As late as 19°5 a leader of the American
bar, thoroughly imbued with the ideas of the historical school, told us that it was a wise doctrine to
presume that legislators intended no innovations
upon the common law and to assume so far as possible that statutes were meant to declare and reassert its principles. As no statute of any conse-
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quence dealing with any relation of private law can
be anything but in derogation of the common law,
the social reformer and the legal reformer, under
such a doctrine, had always to face the situation that
the legislative act which represented the fruit of
their labors would find no sympathy in those who applied it, would be construed strictly and would be
made to interfere with the status quo as little as possible.
Jhering tells a story of a professor to whom a
question of commercial law was submitted. He returned an elaborate and thoroughly reasoned answer
based upon the principles of the Roman law, the
basis of the common law of Continental Europe and
hence of legal instruction. Upon suggestion that he
had omitted to notice a section of the commercial
code which appeared to govern, he responded that if
the commercial code saw fit to go counter to reason
and the Roman law it was no affair of his. Surely
we may sympathize with the learned professor for
under the influence of a taught traditional law and
of a historical school of jurists which scouts legislative lawmaking we proceed in much the same way.
Our text writers will scrupulously gather up from
every remote corner the most obsolete decisions and
cite them diligently. But they seldom cite any statutes beyond those landmarks which have found a
place in our common law. When they do refer to
statutes it is almost always solely through judicial
decisions in which they are construed or applied.
Nor will it do to say that this is justified by the instability of our legislation. Unstable as some of it
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is, much of it is thoroughly stable while much of our
case law is unstable. It is not that the statutes are
unstable. It is rather that the reader will not be interested in them. He does not feel that they are law
in the same sense as an adjudicated case; he does not
want to cite them if a case may be had in which the
portions of the statute applicable have been incorporated. Accordingly, it is natural that courts, even
where they do not actually hold important legislation
to be merely declaratory of the common law, too
often make it declaratory in effect by citing prior
judicial decisions and assuming that they express the
rule enacted by the statute. In this way much of the
work of uniform state legislation upon commercial
subjects is threatened with undoing.
While the metaphysical jurists were deducing the
whole system of rights and the idea of the end of
legal systems from a metaphysical conception of
liberty, another school of jurists was seeking a practical principle of lawmaking. The metaphysical
school was a school of jurists. Its adherents had
their eye upon the law as a whole-upon systems
which had come down from the past-and they
sought the principles upon which such systems and
their doctrines might be criticised and their further
development might be directed. The English utili.
tarians, on the other hand, were a school of legislators. While the metaphysical jurists sought principles of criticism of what was, they sought principles
of constructing a new body of law. The founder of
the utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham, took law reform
for his life work. As a practical principle in his
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work of law reform he took what he called the principle of utility, namely, does the rule or measure
conduce to human happiness? His one principle of
criticism was, how far does a rule or doctrine or institution conduce to or promote human happiness?
This criterion might well have been used to break
down the individualist idea of justice. At this time,
however, the age of Adam Smith and the great economists, individualist ideas were too firmly fixed in
men's minds to be questioned. A criterion of the
greatest good of the greatest number possible, of
that which serves for the happiness of the greatest
number used as the measure of the conduct of each,
would not be far from some recent ideas of justice.
But Bentham did not question individualism. He
vacillated between utility in the sense of the greatest
happiness of the individual and in the sense of the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. Perhaps
as near as he came to a choice was to assume that the
greatest general happiness was to be procured
through the greatest individual self-assertion. Accordingly his juristic principle was not unlike that
of the metaphysical jurists. Everyone, he held, is
the best judge of his own happiness. "Hence legislation should aim at a removal of all those restrictions on the free action of an individual which are
not necessary for securing the like freedom on the
part of his neighbors." It will be seen that practically Bentham's principle was to permit the maximum of free individual action consistent with general
free individual action. In effect his conception of the
end of the law was the same as that of the meta-
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physical school-to secure the maximum of abstract
individual self-assertion. This fitted entirely with
the inherited individualism of common-law lawyers.
Bentham and his immediate disciples believed in
legislation. They left their mark upon Anglo-American law through the legislative reform movement
of the first half of the last century of which they
were the promoters. But this reform movement
was not a creative one. In many ways it was analogous to Justinian's legislation in the maturity of
Roman law. It carried out to formal and logical
fruition ideas which had achieved their maturity in
a prior stage of legal development. Bentham's legislation was a pruning away of archaisms, a removal
of shackles upon individual activity which had come
down from the Middle Ages, and a stating of the
law in a more accessible and intelligible form. This
conception of legislation coupled with Bentham's
interpretation of utility as requiring a minimum of
interference with the individual led the next generation of English utilitarians to the same position
as that of the historical school. They came to agree
that legislation except in emergencies and for certain incidental purposes was an evil. The historical
school said it was an evil because it attempted to
do what could not be done, namely to make law consciously. The newer utilitarians said it was an evil
because that government governed best that left
men most free to work out their own happiness.
Bentham had already put security as the main end to
which the legal order should be directed. Taking
this to mean security in the maximum of individual
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self-assertion a sort of juristic pessimism was developed; a doctrine that we can do no good by law,
we may only avert some evils. "Equality," says
Markby, one of Bentham's later followers, "may be
hindered by the law, it cannot be promoted by it."
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century
the juristic ideas on which metaphysical jurist, historical jurist and utilitarian were agreed appeared
to be confirmed from a new quarter. Although in
common with sociology, sociological jurisprudence
has its origin in the positivist philosophers, in the
sense that each has a continuous development from
Comte's positive philosophy, its development has
been determined rather by the social-philosophical
school which arose from the breakdown of the metaphysical and historical schools on the Continent.
At first, however, the positivist philosophy of law
and the so-called sociological science of law were
in their way quite as absolute as their rivals. Comte
thought of the universe as governed by mathematical
mechanical laws, and hence of moral and social
phenomena as so governed. The next generation
of positivists, influenced by Darwin, thought of evolution as governed by inexorable mechanical laws.
Accordingly the positivist or mechanical type of
sociologist sought for absolute mechanical social
laws whose inevitable operations produced all social,
political and jural institutions, as completely apart
from human will as the motions of the planets. The
positivist jurists sought to find laws of morals and
laws of legal and social evolution analogous to gravitation, conservation of energy and the like, and they
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expected to find these laws through observation and
experience. But observation and experience led
them to the same result to which metaphysics had led
the philosophical jurists and history had led the
historical jurists. For one thing, they got their data
from the historical jurists and so looked at them
not independently but through the metaphysical
spectacles of that school. Moreover, like the whole
century, they were subconsciously under the influence of Kant. Kant had become a part of the
thought of the time so thoroughly that all four of
the nineteenth-century schools came to his position
as to the end of the law, though for different reasons
and in different ways. Thus the views of the positivists were congenial in jurisprudence and were especially congenial in America. Spencer's writings
had great vogue in the United States, and many
cases where judicial decisions show the effect of his
ideas might be cited. Accordingly mechanical sociology lingered in American juristic writing longer than
elsewhere because its ideas appeared to confirm
those of the historical school. Many who were beginning to be conscious that the historical school
could not hold the ground much longer were able
to flatter themselves that they were moving forward
by giving to their old views a new form of mechanical sociology.
Like the historical jurist, the mechanical sociologist
of the end of the nineteenth century looked at law
in its evolution, in its successive changes, and sought
to relate these changes to changes undergone by
society itself. The historical jurist found metaphys-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

163

ical laws behind these changes. The mechanical
sociologist substituted physical laws.
For all
practical purposes the result was the same. This is
true especially of the type which has had most vogue
in America, namely, the phase of the mechanical
sociology which identified with economic laws these
supposed mechanical laws which absolutely determine the content of legal systems. It is not too
much to say that this combination of the economic
interpretation with positivism gave rise to a sort
of fatalist natural law. The old natural law called
for search for an eternal body of principles to which
the positive law must be made to conform. This
new natural law called for search for a body of
rules governing legal development, to which law
will conform do what we may. The operation of
these same rules will change it and will change it in
accordance with fixed and definite rules in every way
comparable to those which determine the events of
nature. The most man may do is to observe and
thus, it may be, learn to predict. For the rest nature
will take her inexorable course and we may but impotently wring our hands. If law is an inevitable
resultant, if in making it or finding it, legislator or
judge is merely bringing about "conformity to the
de facto wishes of the dominant forces of the community," conscious effort to improve the law can be
effective in appearance only. The eighteenth-century theory, even if it put the basis of legal systems
beyond reach of change, moved us to scan the details and to endeavor to make each part conform to
the fixed ideal plan. It admitted that legislator and
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jurist had each a function. The historical school
denied any function to the legislator. It said law
could no more be made than language. Each was
a growth upon the basis of a received tradition. The
positivist economic interpretation denied all function
to the jurist. To the doctrine of legislative futility,
which the historical school had fastened on our
teaching, it added a doctrine of juristic futility. It
is no wonder that a generation of lawyers trained
in nineteenth-century philosophy of law has been
slow to respond to the modem faith in the efficacy
of effort.
At the end of the last century the rise of the social·
philosophical jurists and in the last two decades the
development of a sociological jurisprudence which
has definitely rejected absolute ideas produced a new
legal science on the Continent and its ideas are slowly
taking root in Anglo-American thought. But as I
shall endeavor to show in a subsequent lecture the
good sense of courts has led to a movement beneath
the surface in judicial decision which has been in
advance of our thinking and teaching. Hence I
used to suggest, when the recall was agitating, that
our impatient reformers should demand, not recall
of judges or of judicial decisions, but recall of law
teachers and of juristic thinking. Certainly our busy
courts have had much more excuse for being out of
touch with recent social and political and economic
science when we reflect that everything scientific
which was accessible to them in English served to
confirm the ideas in which judges had been brought
up.
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We must recall much of the jurisprudence of the
last century. And yet the juristic thought of that
time was not wholly in vain. It may teach us that
there are inherent limitations on what may be
achieved through law and inherent limitations upon
the efficacy of effort in conscious lawmaking; that
for the greatest part law must always be found
through application of reason to causes as they arise
and the testing of principles in their actual operation;
that laws are not like clothes to be thrown off and
replaced at will, but, like language are so intimately
a part of all we do that development of the traditional materials will always be the chief agency of
growth. Used to temper the enthusiasm of a new
period of liberalization, the philosophy of law of
the last century may yet save us from the excesses of
cne stage of equity and natural law, a reaction wherefrom had so much to do with the rigidity of the
law under which we live.

VII
JUDICIAL EMPIRICISMWHEN Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn had determined to rescue Jim by digging under the
cabin where he was confined, it seemed to the uninformed lay mind of Huck Finn that some old picks
the boys had found were the proper implements to
use. But Tom knew better. From reading he
knew what was the right course in such cases, and
he called for case-knives. ''It doesn't make no difference," said Tom, "how foolish it is, it's the right
way and it's the regular way. And there ain't no
other way that I ever heard of, and I've read all
the books that gives any information about these
things. They always dig out with a case-knife."
So in deference to the books and to the proprieties
the boys set to work with case-knives. But after
they had dug till nearly midnight and they were
tired and their hands were blistered and they had
made little progress, a light came to Tom's legal
mind. He dropped his knife and, turning to Huck,
said firmly, "Gimme a case-knife." Let Huck tell
the rest:
"He had his own by him, but I handed him mine.
He flung it down and says, 'Gimme a case-knife.'
"I didn't know just what to do--but then I
thought. I scratched around amongst the old tools
and got a pickax and give it to him, and he took it
and went to work and never said a word.
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"He was always just that particular. Full of
principle."
Tom Sawyer had made over again one of the
~arliest discoveries of the law. When legislation or
tradition prescribed case-knives for tasks for which
pickaxes were better adapted, it seemed better to
our forefathers, after a little vain effort with caseknives, to adhere to principle-but use the pickax.
They granted that law ought not to change. Changes
in law were full of danger. But, on the other hand,
it was highly inconvenient to use case-knives. And
so the law has always managed to get a pickax in
its hands, though it steadfastly demanded a caseknife and to wield it in the virtuous belief that it was
using the approved instrument.
It is worth while to recall some of the common..
places of legal history by way of illustration. One
of the first difficulties encountered by archaic legal
systems, founded upon the family and postulating
for every sort of legal, social and religious institution the continuity of the household, was the failure
of issue, the want of the son to perpetuate the household worship whom religious and legal dogmas required. Noone thought of superseding these dogmas, but their manifest inconvenience and injustice
were avoided by the device of adoption. Presently
a better way of disposing of property after death
without infringing upon ancient doctrines occurred
to some Roman. Why not sell his whole household
and estate to the person upon whom he desired it to
devolve? If he so sold it and the purchaser was
an honorable man, he would carry out oral instruc-
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tions given at the time of the transfer as to the
purpose for which it was made and the disposition to
be made of the property. After this had gone on
until everyone had begun to employ the proceeding,
a law of the Twelve Tables gave legal efficacy to the
oral instructions, when the form of sale was hadand wills had come into being. A better example is to
be seen in the Roman law of marriage. The religious
marriage, which was the only one recognized by religion and hence by law, was not open to the plebeian.
In consequence he did not have his wife in manus
or his children in potestas and his household had no
standing before the law. The law was not altered.
It was not enacted that there might be marriage
without a wife in manus and a family without children in potestas, but purchase or adverse possession
and the statute of limitations were resorted to in
order to bring the plebeian's wife into manus in another way. Our own law furnishes many such instances. When the Anglo-Saxon king desired to extend the protection of his peace to some one, he took
him by the hand publicly and made of him, for legal
purposes, a minister or servant, entitled to the king's
peace which attached to members of his household.
When wager of law, a simple oath backed by the
oaths of one's neighbors that this oath was clean
and unperjured, made the action of debt a worthless action upon simple contracts, wager of law was
not abolished but the courts found a trespass and a
breach of the king's peace in failure to perfonn a
promise, if only something had been given presently
in exchange for it, and thus imposed on our law of
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lontract what has now become the formality of consideration. When the delay and formalism of real
actions and the incident of trial by battle made them
inadequate remedies, a fictitious lease and fictitious
ejectment were resorted to in order to make another
remedy meet the s~tuation. When the hard and fast
form of writ and declaration failed to provide for
new cases of conversion of a plaintiff's property, the
form was not altered but a loss and finding were
assumed from the conversion, so that we are able
to read in an American report of yesterday that the
plaintiff casually lost one hundred freight cars and
the defendant casually found them and converted
them to its own use, as if it were a watch or a pocketbook that had been lost.
N ewer and less crude modes of growth were long
ago discovered by the law. But this primitive mode
of growth by the employment of fictions, which is
closely akin to the "let's play" so and so of our
childhood, has not disappeared from political institutions. The turning back of the legislative clock
is a familiar institution, and in at least one American
state, where in an age of printing the constitution requires every bill to be read in extenso three times
before each house, it is possible today to see five
reading clerks simultaneously reading five separate
bills, while the legislators peruse their morning
papers and answer the letters of their constituents.
After the general employment of fictions has accustomed men to intentional change of law bolder
devices come into use. Particular fictions, employed
to meet a particular case or to change a particular
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rule, such as those referred to above, are superseded
by what may be called general fictions, fictions having
a more sweeping operation to alter or create whole
departments of the law, introducing new principles
or new methods rather than mere isolated rules.
These general fictions are interpretation, equity and
natural law.
Interpretation as an agency of growth has to do
chiefly with the legislative element. In primitive
times, when the law is taken to be God-given and
unchangeable, the most that may be permitted to
human magistrates is to interpret the sacred text.
Later when the customary law has been formulated
authoritatively the antipathy of the stage of strict
law to change and the desire to limit the judicial
function to the purely mechanical in order to insure
uniformity leads to an endeavor to confine lawmaking to interpretation and logical development of
the text. In the maturity of law the dogma of separation of powers, whereby the making and the application of law are required to be wholly divorced
so that judges are to do no more than ascertain the
actual intent of the legislator according to settled
canons of genuine interpretation, led countries governed by codes to attempt once more to make of the
court a mere automaton. As a critic has put it, the
theory of the codes in Continental Europe in the
last century made of the court a sort of judicial slot
machine. The necessary machinery had been provided in advance by legislation or by received legal
principles and one had but to put in the facts above
and take out the decision below. True, this critic
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says, the facts do not always fit the machinery, and
hence we may have to thump and joggle the rna·
chinery a bit in order to get anything out. But even
in extreme cases of this departure from the purely
automatic, the decision is attributed, not at all to the
thumping and joggling process, but solely to the rna,
chine. Such a conception of the process of judiciaf
decision cannot stand the critical scrutiny to which aU
legal and political institutions are now subjected
Men insist upon knowing where the pre-existing rul~
was to be found before the judges discovered and applied it, in what form it existed, and how and whenc~
it derived its form and obtained its authority. And
when as a result of such inquiries, the rule seems to
have sprung full fledged from the judicial head, the
assumption that the judicial function is one of inter.
pretation and application only leads to the conclusion
that the courts are exercising a usurped authority.
The true conclusion is, rather, that our political
theory of the nature of the judicial function is unsound. It was never truly the common-law theory.
In its origin it is a fiction, born in periods of absolute
and unchangeable law. If all legal rules are con·
tained in immutable form in holy writ or in twelve
tables or in a code or in a received corpus juris or
in a custom of the realm whose principles are author·
itatively evidenced, not only must new situations be
met by deduction and analogical extension under the
guise of interpretation but the inevitable changes to
which aU law is subject must be hidden under the
same guise. Beginning in this way, the mechanical
conception of the judicial office was taken over in
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political theory through the adoption of the Byzantine idea of sovereignity and consequent reception of
the Byzantine notion that the sovereign will both
made and interpreted law, and was fixed therein by
the general adoption of Montesquieu's theory of the
separation of powers. Today, when all recognize,
nay insist, that legal systems do and must grow,
that legal principles are not absolute, but are relative
to time and place, and that juridicial idealism may
go no further than the ideals of an epoch, the fiction
should be discarded. A process of judiciallawmaking has always gone on and still goes on in all
systems of law, no matter how completely in their
juristic theory they limit the function of adjudication
to the purely mechanical.
In their origin equity and natural law are also
general fictions along with interpretation. In our
law the chancellor purported to be governed by a
body of moral rules of superior sanctity to those of
the strict law and to constrain men to perform the
moral duties which those rules of equity and good
conscience dictated. In the Roman law the juris~
consult held himself bound to take note of certain
principles of reason to be found in nature itself by
which all matters which he was free to pass upon
should be tried and to which all rules which were
plastic should be shaped. In each case the result
was an infusion of morals into law and a making
over of the law, although in theory the old rules
stood unaltered. These general fictions, which bore
the brunt in past eras of growth, were wholly unsuited to the maturity of law, wherein stability i.
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held the one thing needful, and so fell out of use.
Interpretation is the general fiction of the nineteenth
century.
Law grows subconsciously at first. Afterwards it
grows more or less consciously but as it were surreptitiously under the cloak of fictions. N ext it
grows consciously but shamefacedly through general
fictions. Finally it may grow consciously, deliberately and avowedly through juristic science and legislation tested by judicial empiricism. It is not the
least of the achievements of the common law that
it discovered and worked out a system of legal development by judicial empiricism at a time when the
rest of the world was running to Rome and was
seeking to administer justice to modem Europe not
by the free judicial methods of the classical jurists
but by the hard and fast legislative text and fettered
judge of Constantine and Justinian.
A developed legal system is made up of two elements, a traditional or habitual element and an enacted or imperative element. The latter is usually the
modem element and at present, so far as the form of
the law is concerned, is tending to become predominant. The former is the older or historical element
upon which juristic development proceeds by analogy.
It is by no means universally true, however, that the
imperative element in a legal system is the modem
element and the traditional element speaks only from
the past. In truth the two act upon and correct each
other so that when either, from occupying the field
too long, becomes too fixed and rigid, the needed
flexibility is restored to the law by its rival. Yet on
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the whole, the traditional element is by far the more
important. In the first instance we must rely upon
it to meet all new problems for the legislator acts
only after they attract attention. And even after
the legislator has acted it is seldom if ever that his
foresight extends to all the details of his problem
or that he is able to do more than provide a broad
if not crude outline. Hence even in the field of the
enacted law the traditional element of the legal system plays a chief part. We must rely upon it to fill
the gaps in legislation, to develop the principles introduced by legislation, and to interpret them. Let
us not forget that so-called interpretation is not
merely ascertainment of the legislative intent. If
it were it would be the easiest instead of the most
difficult of judicial tasks. Where the legislature
has had an intent and has sought to express it there
is seldom a question of interpretation. The difficulties arise in the myriad cases in respect to which
the lawmaker had no intention because he had never
thought of them. Indeed perhaps he could never
have thought of them. Here, if we insist on the
dogmatic separation of powers, the courts, willing
or unwilling, must to some extent make the law
under the guise of interpretation; and our security
that it will be made as law and not as arbitrary will
lies in the judicial and juristic tradition from which
the materials of judicial lawmaking are derived. Accordingly the traditional element of the legal system
is and must be used, even in an age of copious legiJlation, to supplement, round out and develop the
enacted element j and in the end it usually swallows
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up the latter and incorporates the results in the body
of tradition. Moreover a large field is always unappropriated by enactment, and here the traditional
element is supreme.
Juristic science works with the materials of the
traditional element. It analyzes them and systemizes them, it traces their history, it seeks their philosophical foundations, it compares them with the
traditional materials of other legal systems. In this
way it prunes away arbitrary rules, molds doctrines
into accord with reason and reconciles inconsistencies. In the future, under the influence of the
sociological school in jurisprudence, it will add to
the foregoing tasks study of the social operation of
rules and doctrines and of the effects which they
produce in action, in order to determine how far they
achieve the ends of law. Legislation on the other
hand, except as it merely gives form to what has
been worked out by juristic science and stamped with
approval by judicial empiricism, has for its function
to introduce new premises. In the past, under the
influence of absolute ideas of law as something eternal and unchangeable, it took a jural revolution
through reversion to justice without law and recourse
to some such general fiction as that of equity or
natural law to introduce new premises on any considerable scale. Today no such jural revolutions
are required. We have come to believe in conscious
lawmaking-perhaps, indeed, to have too much faith
in what may be achieved thereby. But the true
function of codes, as jurists recognize today, is not
merely to put the results of past legal development
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in better and more authoritative form but even more
to afford a basis for a juristic and judicial new start.
Thus the jurist works over the traditional materials
and the legislator provides new materials. From
these the judge makes the actual law by a process
of trying the principles and rules and standards in
concrete cases, observing their practical operation
and gradually discovering by experience of many
causes how to apply them so as to administer justice
by means of them. Such has been the common law
from the first. Such is coming to be the accepted
theory of the rest of the world as failure of the
eighteenth-century attempt to make the courts mere
automata leads the jurists of Continental Europe to
reject the Byzantine notion of the relation of the
judge to the legislator and return to the more liberal
doctrine of the classical Roman law.
It was not always the Roman doctrine that law was
made only by a legislative act or authentic interpretation by the sovereign. On the contrary in Cicero's
time precedents were enumerated among the forms
of the law. At the end of the second century a jurist
could lay down, on the authority of a rescript, that
the authority of cases adjudged to the same effect
had the force of law. But Roman case law was
made by jurisconsults rather than by judges. For
whereas we entrust judicial power to a permanent
judge learned in the law but bid him take the facts
from a lay jury, the classical Roman polity put the
judicial power in the hands of a lay iudex chosen for
the case in hand and bade him take his law from a
duly licensed jurisconsult. Where jurisconsults dif-
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fered he had to decide what opinion he would adopt.
Yet his decision, as that of a layman acting only for
the one case, had no particular weight and was not
preserved. What was significant was the answer of
the learned jurisconsult whose opinion had been
sought, and the most enduring part of the Roman
law was made up of such opinions. As a permanent
judicial magistracy grew up under the empire the
function of the jurisconsult waned and it is not unlikely that judicial decisions would have established
themselves as a form of law had not the union of all
powers, legislative, adminstrative and judicial in the
emperors after Diocletian led to the doctrine which
Justinian handed down to the modern world with
the authoritative stamp of his compilation-the doctrine that the judge can do no more than decide the
particular case for the purposes of that case, and
that only the sovereign by a legislative act is competent to make a binding rule which shall govern in
other cases than that in which it was used as the
ground of a decision. In the Middle Ages it was
enough that this doctrine had behind it the unassailable authority of Justinian. But when Roman law
was first applied by lay judges advised as to the law
by learned doctors of the law from the universities,
a practice which the trial in Shakespeare's Merchant
of Venice may serve to illustrate, it was not to be
expected in any event that the decisions of such magistrates could acquire the force of law. The doctrinal writer who furnished the materials for decision was the real voice of the law.
Thus a conception of the judicial office arose on
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the Continent which persisted after permanent
courts learned in the law had been set up, since it
appeared to accord with the theory of the separation
of powers and was in line with the political theory
which developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. It was in line also with the eighteenthcentury doctrine of a complete code deduced from
the principles of natural law. Through the influence
of the latter doctrine it became a favorite notion
of legislators that the finding of law for the purposes of judicial decision might be reduced to a
simple matter of genuine interpretation; that a body
of enacted rules might be made so complete and so
perfect that the judge would have only to select the
one made in advance for the case in hand, find what
the lawgiver intended thereby through application
of fixed canons of genuine interpretation and proceed to apply it. The code of Frederick the Great
was drawn up on this theory. The intention was
that "all contingencies should be provided for with
such careful minuteness that no possible doubt could
arise at any future time. The judges were not to
have any discretion as regards interpretation but
were to consult a royal commission as to any doubtful points and to be absolutely bound by its answer."
"This stereotyping of the law," says Schuster, "was
in accordance with the doctrines of the law of nature, according to which a perfect system might be
imagined, for which no changes would ever become
necessary, and which could, therefore, be laid down
once for all, so as to be available for any possible
combination of circumstances." So firm a grip has
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this eighteenth-century doctrine upon American
political theory that in 1912 a senator of the United
States could tell us complacently that the uncertainties to which judicial construction of the anti-trust
laws had led us might be relieved through a bill he
had drawn which, he said, "enumerates in plain English every known practice and expedient through
which combinations have stifled competition and prohibits anyone from engaging in them." In the same
spirit a professor of political science in one of our
universities proposed that the power of interpretation should be taken from the courts and be given
to some executive body in supposed closer touch with
the popular will, confining the courts to the task of
applying the prescribed and interpreted rule. Both
of these ideas, a complete legislative provision in advance covering every case, and authoritative extrajudicial interpretation, have failed in practice although they have had the advantage of careful, deliberate legislation formulated by experts and of application by bench and bar trained in the Byzantine
doctrine. It is as clear as legal history can make
it that interpretation apart from judicial application
is impracticable; that it is futile to attempt to separate the functions of finding the law, interpreting the
law and applying the law. For example, the plan
of interpretation by a royal commission, tried in
the code of Frederick the Great, failed utterly. It
soon appeared that there was no reason for supposing that the executive commission would have
more foresight than the legislature. Experience
quickly taught that the most which might be achieved
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in advance was to lay down a premise or a guiding
principle and that the details of application must be
the product of judicial experiment and judicial expenence.
Nevertheless the Byzantine doctrine dies hard.
In the nineteenth century certainty was sought not
by a complete body of rules covering every case in
advance but by a complete body of principles and a
complete system of logical exposition and application of those principles. All the nineteenth-century
codes in Continental Europe, except the German
Civil Code of 1896, go upon the theory that judicial
decisions shall have no authority beyond the cases
in which they are rendered and that there can be
no authoritative interpretation by anyone except the
legislature itself. If the codes left anything open,
the judges were directed where to turn in order to
decide the case. But the next judge was not to look
upon the decision of his predecessor as establishing
anything. He was to repeat the process independently. An excellent example may be found in article
5 of the French Civil Code. That article reads as
follows: "Judges are forbidden, when giving judgment in the cases which are brought before them,
to lay down general rules of conduct or decide a
case by holding it was governed by a previous decision." Its purpose was, as we are told by an
authoritative commentator, to prevent the judges
from forming a body of case law which should govern the courts and to prevent them from "correcting
by judicial interpretations the mistakes made in the
[enacted] law." Before fifty years had passed
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legislation was required to compel the lower courts
to follow the solemn decision of the highest court
of France, and now, after a century of experience,
French jurists are conceding that the article in question has failed of effect. Today elementary books
from which law is taught to the French students,
in the face of the code and of the received Roman
tradition, do not hesitate to say that the course of
judicial decision is a form of law. All over the Continent the new school is clamoring for free judicial
finding of law. It is agreed that the path of deliverance from the stagnation of nineteenth-century
law is a judicial empiricism, working upon the materials supplied by jurist and legislator.
Anglo-American law is fortunate indeed in entering upon a new period of growth with a well-established doctrine of lawmaking by judicial decision.
It is true we have to combat the political theory and
the dogma of separation of powers. It is true also
that the influence of these ideas and the nineteenth.
century insistence upon certainty led to a theory that
the judicial finding of law was but a discovery of
something which was logically or potentially preexisting, so that the decision made nothing, it merely
evidenced. Undoubtedly under the influence of this
idea judicial empiricism was proceeding over-cautiously at the end of the last century. Yet this was
not wholly an evil. It would be most unfortunate
if both legislature and court should be governed by
a conception of law as will and proceed to lay down
whatever seemed best, for that reason alone, unrestrained by the necessity of going upon pre deter-
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mined premises or of developing them by a known
technique and along fixed lines. The chief cause of
the success of our common-law doctrine of precedents as a form of law is that it combines certainty
and power of growth as no other doctrine has been
able to do. Certainty is insured within reasonable
limits in that the court proceeds by analogy of rules
and doctrines in the traditional system and develops
a principle for the cause before it according to a
known technique. Growth is insured in that the
limits of the principle are not fixed authoritatively
once for all but are discovered gradually by a process
of inclusion and exclusion as cases arise which bring
out its practical workings and prove how far it may
be made to do justice in its actual operation. If the
last century insisted over much upon the predetermined premises and fixed technique, it did not lose to
our law the method of applying the judicial experience of the past to the judicial questions of the
present and of making that experience yield principles to be developed into working and workable
rules of justice by a process of judicial experimentation.
There is a common element in the two fundamental doctrines of the common law, the doctrine of
precedents and the doctrine of the supremacy of
law. The same spirit is behind each. The doctrine
of precedents means that causes are to be judged
by principles reached inductively from the judicial
experience of the past, not by deduction from rules
established arbitrarily by the sovereign will. In
other words, reason, not arbitrary will is to be the
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ultimate ground of decision. The doctrine of supremacy of law is reducible to the same idea. It is
a doctrine that the sovereign and all its agencies
are bound to act upon principles, not according to
arbitrary will; are obliged to follow reason instead
of being free w follow caprice. Both represent the
Germanic idea of law as a quest for the justice and
truth of the Creator. The common-law doctrine
is one of reason applied to experience. It assumes
that experience will afford the most satisfactory
foundation for standards of action and principles
of decision. It holds that law is not to be made arbitrarily by a fiat of the sovereign will, but is to be
discovered by judicial and juristic experience of the
rules and principles which in the past have accomplished or have failed to accomplish justice. Where
such a doctrine obtains, not merely the interpretation and application of legal rules but in large measure the ascertainment of them must be left to the
disciplined reason of the judges, and we must find
in the criticism of the reported decision by bench
and bar in other cases our assurance that they will
be governed by reason and that the personal equation of the individual judge will be suppressed. The
vitality of the common law and the steady increase
in the value attributed to judicial decisions in the
rest of the world attest the soundness of this expectation. We have, then, the means of progress
in our law to begin with, wher p , the rest of the world
is struggling to attain it. It is the part of wisdom
to preserve and develop it and to set up and maintain courts adequate to employ it instead of exper-
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imenting with the Byzantine doctrine which has been
thoroughly tried and found wanting in Continental
Europe or with the Byzantine method of administration in any of its forms.
Much of the criticism of our Anglo-American system of judicial empiricism assumes that it is responsible for the obstinacy with which American law
stood in its tracks at the end of the last century
while other departments of human endeavor were
moving on. But it must be remembered that American law was not alone in this respect. The world
over the law of the last century sought to stand still,
and the century demanded that it do so. No matter
what the form of the law, code or case law or received Roman tradition modernized and made a
juristic tradition, we see the same characteristic condition of quiescence.
If the causes of the backwardness of the law with
respect to social problems and the unsocial attitude
of the law toward questions of great import in the
modern community are to be found in the traditional
element of our legal system, determined by a succession of causes which I have discussed in the preceding
lectures, the surest means of deliverance are to be
found there also. The infusion of morals into the
law through the development of equity was not an
achievement of legislation, it was the work of courts.
The absorption of the usages of merchants into the
law was not brought about by statutes but by judicial
decisions. When once the current of juristic thought
and judicial decision is turned into the new course our
Anglo-American method of judicial empiricism has
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always proved adequate. Given new premises, our
common law has the means of developing them to
meet the exigencies of justice and of molding the results into a scientific system. Moreover it has the
power of acquiring new premises, as it did in the development of equity and the absorption of the law
merchant. Indeed fundamental changes have been
taking place in our legal system almost unnoticed,
and a shifting was in progress in our case law from
the individualist justice of the nineteenth century,
which has passed so significantly by the name of legal
justice, to the social justice of today even before the
change in our legislative policy became so marked.
Eight noteworthy changes in the law in the present
generation, which are in the spirit of recent ethics,
recent philosophy and recent political thought, will
serve to make the point.
First among these we may note limitations on the
use of property, attempts to prevent anti-social exercise of the incidents of ownership. At this point
judicial decision has been the agency of progress.
This is no time or place for details. I need only
refer to the gradual but steady change of front in
our case law with respect to the so-called spite fence,
and to the establishment in American case law of
doctrines with respect to percolating water and to
surface water, in which a principle of reasonable use
has superseded the old and narrow idea that the
owner of the surface might do as he pleased. In
this growing tendency of the law to impose limitations on the use of property, especially limitations
designed to prevent what the French call "abusive
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exercise of rights," there is a suggestive parallel between the period of legal development on which we
have entered and the earlier period of liberalization
which I have called the stage of equity or natural
law. Equity sought to prevent the unconscientious
exercise of legal rights j today we seek to prevent the
anti-social exercise of them. Equity imposed moral
limitations j the law of today is imposing social
limitations. It is endeavoring to delimit the individual interest better with respect to social interests and
to confine the legal right to the bounds of the interest
so delimited. More and more the tendency is to
hold that what the law should secure is satisfaction
of the owner's reasonable wants with respect to the
property-that is those which consist with the like
wants of his neighbors and the interests of society.
Second, we may note limitations upon freedom of
contract. Such limitations have been imposed both
through legislation and through judicial decision.
As examples of legislative limitations reference may
be made to statutes requiring payment of wages in
cash, statutes regulating conditions of labor, and
legislation with respect to non-living wage, minimum
wage and the like. As examples of judicial limitations, it is enough to remind you that our courts have
taken the law of insurance practically out of the
category of contract, have taken the law of surety
companies practically out of the law of suretyship
and have established that the duties of public service
companies are not contractual, flowing from agreement, but instead flow from the calling in which the
public servant is engaged. Here again the parallel
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between the present and the stage of equity or
natural law is suggestive. Equity sought by limiting
their power of contract to protect debtors against
unfair advantage on the part of creditors. Accordingly it prevented clogs upon or bargainings away
of the debtor's right to redeem mortgaged property
and overturned oppressive contracts with heirs and
reversioners. Today we seek once more, by limiting
freedom of contract, to protect those who are subjected to economic pressure against unfair advantage
on the part of those who have greater economic
freedom.
Third, we may note limitations on the power of
disposing of property. These are chiefly legislative.
Examples are the requirement in many states that
the wife join in a conveyance of the family home;
the statutes in some jurisdictions requiring the wife
to join in a mortgage of household goods; the statute
of Massachusetts requiring the wife to join in an
assignment of the husband's wages. But there has
been a tendency in judicial decision to put limitations
on the jus disponendi in order to prevent acquisition
or perpetuation of a monopoly by unfair underselling
in particular localities.
Fourth, reference may be made to limitations upon
the power of the creditor or injured party to secure
satisfaction. The Roman law in its classical period
had developed something of this sort.
In the case
of certain debtors as against certain creditors the
Roman law gave the benefit or the privilege of not
answering for the entire amount but for so much as
the debtor could pay for the time being. Naturally
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this doctrine was rejected in the modern civil law as
being out of accord with the individualism of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The newer
codes, however, have a number of provisions restricting the power of the creditor to secure satisfaction,
such as, for example, provision that the statutory
liability of an insane wrongdoer shall not go so far
as to deprive him of means of support. In the
United States the homestead exemption statutes
which prevail in so many states, and the personalty
exemptions which in some states go so far as to
exempt five hundred dollars to the head of the
family, and usually make liberal exemptions of tools
to the artisan, library to the professional man,
animals and implements to the farmer, and wages to
the head of a family, will serve as illustrations.
There is a notable tendency in recent legislation and
in recent discussion to insist not that the debtor keep
faith in all cases even if it ruin him and his family,
but that the creditor must take a risk also-either
along with or even in some cases instead of the
debtor.
Fifth, there is a tendency to revive the idea of
liability without fault not only in the form of wide
responsibility for agencies employed, but in placing
upon an enterprise the burden of repairing injuries,
without fault of him who conducts it, which are incident to the undertaking. What Dean Ames, from
the standpoint of the historical jurist reviewing the
gradual development of legal doctrines based upon
free action of the human will, called "the unmoral
standard of acting at one's peril" is coming back into
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the law. There is a strong and growing tendency,
where there is no blame on either side, to ask in
view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best
bear the loss.
Sixth, there is a very marked tendency in judicial
decision to regard the social interest in the use and
conservation of natural resources i to hold, for example, that running water and wild game are, as it
were, assets of society which are not capable of
private appropriation or ownership except under
regulations that protect the social interest.
Seventh, we may note an increasing tendency to
hold that public funds should respond for injuries
to individuals by public agencies i that the risk of
injuries to individuals inherent in the operations
of government are not to be borne exclusively
by the luckless individual on whom loss happens to
fall.
Finally, recent legislation and judicial decision
have changed the old attitude of the law with respect to dependent members of the household.
Courts no longer make the natural rights of parents
with respect to children the chief basis of their decisions. The individual interest of parents which used
to be the one thing regarded has come to be almost
the last thing regarded as compared with the interest
of the child and the interest of society. In other
words, here also social interests are now chiefly
regarded.
It is true many of the examples I have just adduced are taken from legislation. It is true also that
some of these legislative innovations upon the settled
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legal ideas of the past two centuries have been resisted bitterly by some courts. Yet I am confident
that everyone of them would stand in the highest
court of the land and in a growing majority of our
state courts today. Moreover, what is more important, many of the most significant examples are
taken from judicial decisions. If, therefore, the
disease is in the traditional element of our legal
system, the cure is going on there under our eyes.
It is an infusion of social ideas into the traditional
element of our law that we must bring about; and
such an infusion is going on. The right course is not
to tinker with our courts and with our judicial or.
ganization in the hope of bringing about particular
results in particular kinds of cases at a sacrifice of
all that we have learned or ought to have learned
from legal and judicial history. It is rather to pro.
vide a new set of premises, a new order of ideas in
such form that the courts may use them and develop
them into a modern system by judicial experience of
actual causes. A body of law which will satisfy the
demands of the society of today cannot be made of
the ultra-individualist materials of eighteenth-cen"
tury jurisprudence and nineteenth-century commor.
law based thereon, no matter how judges are chosen
or how often they are dismissed. For a great part
the way must be prepared by juristic science and by
careful legislation worked out consistently and upon
a clear program, as the legislation of the reform
movement in the first half of the nineteenth century
was framed on the basis of Bentham's doctrine of
utility.
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In reason the judges may not be asked to lead in
the present transition. They must go with the main
body not with the advance guard, and with the main
body only when it has attained reasonably fixed and
settled conceptions. Let us remember that it is not
so long ago that the votaries of the social sciences
who now complain of law had succeeded in confirming lawyers in the ideas they had found in their law
books. They cannot expect courts, which have the
whole economic structure in their hands and are
bound to regard the social interest in general security,
to turn the law about in a moment. When we reflect
how fundamental is the shifting from the older idea
of the end of the legal order to the newer, how uncertain the new lines are as yet on the one hand, and
on the other hand how completely the change goes
to the root of everything the courts do, we must
recognize how futile it is to expect the courts to
adjust our whole legal system to it over night.
Lay bad-men interpretations are superficial.
The fundamental difference between the law of the
nineteenth century and the law of the period of legal
development on which we have entered is not in the
least due to the dominance of sinister interests over
courts or lawyers or jurists. It is not due, the legal
muckraker notwithstanding, to bad men in judicial
office or to intentional enemies to society in high
places at the bar. It is a conflict of ideas, not of
men; a clash between conceptions that have come
down to us and entered into the very flesh and blood
of our institutions and modern juristic conceptions
born of a new movement in all the social sciences.
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Study of fundamental problems, not reversion to
justice without law through changes in the judicial
establishment or referenda on judicial decisions, is
the road to socialization of the law.

VIn
LEGAL REASON

WILLIAM JAMES tells a story, which he attributes to the Danish philosopher Hoffding,
about a small boy who asked his mother if it were
really true that God had made the whole world in
six days. "Oh yes," she answered, "it was quite
true." "Did he make it all in six days," asked the
boy? "Oh yes," she said, "it's all done." "Well
then," said he, "mamma, what is God doing now?"
Hoffding considered that the mother ought to have
explained to him that God was now sitting for His
portrait to the metaphysicians. In truth all attempt
to give a philosophical account of some section of
recorded human conduct is on a smaller scale very
like the attempt of the professional philosopher to
make God sit for His portrait. Moreover, if we are
to make an adequate picture of a stage of legal development, the picture must be taken after the period
has definitely come to an end so that we may view its
phenomena, as it were, under the aspect of eternity.
It is, therefore, a rash undertaking to essay even a
snapshot photograph of the stage of legal development into which we are passing. But without some
such attempt we shall fail to understand one of the
chief instruments by which the traditional materials
of our legal system are kept in touch with reality and
are made available for a changed and changing
society.
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In a former lecture I sought to show that the
process of judicial lawmaking consisted in development of the materials of the common-law tradition
and of the new premises provided, largely on the
basis of that tradition by jurist and legislator, by
means of a known technique-the "artificial reason
and judgment of the law" of which Lord Coke told
his indignant sovereign. For whether working upon
the materials of the tradition with the case-knife or
pickax of the beginnings of legal science or with the
more complicated instruments of the modern legal
armory, judicial activity must be directed consciously
or unconsciously to some end. In the beginnings of
law this end was simply a peaceable ordering. In
Roman law and in the Middle Ages it was the maintenance of the social status quo. From the seventeenth century until our own day it has been the
promotion of a maximum of individual self-assertion.
Assuming some one of these as the end of the
legal ordering of society, the jurist works out an
elaborate critique on the basis thereof, the legislator
provides new premises for judicial decision more or
less expressing the principles of this critique, and the
judge applies it in his choice of analogies when called
upon to deal with questions of first impression and
uses it to measure existing rules or doctrines in passing upon variant states of fact and thus to shape
these rules and doctrines by extending or limiting
them in different directions. The basis of all these
operations is some theory as to what law is for.
When, then, is the theory of the new stage of legal
development upon which we seem to be entering t
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Those who conceive that the law is entering upon
such a new stage of development-and this category
includes the professor ot jurisprudence at as conservative an institution as the University of Oxford
-speak of that stage, in contrast with the nineteenth
century, as a stage of socialization of law. For in
contrast with the nineteenth century it appears to
put the emphasis upon social interests; upon the demands or claims or desires involved in social life
rather than upon the qualities of the abstract man
in vacuo or upon the freedom of will of the isolated
individual. But if the term "socialization of law"
has alarming implications for any of you, if like
the Russian censor who blocked out the words
"dynamic" and "sociology" in Ward's Dynamic
Sociology wherever they occurred-not that he knew
what they meant, but because they sounded too suspiciously like dynamite and socialism-or like the
president of one of our universities to whom the
word sociological, when used in connection with jurisprudence suggests a professorial cnasseur massaging
a corpus juris which is safe only in the hands of
regular practitioners-if like either of these you are
in fear of mere names, it is possible to put the matter
in wholly innocuous phrases and in terms of the
modes of thought of the moment. Let us put the
new point of view in terms of engineering; let us
speak of a change from a political or ethical idealistic
interpretation to an engineering interpretation. Let
us think of the problem of the end of law in terms
of a great task or great series of tasks of social engineering. Let us say that the change consists in
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thinking not of an abstract harmonizing of human
wills but of a concrete securing or realizing of human
interests. From an earthly standpoint the central
tragedy of existence is that there are not enough of
the material goods of existence, as it were, to go
round; that while individual claims and wants and
desires are infinite, the material means of satisfying
them are finite; that while, in common phrase, we all
want the earth, there are many of us but there is
only one earth. Thus we may think of the task of
the legal order as one of precluding friction and eliminating waste; as one of conserving the goods of
existence in order to make them go as far as possible,
and of precluding friction and eliminating waste in
the human use and enjoyment of them, so that where
each may not have all that he claims, he may at least
have all that is possible. Put in this way, we are
seeking to secure as much of human claims and desires-that is as much of the whole scheme of interests-as possible, with the least sacrifice of such
interests. Let us apply this engineering interpretation to the eight phenomena in American law of the
present of which I spoke in the last lecture.
First we noted the growth of limitations on the
use of property, of limitations on exercise of the incidents of ownership. To the nineteenth-century
way of thinking the question was simply one of the
right of the owner and of the right of his neighbor.
Within his physical boundaries the dominion of each
was complete. So long as he kept within them and
what he did within them was consistent with an
equally absolute dominion of the neighbor within his
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boundaries, the law was to keep its hands off. For
the end of law was taken to be a maximum of selfassertion by each, limited only by the possibility of
a like self-assertion by all. If, therefore, he built a
fence eight feet high cutting off light and air from
his neighbor and painted the fence on the side toward
his neighbor in stripes of hideous colors, this was
consistent with his neighbor's doing the same; it was
an exercise of his incidental jus utendi, and the mere
circumstance that he did it out of unmixed malice
was quite immaterial since it in no way infringed the
liberty or invaded the property of the neighbor. But
suppose we think of law not negatively as a system
of hands off while individuals assert themselves
freely, but positively as a social institution existing
for social ends. Thinking thus, what claims or demands or wants of society are involved in such a
controversy? There is an individual interest of substance on the part of each. Each asserts a claim to
use, enjoy and get the benefit of the land of which
the law recognizes him as the owner. Also the one
asserts an individual interest of personality, a claim
to exert his will and exercise his faculties freely and
hence to employ them in such building operations
upon his land as he thinks proper. What shall
society say to these claims? If we think in terms
of social interests and of giving effect to individual
claims to the extent that they coincide with or may
be identified with a social interest, we shall say that
there is a social interest in the security of acquisitions, on which our economic order rests, and a social
interest in the individual life. But that security of
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acquisitions is satisfied by use of property for the
satisfaction of wants of the owner which are consistent with social life ; or at least it is not seriously
impaired by so limiting it in order to give effect to
other wants which are consistent with social life.
And the individual life, in which there is a social interest, is a moral and social life. Hence the social
interest does not extend to exercise of individual
faculties for anti-social purposes of gratifying malice.
The moment we put the matter in terms of social life
rather than of abstract individual will, we come to
the result to which the law has been coming more and
more of late throughout the world.
Take our second case, the rise of limitations upon
freedom of contract. In a case of 1886, which was
the starting point of a long line of cases in the last
century, a mining company paid wages in orders on
a company store. The legislature forbade this, and
the question was whether the statute forbidding it
and enacting that persons employing more than a
certain number of employees should pay wages in
cash was an arbitrary interference with free contract, an unreasonable restriction of the power of
free men to make such contracts as they pleased, and
so unconstitutional and void. Looking at the matter
simply as between the abstract individual mining
operator and the abstract individual miner, and this
was the way in which the nineteenth century looked
at such things, we should probably say something like
the following: The legislative restriction does not
promote a maximum of free individual self-assertion
but on the contrary restrains such self-assertion and
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does not do this in order that others may have a like
freedom of self-assertion. Hence it is an unjustifiable
interference with a natural right. And this is exactly
what the court said in the actual case. But suppose
we think in terms of the interest of society in the individual moral and social life, the interest of society
in the human life of the individuals therein. It is no
infringement of the human dignity and no considerable interference with the full human life of the
operator to say to him that he shall pay wages only
in cash, while only by some compromise of conflicting
claims which imposes such a limitation may we secure
the human dignity of the employees and enable them
to live human lives in a civilized society. The
criterion actually employed is the one proposed by
William James as a principle of ethical philosophy"since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in
this poor world," our aim should be "to satisfy as
many as we can with the least sacrifice of other demands." Tried by a social-utilitarian criterion of
securing as many interests or as much of interests as
we may with the least sacrifice of other interests, the
restriction upon free contract is justified, and the
courts of today have come to that conclusion.
Turn now to the third case, namely, imposition of
limitations upon the power of an owner to dispose
of property. A husband earns one hundred dollars
in wages and is about to assign this product of his
toil to a "loan shark." The legislature steps in and
says to him: You shall not exercise this incident of
your ownership of this claim for wages unless your
wife is willing to join in the assignment. The nine-
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teenth century would have thought at once of an abstract free man of full age and sound mind, possessed
of a claim for wages as part of his substance, and
would have asked: How does this restriction of the
power of the owner of a claim to assign it promote a
maximum of abstract individual free self-assertion?
Is such a restriction in any way required to secure
some liberty to all by which we may justify restraint
of the liberty of this one? The answer must be in
the negative, and if such a statute had been enacted
in the eighties of the last century instead of the
second decade of the present century, it would have
fared hard in the courts. But let us look at it from
the standpoint of the social interests involved. The
husband's claim is to be subsumed under a social interest in the security of acquisitions, the wife's under
a social interest in the security of domestic institutions, the chiefest of social institutions. The infringement of the general security of acquisitions
involved in such a restriction is negligible. The control of men in general over their property is scarcely
affected thereby. On the other hand the most important of social institutions is secured and protected
against practices that sorely threaten its existence in
crowded, urban, industrial communities.
Or take the limitations upon the power of creditors to exact satisfaction which have become so common and were denounced so extravagantly by courts
when first they were enacted. These courts thought
wholly in terms of an abstract individual debtor and
an abstract individual creditor, and so the case
against such restrictions seemed simple and clear.
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But if we ask how far we may trench upon the social interest in the security of transactions, a fundamental form of the general security in a commercial
and industrial society based upon credit-if we ask
how far we may impair this interest to secure the
social interest in the individual life to the extent of
preserving a minimum human life to the debtor, our
question becomes one of a compromise that will secure as much as possible of each with the least sacrifice of either, and we obtain a rational basis for
legislation which when enacted more or less on instinct in the immediate past, has been governed too
often merely by sentiment or by pressure from classconscious persons "actually engaged in the business
of agriculture."
Just now few things excite more vigorous judicial
dissent than new examples of the notable tendency
in recent decision and in recent legislation to impose
liability in the absence of fault. A minority of the
highest court in the land see in decisions upholding
legislative imposition of such liability "a menace to
all rights, subjecting them unreservedly to considerations of policy." But new cases are adding continually. Let us take an example from legislation. In
more than one jurisdiction if the owner of an automobile allows the machine to go out upon the highway in control of a person who is not licensed to
operate a car he is liable at his peril both penally and
in damages if some injury occurs, although he is
wholly free from want of care and has taken all reasonable precautions. If an unauthorized person
took the machine out without his knowledge he is
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none the less held to answer for resulting injurie::.
How may we justify the imposition of such a liability? If we think only in terms of the individual
owner and the individual pedestrian who is run overit is not easy to do so. But if we think on the one
hand of the security of acquisitions and the individ~
ual life of the owner, with its incident of free exercise of his faculties by owning a car, and on the
other hand of the general security of life and
limb, and ask what rule will secure the most with
the least sacrifice, the matter looks very different. The whole course of the law today is palpably a result of the latter way of looking at such
questions.
Another change in the judicial and legislative attitude in the last thirty years has taken the form of
change of res communes and res nullius into res publica. As we used to think, certain things were res
communes. Although, following the language of
Roman law they were said to be incapable of ownership by anyone and their use was said to be common
to all, we had come to think rather of individual
rights of using these things and of the persons in
whom these rights resided. The law ascertained
the persons who might use these things, attributed
to them individual rights of property and fixed the
extent of such rights. Other things were res nullius.
Noone owned them for the time being, but anyone
who took possession of them intending to make them
his own might become owner by so doing. Of late
there has been an increasing tendency to treat both
as res 'publica; to hold, as some have put it, that both
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are "owned by the state in trust for the people"; to
hold that conservation and socially advantageous use
of these things, regarded as natural resources of society, requires that no one be suffered to acquire any
property in them or any property right in the use of
them, but that they be administered by the state so
as to secure the largest and widest and most beneficial use of them consistent with conserving them.
Here the social interest in the conservation of natural resources has come to be recognized and a compromise is sought not between the wills of conflicting
individual claimants to control over them but between the exigencies of that interest and those of
the interest in free exercise of individual powers and
the interest in security of acquisitions.
But enough of these illustrations. For by this time
you will have perceived the method. The jurisprudence of today catalogues or inventories individual
claims, individual wants, individual desires, as did
the jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. Only it
does not stop there and assume that these claims
inevitably call for legal recognition and legal securing in and of themselves. It goes on to ask: What
claims, what demands are involved in the existence
of the society in which these individual demands are
put forward; how far may these individual demands
be put in terms of those social interests or identified
with them, and when so subsumed under social interests, in so far as they may be so treated, what will
give the fullest effect to those social interests with
the least sacrifice? We owe this way of thinking to
Rudolf von Jhering who was the first to insist upon
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the interests which the legal order secures rather
than the legal rights by which it secures them.
Law begins by granting remedies j by allowing actions. In time we generalize from these actions and
perceive rights behind them. But as the actions are
means for vindicating rights, so the rights are means
conferred by law for securing the interests which it
recognizes. Accordingly the scheme of natural
rights, to be secured at all hazards, becomes a scheme
of interests-of human claims or wants or demands
-which we may think the law ought to protect and
secure so far as they may be protected and secured j
it becomes something for the lawmaker to take account of as of moral and political significance rather
than something for the judge to consider as of legal
significance. As was pointed out in the lecture on
the philosophy of law in the nineteenth century, prior
to Jhering all theories of law were individualist.
The purpose of law was held to be a harmonizing of
individual wills in such a way as to leave to each the
greatest possible scope for free action. Such, we
saw, was the view both of philosophical and of historical jurists. On the other hand, Jhering's is a
social theory of law. Whereas the eighteenth century conceived of law as something which the individual invoked against society, the idea of our American
bills of rights, Jhering taught that it was something
created by society, through which the individual
found a means of securing his interests, so far as society recognized them. Although much ingenious
philosophical criticism has been directed against this
theory, it has not affected the central point. The
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conception of law as a securing of interests or a protecting of relations has all but universally superseded the individualist theory.
Jhering's work is of enduring value for legal
science. The older juristic theory of law as a means
to individual liberty and of laws as limitations upon
individual wills to secure individual liberty, divorced
the jurist from the actual life of today. The jurists
of whom Jhering made fun, translated to a heaven
of juristic conceptions and seated before a machine
which brought out of each conception its nine hundred and ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and
ninety-nine logical results, have their counterpart in
American judges of the end of the last century who
insisted upon a legal theory of equality of rights and
liberty of contract in the face of notorious social and
economic facts. On the other hand, the conception
of law as a means toward social ends, the doctrine
that law exists to secure interests, social, public and
individual, requires the jurist to keep in touch with
life. Wholly abstract considerations do not suffice
to justify legal rules under such a theory. The function of legal history comes to be one of illustrating
how rules and principles have met concrete situations
in the past and of enabling us to judge how we may
deal with such situations in the present rather than
one of furnishing self-sufficient premises from which
rules are to be obtained by rigid deduction.
Three features of this social utilitarianism a.re
significant for our task of shaping the materials of
the common-law tradition to meet the purposes of
today and of tomorrow. One is the light which it
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throws on legal history. Nineteenth-century individualism wrote legal history as the record of a continually strengthening and increasing securing of the
logical deductions from individual freedom in the
form of individual rights, and hence as a product of
the pressure of individual claims or wants or desires.
But this is just what it is not. It is not too much to
say that the social interest in the general security, in
its lowest terms of an interest in peace and order,
dictated the very beginnings of law. Take, for example, the truce or peace, the most fruitful of the
institutions of Germanic law. As we find this institution in Anglo-Saxon law, one type comprises the
church peace and the peace of festivals and holydays-the exemption of the church and of these days
from prosecution of the feud or seeking of redress
by means of private war. What is behind this exemption, the pressure of individual interests calling
for public recognition and security or the social interest in social performance of the duties of religion
in a Christian society? Another type comprises the
peace of the walled town to which the country people
had fled when the kingdom was invaded and the
peace of the time when the king summoned the host
to gather under his leadership in event of war.
Here also the feud and private vengeance were suspended. Why? Is it because of the pressure of individual wants taking form in recognition of individual rights, or is it because of a social interest in the
performance of military duties essential to maintenance of society, to which the individual claims to redress must for the time being give way? Still an-
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other type comprises the peace of the market, the
peace of forest and the peace of the great highways. These places also were exempted from violent prosecution of claims to redress. Is it not clear
that the basis of this exemption is to be found not
in the pressure of individual interests but in the social
interest in the social performance of the economic
functions on which society rested? Again the peace
of the gemot or assembly of the free men for political and judicial purposes rests upon the social interest in the unimpeded functioning of the political instiutions by which the social order was maintained,
and, without going into more detail, the other phases
of the truce or peace are expressions or recognitions
of the paramount social interest in the general security.
Secondly, from a social-utilitarian standpoint the
history of law is a record of continually wider recognition and more efficacious securing of social interests. This may be seen in the development of legal
rules and doctrines, but it appears also in the development of juristic thought as to the end of the legal
order. Hippodamus of Miletus, a writer on law
and politics in the fifth century B. c., proposed a
threefold classification of law because, he said, there
were but three possible subjects of legal proceedings,
namely, insult, injury and homicide. In this statement of the scope of law the general security is the
only interest taken into account and only the simplest
phases of that interest are regarded. More than a
thousand years later the Institutes of Justinian
sought to reduce the whole law to three precepts:
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To live honorably, not to injure another, and to give
to each his own. In this statement of the scope and
subject matter of law the general security is conceived more widely, the security of acquisitions is
recognized as such, and a social interest in the general morals is added. Still a thousand years later
Bacon, if indeed the treatise on the Use of the Law
is his, could not find as much as this in the English
law of the sixteenth century. He put the ends of the
legal order as three: To secure us in property, to
secure us in life and to secure us in our reputations.
Here the general security is conceived narrowly in
terms of individual substance and of individual personality in the two simple forms of life and reputation. In the nineteenth century Bentham stated the
ends of law as four: To provide subsistence, to
maintain security, to promote abundance and to
favor equality. Here the second of the four includes two of Justinian's three and much besides.
But even Bentham's comprehensive statement is
inadequate to the multitude of claims which the law
of today recognizes and seeks to secure. For if we
look only at social interests, we may see that the
legal order endeavors to give effect to at least six
groups of claims or demands involved in the existence of civilized society. First we may put the general security, the claim or want of civilized f:;ociety
to be secure from those acts or courses of conduct
that threaten its existence. This paramount social
interest includes (I) peace and order, the first interest to receive legal recognition, (2) the general
health, recognition whereof by means of sanitary
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legislation was objected to by the positivists a gen~
eration ago, (3) the security of acquisitions and (4)
the security of transactions. The security of acqui~
sitions was recognized in Justinian's three precepts
and has been emphasized ever since. The security
of transactions is no less important in an economic
order resting upon credit, and the last century insisted upon these two phases of the general security
at the expense of the individual life. Second, there
is the security of social institutions, the claim or
want of civilized society to be secure from those acts
or courses of conduct which threaten or impede the
functioning of its fundamental institutions, domestic,
religious and political. Third, we may put the conservation of social resources, the claim or want of
civilized society that the natural media of civilized
human existence and means of satisfying human
wants in such a society shall not be wasted and shall
be used and enjoyed in a manner consistent with the
widest and most beneficial application of them to
human purposes. In a world of discovery and colo~
nizing activity, in a society of pioneers engaged in
discovering, appropriating and exploiting the resources of nature, this interest seemed negligible.
In the crowded world of today the law is constantly
taking account of it and the jus abutendi as an incident of ownership is becoming obsolete. Fourth we
may put the general morals, the claim or want of
civilized society to be secure against those acts and
courses of conduct which run counter to the moral
sentiment of the general body of those who live
therein for the time being. In primitive society this
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interest is secured through organized religion. But
the law soon takes it over. In our law today it is
secured through the common law as to misdemeanors, by definition of a multitude of statutory
offences and by the doctrine of a public policy against
things of immoral tendency. Fifth there is the interest in general progress, the claim or want of civilized
society to be secure against those acts and courses
of conduct that interfere with economic, political and
cultural progress and the claim that so far as possible individual conduct be so shaped as to conduce
to these forms of progress. The law is coming to be
full of recognitions of this interest. Lastly, sixth,
we may put the social interest in the individual human life, the claim or want of civilized society that
each individual therein be able to live a human life
according to the standards of the society, and to be
secure against those acts and courses of conduct
which interfere with the possibility of each individual's living such a life. Recognition of this interest
as such is characteristic of the law of the present and
the twentieth century is insisting upon it as strongly
as the seventeenth century insisted upon the general
morals or the nineteenth century upon the security
of acquisitions and the security of transactions.
Finally as a result of social utilitarianism the legal
reason of today in shaping rules and developing traditional premises of the legal system in order to give
effect to social interests, looks at them in terms of the
concrete situation, not in terms of the abstract claims
of abstract human beings. The purely abstract legal
reason of the nineteenth century was set forth satiri.
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cally by an English judge who, in the old days before
the divorce court, was called on to sentence a workingman convicted of bigamy. On being asked what
he had to say why sentence should not be pronounced, the accused told a moving story of how his
wife had run away with another man and left him
with a number of small children to look after while
barely earning a living by hard labor. After waiting
several years he remarried in order to provide a
proper home for the children. Mr. Justice Maule
shook his head. "My good man," said he, "the law
did not in any wise leave you without a sufficient
remedy. You should first have brought an action in
Her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas against this
man with whom, as you say, your wife went away.
In that action, after two or three years and the expenditure of two or three hundred pounds you would
have obtained a judgment against him which very
likely would have been uncollectible. You should
then have brought a suit against your wife in the
ecclesiastical court for a divorce from bed and
board, which you might have obtained in two or
three years after expenditure of two or three hundred pounds. You would then have been able to
apply to Parliament for an absolute divorce, which
you might have obtained in four or five years more
after spending four or five hundred pounds. And,"
he continued, for he saw the accused impatiently
seeking to interpose and to say something, "if you
tell me that you never had and never in your life expect to have so many pennies at one time, my answer
must be that it hath ever been the glory of England
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not to have one law for the rich and another for the
poor." Accordingly, he imposed a sentence of imprisonment for one day. But Maule, J., was ahead
of his time. Even down to the end of the last century, lawyers took seriously the existence of theoretical remedies which in practice were unavailable
and regarded the abstract justice of abstract rules as
quite enough, be the concrete results what they
might. This attitude was a natural result of measuring the law solely by standards drawn from the
law itself.
In the past century we studied law from within.
The jurists of today are studying it from without.
The past century sought to develop completely and
harmoniously the fundamental principles which jurists discovered by metaphysics or by history. The
jurists of today seek to enable and to compel lawmaking and also the interpretation and application
of legal rules, to take more account and more intelligent account, of the social facts upon which law must
proceed and to which it is to be applied. Where the
last century studied law in the abstract, they insist
upon study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines. Where the last century
prepared for legislation by study of other legislation
analytically, they insist on sociological study in connection with legal study in preparation for legislation. Where the last century held comparative law
the best foundation for wise lawmaking, they hold it
not enough to compare the laws themselves, but that
even more their social operation must be studied and
the effects which they produce, if any, when put in
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action. Where the last century studied only the
making of law, they hold it necessary to study as
well the means of making legal rules effective.
Where the last century made of legal history merely
a study of how doctrines have evolved and developed
considered solely as jural materials, they call for a
sociological legal history, a study of the social effects
which the doctrines of the law have produced in the
past and of how they have produced them. They
call for a legal history which shall not deal with rules
and doctrines apart from the economic and social
history of their time, as if the causes of change in the
law were always to be found in the legal phenomena
of the past; a legal history that shall not try to show
that the law of the past can give us an answer to
every question by systematic deduction as if it were
a system without hiatus and without antinomies.
They call for a legal history which is to show us how
the law of the past grew out of social, economic and
psychological conditions, how it accommodated itself
to them, and how far we may proceed upon that law
as a basis, or in disregard of it, with well-grounded
expectations of producing the results desired. In
these ways they strive to make effort more effective
in achieving the purposes of law. Such is the spirit
of twentieth-century jurisprudence. Such is the spirit
in which legal reason is to be employed upon our received jural materials in order to make of them instruments for realizing justice in the world of today.
But a new theory of lawmaking as a social function is not the whole of our task. Before we can
have sound theories here we need facts on which to
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build them. Even after we get sound theories, we
shall need facts to enable us to apply them. Hard
as it is for legislators to ascertain social facts, it is
even more difficult for courts with the machinery
which our judicial organization affords. As a general proposition, courts have no adequate machinery
for getting at the facts required for the exercise of
their necessary lawmaking function. As things are,
our courts must decide on the basis of matters of
general knowledge and on supposed accepted principles of uniform application. Except as counsel
furnish material in their printed arguments, a court
has no facilities for obtaining knowledge of social
facts comparable to hearings before committees, testimony of specialists who have conducted detailed
investigations, and other means of the sort available
to the legislature. Yet judges must make law as well
as apply it, and judicial reference bureaus not remotely unlike Dr. McCarthy's epoch-making contribution to practical legislative lawmaking are not unlikely to develop. The laboratories and staffs of
experts which are coming to be attached to some trio
bunals strongly suggest this. But before we can do
anything in this direction, we must provide a more
flexible judicial organization. We must give our
courts power to organize such administrative agencies as the business before them may require. The
present system, in which in many of our jurisdictions
the judges are at the mercy of elective administrative
officers over whom they have no control, is incompatible with effective handling of social facts in our
tribunals. We must abandon to some extent the

LEGAL REASON

215

hard and fast line between the judicial and the administrative involved in our legal tradition. We
must recognize that not a little of the administrative
is involved in and necessary to the effective working
of the judicial and must make a court within its
proper scope a bureau of justice, not merely a machine for grinding out judgments and written opinions. Only by a gradual process did our law evolve
a rational mode of trial for ascertainment of the
facts of particular controversies. There may be an
analogy here. Starting with purely mechanical
modes of trying facts, the law developed rational
methods. In the immediate past the social facts required for exercise of the judicial function of lawmaking have been arrived at by means which may
fairly be called mechanical. In a transition from
the mechanical lawmaking of the past century to
rational lawmaking, not the least problem is to discover a rational mode of advising the court of
facts of which it is supposed to take judicial notice.
Wha t will be the effect of all these changes upon
the spirit of our legal tradition-upon the spirit of
the common law? They are so at variance with the
course of our legal thought since the end of the
seventeenth century that some fear our whole juristic
edifice is about to be subverted. Yet the change of
front today is no more radical than that which took
place in the rise of the court of chancery, the development of equity and the consequent making
over of the strict law by an infusion of morals. And
the nineteenth century, after equity had been absorbed, could look back into the Year Books and
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recognize Choke and Brian and Fortescue, the
worthies of our medieval law, as lights of the same
system under which it was living. For through all
vicissitudes the supremacy of law, the insistence upon
law as reason to be developed by judicial experience
in the decision of causes and the refusal to take the
burden of upholding right from the concrete each
and put it wholly upon the abstract all have survived.
These ideas are realities in comparison whereof
rules and dogmas are ephemeral appearances. They
are so much a part of the mental and moral makeup
of our race, that much more than legal and political
revolutions will be required to uproot them.
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